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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SERIES.

MILITARY STUDIES

HUIDEKOPER

War 859.04

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F. L. Huidekoper.

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THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SERIES.

No. 8.

MILITARY STUDIES,

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.

KANSAS CITY, MO.:
HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO.
1904.

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"There is no genius like the genius of labor; there is no reward like that which comes from energy, system and perseverance."—*R. W Johnson, "A Soldier's Reminiscences in Peace and War."*

CONTENTS.

Preface..... 5
Did Grouchy by Disobedience of Orders Cause the Defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo?..... 9
Kolin-Rossbach-Gravelotte-Leuthen..... 21
Jena-Mars la Tour-Vionville..... 53
Napoleonic Strategy..... 97
The Campaign of Eckmühl, 1809..... 141

LIST OF MAPS.

PAGE.

The Campaign of Waterloo ... 20
The Battle of Kolin ... 30
The Battle of Rossbach ... 36
The Battle of Gravelotte ... 44
The Battle of Leuthen ... 50
The Operations of Frederick the Great ... 52
The Campaign of Jena ... 64
The Battle of Jena ... 74
The Operations about Metz ... 80
The Battle of Mars la Tour–Vionville ... 94
The Campaign of 1796 ... 132
The Campaign of 1797 ... 140
The Campaign of Eckmühl ... 168
The Manœuvres about Eckmühl ... 220
The Battle of Eckmühl ... 224
The Campaign of Wagram ... 228

PREFACE.

The marked favor with which military men received these Studies alone induced the author to submit them to the editors of the International Military Series for publication in book form. The first Study — "Did Grouchy by Disobedience of Orders Cause the Defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo?"—was selected during the winter of 1894-5 as an elective for the third of a series of four Forensics prescribed for the Junior classes at Harvard, and, after having been carefully corrected by the late John Codman Ropes, the author of the "Campaign of Waterloo," was sent at his suggestion to the *United Service Magazine*, in which it was published as the leading article in March, 1896; the second — "Kolin-Rossbach-Gravelotte-Leuthen; A Comparative Study of Oblique Attack"—was written while the author, after taking his degree at Harvard, was an undergraduate at Christ Church, Oxford, and upon his return to America appeared as the leading article in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* for March, 1899; the third—"Jena-Mars la Tour-Vionville; A Comparative Study"—was published as the leading article in the next number of the same magazine (May, 1899); the fourth—"Napoleonic Strategy"—appeared in the number for January, 1901; and the last article—"The Campaign of Eckmühl, 1809; Napoleon's Most Brilliant Manœuvres"—was divided into three parts and published in July, September, and November, 1902, in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution.*

These Studies have been reviewed with the greatest care, involving a vast amount of labor to verify every statement and every reference with scrupulous exactness. Exceptional caution has been used in revising the orders—which in all instances are the writer's own translations—and the endeavor has been made to render

them into English as literally as is consistent with clearness and force. A very few supplemental foot-notes have been added to the Studies on Waterloo and "The Campaign of Eckmühl," but it has been found necessary to make such a small number of corrections, except in the most minute details, that the Studies are substantially identical with those originally published. It was, however, found advisable to redraw the maps of the battles of Kolin, Rossbach, and Gravelotte, together with that illustrating the Manœuvres about Eckmühl; additions have also been made by the insertion of the maps of The Campaign of Waterloo, The Operations of Frederick the Great, and two for the Campaigns of 1796 and 1797, which were not published with the original articles.

It has been the author's constant aim to make these Studies as accurate as possible in every detail; the references have been selected with greatest care from the authorities generally acknowledged as the best, with the object of drawing from irrefutable sources only and of making these Studies as correct a century hence as they are to-day in the light of the authorities known at the present time. The amount of collateral reading and the perplexing questions to be solved which were requisite to attain this high ideal have been truly colossal—as will be appreciated by any one who has attempted a similar aim. This method of citing *in extenso* the sources from which the information has been derived for each important statement in the text is analogous to the system invariably employed by the best legal writers and by judges in supporting their contentions and in giving full weight to their conclusions. While this method is admirably exemplified in the late Mr. Ropes' "Campaign of Waterloo," no attempt was made in that unusually thorough work to draw attention to the mistakes made, and the manner in which they might have been avoided or rectified, by keeping constantly before the reader the un-

changing fundamental principles of Strategy which are applicable under every possible circumstance. This system is here employed for the first time and thereby renders these "Military Studies" *sui generis.*

To the late John Codman Ropes the author is deeply indebted for the help, valuable suggestions and unstinted encouragement received from that splendid character whose devotion and assistance to young men invariably won the lifelong affection and gratitude of all those who were fortunate enough to enjoy his intimate acquaintance. To Professor William Milligan Sloane also, the author of the well-known "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," the writer's debt of gratitude is no less great for the most valuable suggestions, corrections and encouragement which have enabled him to avoid the many pitfalls abounding in the political questions of the Napoleonic era. To Major-General James Harrison Wilson, Brigadier-General Wallace F. Randolph, Chief of Artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew H. Russell, Chief Ordnance Officer of the Philippines; Lieutenant-Colonel Marion P. Maus, aide-de-camp to the Lieutenant-General commanding; and Captain Edward C. Brooks, 11th Cavalry, in particular, as well as to other friends among the officers of the United States Army, the author returns his sincerest thanks for their kind interest and generous encouragement, which have stimulated him to unremitting efforts.

The writer realizes thoroughly the force of the argument with which he has so often been confronted as to the uselessness of modeling the Tactics of to-day upon those of commanders of the past, however great, but, although the improvements in ordnance, transportation, and other increasing facilities are constantly modifying Tactics, no one has yet succeeded in refuting the maxim that the fundamental principles of Strategy always have been and always will be immutable. Moreover, there is not the slightest doubt that every officer, however well versed

otherwise in Military Science, can draw much valuable information from a careful and exhaustive study of the campaigns of such generals as Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and von Moltke. "It does not take long for contemporary pygmies to hide the giants of times past; the old horizon of renown is every day covered by thicker mists and only a few colossal figures remain uneffaced."

If any officer shall glean from these pages information which may help him to unravel problems in war that had formerly perplexed him, or shall discover any point by which he will be better fitted to lead troops either in general manœuvres or in actual warfare, then the author will not consider that he has spent in vain the many arduous, but nevertheless extremely interesting, hours devoted to this labor of love.

F. L. H.

Washington, D. C., June 30th, 1903.

DID GROUCHY BY DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS CAUSE THE DEFEAT OF NAPOLEON AT WATERLOO?

DID GROUCHY BY DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS CAUSE THE DEFEAT OF NAPOLEON AT WATERLOO?

Napoleon's object was to begin the Waterloo campaign with a signal victory which would cripple, and perhaps destroy, the Prussian army. The result he knew would be the retreat of the Prussians in a direction which would separate them from the Anglo-Dutch army under the Duke of Wellington.[1] His object was not—as many writers have claimed—to wedge himself in between the two armies and to defeat first one and then the other. These two armies were scattered along the frontier of Belgium for over a hundred miles, extending from Liége to near Ghent, with a depth of almost forty miles from Charleroi to Brussels.[2] They outnumbered Napoleon's forces nearly two to one, and had he attempted to wedge himself in between them it is obvious that he would have been crushed. He therefore selected the Prussian army, because it lay in scattered divisions nearer the frontier and was accordingly the more exposed, and because it had not concentrated, as the army under Wellington was then doing.

On June 15th, 1815, the Emperor entered Flanders with an army of 124,588 men, of which 23,595 were cavalry, including the horse artillery of the reserve, and 344 guns.[3] The corps of Ziethen, which was considerably in advance of the rest of the Prussian army under Blücher, was vig-

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1 Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 31, pp. 195-198; Ropes, "Campaign of Waterloo," pp. 2-15.

2 *Vide* map facing p. 20.

3 Ropes, pp. 25-28; Charras, "Histoire de la Campagne de 1815, Waterloo" (edition of 1858), pp. 56-58, and Latour d'Auvergne, "Waterloo, Étude de la Campagne de 1815," pp. 46-51, give a total of 128,088, in which are included 3,500 non-combatants and 22,302 cavalry.

orously attacked and forced to fall back on Sombreffe, where the main body of the Prussians was concentrating.

On the afternoon of the following day—June 16th—Marshal Ney attacked the English under Wellington at Quatre Bras, but, through disobedience of orders and mismanagement, was unsuccessful in driving them from their position. The same afternoon Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Ligny. The battle was indecisive, owing to to the unfortunate blunder of a staff officer which kept d'Erlon's corps (Ney's reserve) marching and countermarching between Quatre Bras and Ligny without taking part in either battle. The Prussians, however, lost one-third of their troops and were forced to retreat before they could co-operate with the Allied army under Wellington, which was scattered from Quatre Bras westward towards Nivelles and Hal. Napoleon then detached Marshal Grouchy, who commanded the right wing of the French army, with two corps, those of Vandamme and Gérard, and ordered him to proceed to Gembloux, to pursue the Prussians, to explore their march, and to instruct him (the Emperor) respecting their manœuvres; at the same time warning him that a junction of the Prussian and the English armies would be fatal to the French.[1]

Grouchy was unnecessarily slow in taking up the pursuit. His troops, it is true, were much fatigued, but when they did get under way, their progress was so slow that they only got as far as Gembloux, and there spent the night of the 17th. For this Grouchy has been generally condemned, and, in our estimation, correctly, as the distance from St. Armand to Gembloux is *only eight miles.* Early on the morning of the 18th he received information that the Prussians were retreating on Brussels. Here again he was strangely negligent, for, although this news was received before sunrise, which at that season of the year occurs at 3:48 a. m., his troops were so slow in start-

1Ropes, pp. 210-211.

ing that Gérard's corps did not leave Gembloux until nine o'clock.[1]

At Walhain, Grouchy heard the sound of the cannon at Waterloo, and was strongly urged by Gérard to march to the aid of the Emperor.[2] The son of Grouchy says that "the commander of the Fourth Corps uttered haughtily and in a fashion little in harmony with the respect due to his chief and military discipline, the advice that the right wing ought to march to the sound of the cannon to effectuate a junction with the Emperor. Grouchy did not find the advice bad in itself, but the form employed to present it."[3] *Piqued by wounded vanity alone*, Grouchy refused to aid the Emperor to whom he owed everything. He continued his way to Wavre, where he vigorously attacked the Prussian corps under Thielemann, while he permitted the corps of Bülow, Pirch, and Ziethen to effect a junction with the English at Waterloo. Here again has Grouchy been strongly condemned for his seemingly unaccountable neglect, as he failed to make proper cavalry reconnaissance in order to ascertain the direction taken by the main body of the Prussians. In pursuing an enemy it is evident that anyone should take the trouble to find the direction in which the enemy has gone. This is just what Grouchy did *not* do. He then spent the night of the 18th at Wavre, satisfied with having held Thielemann in check, and never appeared at Waterloo at all.[4]

Meanwhile Napoleon had been very much occupied. On the afternoon of the 17th he ordered his army in pursuit of the English troops, which Ney, in direct disobedience to the orders of the Emperor, had permitted to retreat unmolested from Quatre Bras northward to Water-

1 Ropes, p. 251.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 256.

3 "Le Maréchal de Grouchy, du 16 au 19 Juin, 1815," p. 15, footnote 2, and p. 59; "Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy," tome 4, p. 75.

4 Ropes, p. 215; Siborne, "History of the War in France and Belgium, 1815," p. 404.

loo. On the following day, the 18th, Napoleon came up with the English army, which had halted before the Forest of Soignes, at Waterloo, and gave it battle. The Emperor managed the French army with his usual masterly skill, and the contest was slowly but surely going against the English when the Prussians arrived on the field of battle.[1] There were three corps under Bülow, Pirch, and Ziethen, numbering over 55,000 fresh troops, which Grouchy had permitted to march unmolested, ever since the battle of Ligny on the 16th, to join the English army. The English could be held in check, but it was absolutely necessary to fend off the Prussians. The Emperor was thus compelled to go in person towards Planchenoit, one and a half miles distant, and there to fight another battle against the Prussians—a force but little inferior to his whole army at Waterloo, and greatly superior to the troops at his disposal at Planchenoit. Ney, "the bravest of the brave," the hero of the Beresina and the awful Russian campaign, was left in command at Waterloo. Yet in spite of his almost unparalleled experience, "Ney, in fact, contributed apparently little, except his example of desperate courage, to the success of the day." He made terrible blunders just at the time when the English troops were most exhausted and about to give way.[2] The manner in which he used up all the Emperor's reserves was absolutely inexcusable. Indeed, Ney seems to have been most thoroughly demoralized and totally incapable of the splendid deeds of his former campaigns. Had Napoleon been on the field of Waterloo in person, military writers concur in the opinion that such blunders would never have been made.[3]

In the following argument we are to prove that Grouchy disobeyed orders, in that he permitted the junction of the Prussians with the English; and that had

1 Ropes, p. 307, *et seq.*
2 *Ibid.*, p. 314.
3 *Ibid.*, pp. 313, 329-330.

Grouchy obeyed orders, Napoleon would have won the battle of Waterloo.

Grouchy disobeyed the orders given him by the Emperor because, in the first place, he did not ascertain what the Prussians, retreating after the battle of Ligny, were intending to do. He did not know, until he arrived before Wavre on the afternoon of the 18th, that any of the Prussians had succeeded in effecting a junction with the English army. No valid excuse can be given for his conduct, since he should have known about the movements of the Prussians. In an order from Napoleon, dated Ligny, June 17th, he was instructed that "It is important to penetrate what the enemy is intending to do: whether they are separating themselves from the English, or whether they are intending still to unite to cover Brussels or Liége, in trying the fate of another battle."[1]

Although Grouchy's assertion that he never received this order[2] has been upheld by some writers, the evidence against it is too strong to be disregarded. Grouchy himself acknowledged that he sent to Napoleon the following reply, dated Gembloux, June 17th, in which he said, "If the mass of the Prussians is retreating on Wavre, I shall follow them in that direction, in order that they may not be able to gain Brussels, and *to separate them from Wellington*."[3] This reply corresponds exactly to the answer any one would give after receiving the Emperor's order from Ligny. It shows beyond a doubt that Grouchy received the order in question, and that, moreover, he understood it. Even if Grouchy had never received this particular order; if he had received his orders verbally from the

1Ropes, p. 210; Charras, Vol. I., p. 192. Compare Chesney, "Waterloo Lectures," p. 152.

2Grouchy, "Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815," p. 9.

3Ropes, pp 212-213; Charras, Vol. I., p. 194; Siborne, p. 186; Chesney, p. 153; Gérard, "Dernières Observations sur les Opérations de l'aile droite de l'armée française à la Bataille de Waterloo," pp. 15-16.

Emperor while at Ligny, as he claimed he did, this reply leaves no doubt that he understood Napoleon's plan of keeping the Prussians separated from the English. This is just what Grouchy did *not* do. It is only natural that, as a culprit realizing that his disobedience had decided the fate of Waterloo, of the Emperor, and of France, perhaps even of Europe, he should have denied most vehemently that he ever received this order. This case, however, is too strong against him, and we cannot but accept the overwhelming evidence of every other French officer in the campaign and of the best military writers.[1]

In the second place, Grouchy disobeyed orders, for he did not prevent the junction of the Prussians and the English. At 1 p. m., when the battle of Waterloo was in progress, Bülow's corps of the Prussians appeared on the heights of St. Lambert on the French right, coming to co-operate with the English. They were followed at 4 p. m. by Pirch's corps, and at 7:30 by Ziethen's corps, making a total of over 55,000 fresh men.[2] These troops had done absolutely no fighting since the battle of Ligny on the 16th. They had been permitted to march for nearly two days unmolested to join the English. Yet Grouchy had been fully warned that the Prussians would attempt a junction with the English army and that such a junction would be fatal to the French. If Grouchy, when he heard the cannon at Waterloo at noon on the 18th, had taken the advice of his two corps commanders, Vandamme and Gérard, and had marched for Waterloo by any of the country roads, of which there are plenty thereabouts, he could have prevented this junction. There is but one road from Wavre to St. Lambert and Planchenoit; this road leads through the defiles of the river Lasne, and along it the Prussians would be forced to advance. Had Grouchy seized this road, he could have prevented the Prussians from tak-

1 Gérard, Chesney, Quinet, and Ropes.
2 Charras, Vol. II., p 50.

ing part in the battle that day; but his personal vanity had been piqued by Gérard, and he kept on to Wavre, refusing to aid his Emperor. Like Marmont, in 1814, by his disobedience he caused the Emperor to lose his throne.

In the third place, he disobeyed orders because he never appeared at all on the field of Waterloo. He should have done so, because he received an order, dated Waterloo, June 18th, 1 p. m., to the effect that "the Emperor directs me [Marshal Soult, chief of staff] to tell you that you ought always to manœuvre in our direction. It is for you to see the place where we are, to govern yourself accordingly, and to connect our communications so as to be always prepared to fall upon any of the enemy's troops which may endeavor to annoy our right, and to destroy them. At this moment the battle is in progress on the line of Waterloo. The enemy's centre is at Mt. St. Jean; manœuvre, therefore, to join our right." (Signed) "The Marshal, the Duke of Dalmatia."

P. S.—"A letter which has just been intercepted says that General Bülow is about to attack our right flank; we believe that we see this corps on the height of St. Lambert. So lose not an instant in drawing near us and joining us, in order to crush Bülow, whom you will take in the very act."[1]

Napoleon would have won the battle of Waterloo had Grouchy prevented the junction of the Prussians with the English army, because he would not have had to fight two battles at once. Few persons realize that the so-called battle of Waterloo was in reality a double battle, somewhat like Jena and Auerstädt. Napoleon fought one battle at Waterloo against the English. On the arrival of the Prussians he was forced to go in person towards Planchenoit and there fight another battle against the Prussian army, leaving to Ney the conduct of the troops at Water-

1Latour d'Auvergne, p. 270; Siborne, p. 244; Grouchy, "Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815," p. 18.

loo. It is a well-known maxim in war that a very great or decisive victory cannot be gained unless one commander makes a serious blunder, of which the other takes immediate advantage. It is very evident that the fact of the Emperor's having to fight two battles at once, instead of concentrating his attention on one alone, enormously increased the possibility of a mistake. Moreover, Napoleon did not have the able lieutenants of his former campaigns. Désaix, Kléber, Lannes, and Bessières were dead, Masséna and Macdonald had taken the oath of allegiance to the Bourbons, and Murat had quarreled with the Emperor. Napoleon's personal attention was, therefore, imperative. To Grouchy alone all blame must be attributed, for had he prevented the union of the Prussians with the English, the Emperor would have had to fight only one battle at a time, and could have given his entire personal attention to that one battle.

In the second place, Napoleon would not have been forced to fight with 71,947 men against two armies numbering about 125,000—nearly two to one against him. He would have had 71,947 good soldiers pitted against a raw, undisciplined army of 67,661 men under the Duke of Wellington, which was not only inferior in mere numbers, but far inferior in *morale* and experience. The chances would have been greatly in favor of the French. Then, too, the French army was commanded by the acknowledged master of modern warfare, whose brilliant successes at Rivoli, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, the Borodina, and Dresden had dazzled the whole world. Until then Napoleon had never been defeated in any great decisive battle except Leipsic, and the French were strong in their confidence of the Emperor's success. Two of the best writers on the Waterloo campaign—Shaw-Kennedy and Siborne, both Englishmen —concur in saying that had Grouchy kept the Prussian army away, the English army would have been badly

beaten. This view is also held by the ablest writer of all, Mr. Ropes.

Moreover, the Emperor would have had 16,000 more reserves to hurl against the fast-weakening English army. Instead of having to use up completely two divisions of the Sixth Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, the whole of the Young Guard and three battalions of the Old and the Middle Guards, with two batteries, in checking the Prussians and holding Planchenoit — which was of great importance—Napoleon could have held them in reserve until the proper moment. Histories of Napoleon's campaigns furnish abundant examples of the victories won by the brilliant charges of the Imperial Guard under Bessières at the critical moments, of which Napoleon knew so well how to take advantage. The Imperial Guard was the finest body of veterans the world has ever seen. They had been trained in the wonderful campaigns of the greatest military genius that has ever lived, and were taught to believe themselves absolutely invincible. When we realize that had the Prussians been kept away from Waterloo, the Emperor could have used the whole of the Guard, we can then understand how different the result might have been had Grouchy obeyed orders.

Furthermore, had Napoleon been able to stay in person at Waterloo, he would have utilized to great effect the immense tactical advantage gained by the capture of La Haye-Sainte. Although it commanded the English line in such a way that a few batteries placed on its crest would have enfiladed the English line and completely demoralized it, yet Ney most unaccountably failed to seize the advantage. Any student of Napoleon's campaigns will be thoroughly convinced that the acknowledged master of modern warfare would never have made such a mistake. He had never yet failed to seize such an advantage on the field of battle, and it is scarcely probable that he would have failed at Waterloo.

Had the Prussians been prevented from uniting with the English, the best military writers, like Siborne, Shaw-Kennedy, and Ropes, concur in the opinion that the Emperor would, in all probability, have badly beaten the Duke of Wellington before 6 o'clock.[1] "To the lack of his presence at Waterloo the loss of the battle is therefore attributable," and Grouchy alone is responsible for Napoleon's enforced absence from Waterloo.

From the facts that Grouchy disobeyed the orders given him by the Emperor, and thereby permitted the union of the Prussians with the English; that the arrival of the Prussians and the non-arrival of Grouchy forced Napoleon, with a greatly inferior force, to fight two battles at the same moment and to absent himself from the field of Waterloo; and that if the Emperor had had his full force to employ against the English alone, and his own presence to direct the manœuvres in person, the result would, in the estimation of the best military writers, have been far different, lead us to conclude beyond the slightest doubt that Grouchy, by his disobedience of orders, caused the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo.

1 Ropes, pp. 313 and 327.


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KOLIN-ROSSBACH-GRAVELOTTE-LEUTHEN.

A Comparative Study of Oblique Attack.

KOLIN-ROSSBACH-GRAVELOTTE-LEUTHEN.

A Comparative Study of Oblique Attack.

"Make offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick. Read and re-read the history of their eighty-eight campaigns. Model yourself on them. It is the only way to become a great captain and to master the secrets of the art. Your genius thus enlightened will make you reject the maxims opposed to those of these great men."

"When one already knows the theory of some of the fundamental principles, it is by reading military history above all things that one can acquire the qualities necessary for a general; the rapid *coup d'oeil* and *sang froid* are the great qualities which one should receive from Nature. A profound study of history will give one all the others."

This is the advice of Napoleon and Jomini.

One of the most useful exercises in the study of war is to compare operations which resemble one another, either by the formation of the ground, the disposition of the forces, or the similarity of the movements. We can thus throw light upon the details and discover the important factor which made one set of operations a success and the other set a failure. It is the ability to recognize and make use of this same factor, whether in Grand Strategy or on the field of battle, which distinguishes a great commander.

There are four battles which bear a marked resemblance to one another—viz., Kolin, Rossbach, Gravelotte, and Leuthen. The first presents a flank march causing the defeat of the assailant without any great counter-effort upon the part of the defender; the second, a flank march bringing disaster upon the assailant, because the defender replied with a timely and vigorous counter-stroke; the

third, a flank march resulting in victory, because of the culpable negligence of the opposing commander; and the fourth, a flank march, correctly executed, which won the victory against a greatly superior enemy.

KOLIN.

June 18th, 1757.

The Prussian army crossed the passes of Bohemia on the 21st and 22nd of April, in four columns, under the command of the King, Frederick the Great, Prince Maurice, the Duke of Bevern, and Marshal Schwerin.[1] They were, fortunately, not attacked, and did not, therefore, suffer the inevitable consequences of such a division in the presence of a determined enemy. The two columns of the right, under Prince Maurice and the King, united at Lobositz and forced the Austrian commanders, Marshal Brown and the Duke of Arenberg, to retrograde on Prague. The third column, under the Duke of Bevern, was checked in the mountains by Count Königseck until the fourth column, under Schwerin, forming the extreme left, had crossed the pass of Trautenau and marched on Brandeis, to the east of Prague, thereby threatening Königseck's line of retreat and forcing him also to retrograde on Prague.

Frederick then assembled his army—46,000 infantry, 18,000 cavalry and 192 guns—and on the 4th of May attacked the Austrians, who, 61,000 strong, under the Duke of Lorraine, had taken up a position to the east of Prague. The King turned the Austrian right, and in the bloody battle of Prague—in which Schwerin was killed—the Duke of Lorraine was badly beaten and forced to retreat into Prague. The King then blockaded and besieged the city, but the siege had scarcely begun when he was menaced from the east by another Austrian army under Marshal Daun. Frederick then detached the Duke of Bevern, with a small

1 *Vide* map facing p. 52.

force, to observe Daun, who retreated to Jenckau and there established his camp, but judging that the Duke was in too great danger in the face of such superior forces, the King marched to his aid just as Bevern, attacked by Daun, was retreating on Prague. Reuniting his forces and leaving Keith to continue the siege of Prague, Frederick, after waiting two days at Kaurzim for Prince Maurice, with six battalions and ten squadrons, and for supplies from Nimburg, marched eastward, hoping to seize Swoyschitz. The march had just begun when Daun took position from Swoyschitz to Chotzemitz, thereby blocking the King's march and forcing him to change his plans.[1] Frederick then obliqued to the left to Planian. The positions of the two armies on the night before the battle was as follows:

The Austrians—35,160 infantry, 18,630 cavalry and 162 guns—coming from Kolin, faced west, their right resting on the road from Kolin to Prague, their centre before Krichenau, and their left prolonged toward the south.

The Prussians—18,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 102 guns—formed parallel to the Austrian line, their right near Kaurzim, opposite the Austrian left, and their left beyond Planian in the direction of Nimburg, where all their depots and supplies were.

In this position Frederick had the choice of two operations. If he moved to the right to attack, he covered the siege of Prague but uncovered his line of supplies, which were parallel to the Austrian front; if, on the contrary, he took position to the north of and parallel to the Kolin-Prague road, he covered his line of communications, but uncovered Prague. The King, however, decided upon a middle course—viz., to turn the Austrian right, but his movement on the 17th on Planian showed so obviously where he would attack that Daun changed front during the night.

On the morning of the 18th Frederick advanced to attack along the Kolin-Prague road. Ziethen, with 55 squad-

[1] *Vide* map, p. 30.

rons, and Hulsen, with 3 battalions of grenadiers and 4 of the reserve, formed the advanced-guard in two columns, one on the Kolin-Prague road, the second to the left of the road. The army followed in three columns, the left wing forming the heads of the columns. It was only after passing Planian that the King discovered the change in the Austrian position. He therefore halted the heads of the columns near Novimiest and the advanced-guard at Slatislunz, and proceeded to reconnoitre the Austrian position. He found Daun's army posted along the heights from Brzesan to Krzeczhorz, facing the Kolin-Prague road. The left wing, composed of the divisions of Colloredo (17 battalions and 15 squadrons), was before Porborz; the centre with the cavalry of Stampach (36 squadrons) and of Serbelloni (39 squadrons) and the infantry of Daun, behind Chotzemitz; and the right, under Wied (12 battalions and 13 squadrons), behind Krzeczhorz. Beyond the right was the reserve cavalry (49 squadrons under Nadasty) *en potence*, extending across the Kolin-Prague road. Along the front were several villages occupied by Croat skirmishers and five batteries judiciously placed. On the left near Brzesan the ground rose abruptly, while on the right there was only a gentle slope.

Frederick should obviously have attacked the left of the Austrian army near Brzesan, thereby covering both his line of communications and the siege of Prague; but, judging the position too strong, he decided to turn their right. The King then ordered Ziethen to march on Kolin, to attack the Austrian cavalry, and to support the advanced-guard. Hulsen, with seven battalions, was to carry the village of Krzeczhorz and to attack the Austrian right. The troops under Manstein and the Duke of Bevern, forming the right wing, were to be refused, and the King "strictly forbade the officers who composed it to cross the grand road to Kolin."

At 1 o'clock the movement was begun. By 3 o'clock Ziethen had routed Nadasty's cavalry and had driven it

across the valley of Radowesnitz, but had suffered so severely from the Austrian batteries and the skirmishers in the wood behind Krzeczhorz that he was forced to retrograde to Kutlirz. After several charges, all of which resulted alike, the two cavalry divisions merely observed one another and took no further part in the battle.

Hulsen, meanwhile, with the advanced-guard and 14 guns, marched on Krzeczhorz, followed by the entire army. The advanced-guard was formed in three lines, three battalions of grenadiers in the first line, the regiments of Schultz and Münchau in the second, supported by the dragoons in the third. The Austrian batteries on the right opened fire, to which the Prussians did not reply, but, pressing on to Krzeczhorz, stormed and carried the village and captured the battery posted there. Hulsen then reformed his troops, using Krzeczhorz as a *point d'appui* from which to attack the Austrian right. Daun then extended his right to the rear of Krzeczhorz, and Hulsen, fearing to be turned by the left and seeing that the remaining battalions were not supporting him, was forced to postpone his attack and to hold the village under a well-directed fire from the two batteries on the Austrian right. He therefore brought up the four battalions of the second line into the first and waited for support.

During these successful attacks of the advanced-guard the rest of the army disobeyed the King's orders. Frederick's plan was, when Hulsen should have manœuvred to turn the Austrian right, that Prince Maurice was to form the first line. This he did too soon and left a space, which the King filled from the battalions of the second line. It is quite unnecessary to discuss here the controversy between Tempelhof and von Retzow, whether the subsequent movements were due to the second battalion of Bornstedt's forming line to drive off the Croat skirmishers on its right—a movement to which the battalions following naturally conformed, since the left was the directing wing —or whether it was due to the order of the King himself,

who halted them while awaiting the result of Hulsen's attack. Suffice to say that the whole of the army behind the battalion of Bornstedt did form line and the oblique order disappeared entirely. The seven battalions in front kept on to support Hulsen, leaving a great opening in the line, which the few squadrons at Frederick's disposal were quite inadequate to fill.

The Prussian line now assumed the aspect of four disjointed attacks. The fourth echelon or right wing, under the Duke of Bevern, which should have still been refused, attacked Brzesan; the third echelon, under Manstein, which should also have been refused, attacked and carried Chotzemitz; Prince Maurice attacked the Austrian right centre; and Hulsen, reinforced by the seven battalions, carried the wood behind Krzeczhorz, drove out the Croats, and held his position in spite of the reinforcements received by the Austrian right. For two hours the Prussians held their ground by desperate valor only. The Austrian artillery, well posted and unusually well served, inflicted tremendous losses upon them and so shook their *morale* that, when the Saxon cavalry charged the column of Prince Maurice, it broke and was almost annihilated, despite the heroic efforts of Seydlitz Five of Hulsen's battalions followed Prince Maurice, Manstein was driven out of Chotzemitz by the Austrian batteries, and of the four echelons of the Prussian army, the last, under the Duke of Bevern, although surrounded at the end of the battle, alone escaped intact.

The Prussians retreated in great disorder on Nimburg, covered by cavalry of Ziethen and Seydlitz. They lost 13,700 officers and men, killed, wounded, or prisoners, and 45 guns.[1] The Austrians lost about 10,750.[2]

1Jomini, "Grandes Opérations militaires," tome 1, pp. 241-256; Decker, "Batailles et Principaux Combats de la Guerre de Sept Ans," pp. 78-93, 127-130, 359-374.

2"Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 49—the official list of Austrians killed, wounded, and captured since 1495.

The siege of Prague was at once raised, and Frederick was placed in a very critical position.

That Frederick's plan of turning the Austrian right while in its original position was sound no one can doubt. He would have covered his precious depots at Nimburg, and at the same time, since the turning movements would have taken place along the Kolin-Prague road, he would have kept open his communications with the besieging army at Prague. As soon, however, as the Austrians changed front, his plan was hopelessly at fault. If he were determined to attack near Kolin, he should have attacked the Austrian left at Brzesan with his own line formed perpendicular to the enemy's front and his center directly opposite the Austrian left wing. Daun would then have found himself in exactly the same position in relation to the King's army as Hohenlohe to Napoleon at Jena, with probably the same results.

Frederick, however, judged the Austrian left too strong. He therefore abandoned his line of operations and made a flank march in the face of an army in position, and that army greatly superior in numbers to his own. He even went so far as to form his columns of attack in plain view of the Austrian left at Brzesan. When Hulsen made his attack on Daun's right at Krzeczhorz and was unsupported, the battle then assumed the aspect of *one of the most dangerous and hazardous forms of attack—viz., that of a body of troops detached to turn an enemy without preserving intact its communication with the main army.* It is quite true that at Hohenlinden, Richepanse, by just such an isolated attack, threw the principal Austrian column into disorder and won a decisive victory for Moreau; but even at Hohenlinden the timely arrival at St. Christophe of Decaen's division alone disengaged Richepanse and prevented his being taken in the flank and rear by the Austrian column of the extreme left and himself hopelessly routed. Liegnitz, Maxen, Torgau, Rivoli, Bautzen, Kulm, and Laon furnish

striking examples of the disastrous effects of such attacks when met with any judgment. Even had Hulsen succeeded in turning the Austrian right—as he nearly did at one time—he would have found himself cut off from the main Prussian army. *"The art of war indicates that a wing must be turned or outflanked without separating the army."*[1]

Tempelhof and other Prussian writers have attributed the loss of the battle, not to the King's faulty dispositions, but to the "inaccessible heights" which they were forced to storm. These "inaccessible heights" do not, in reality, exist. They also claim that the manœuvre failed merely because one battalion, impatient of the fire of the Croat skirmishers, formed line and thus engaged the whole column following. This is scarcely correct; the King was present in person and the various generals were all thoroughly cognizant of his plan. To make such a flank march under the enemy's very eyes is to suppose that he has neither guns nor rifles, as well as to invite one's own army to make a manœuvre which the mere instinct of self-preservation must probably compel it to renounce.

Napoleon in commenting on the battle said: "His [Frederick's] plan of taking position at Kolin, fourteen leagues from Prague, put him beyond the possibility of being succored in one march by part of the blockading army, and *vice versa*."

"At the battle of Kolin it is difficult to justify his pretension of turning Daun's right by making a flank march of 3,000 toises [3.6 miles] at 5,000 toises [slightly more than 6 miles] from the heights crowned by the enemy. It is an operation so foolhardy, so contrary to the principles of war. *'Do not make a flank march before an army in position, above all when it occupies the heights at the foot of which you must defile.'* "[2]

1 Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 23d observation; Correspondance, tome 32, p. 221. The italics are ours.

2 *Ibid.*, 5th observation; Correspondance, tome 32, p. 174. The italics are ours.

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Furthermore Napoleon said: *"There are two principles of war which cannot be violated with impunity:* the first, *Never make a flank march before an enemy in position;* the second, *Preserve with care and never abandon with a light heart your line of operations."*[1]

"The partisans of the oblique order admire the manœuvre of the King at the battle of Kolin, and, although it had the most fatal consequences and caused him the loss of the battle, half of his army and two hundred guns, which forced him to raise the siege of Prague and to evacuate Bohemia, they none the less persist in their infatuation. Nothing can undeceive them. . . ."

"The loss of the battle of Kolin should be attributed to the violation of the first of the principles of which we have spoken above. If Frederick had had the affair with any other general than Daun, who, after the battle, remained twelve days in his camp singing Te Deums, he would have felt severely the consequences of having violated the principle of maintaining his communications. The remains of his army would never have regained either his depots or the army before Prague. He never could have retrieved his losses."[2]

ROSSBACH.

November 5th, 1757.

In the autumn of 1757, Frederick's position was most critical. In August the Allied army, consisting of the French under Soubise, and the forces of the German confederation under the Prince of Hildsburghausen, had invaded Saxony, besieged and captured Leipzig, hoping to drive Frederick out of the country.[3] The King therefore left an army under the Duke of Bevern to defend Silesia, united with Prince Maurice, who covered Saxony, and,

1 Napoleon, "Quelques Considérations sur la Guerre de Sept Ans," II.; Correspondance, tome 32, p. 240. The italics are ours.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 241.

3 *Vide* map facing p. 52.

marching to Erfurt, forced the Allies to retire on Eisenach. In spite of his numerical weakness, he detached Ferdinand to Magdeburg to cover his magazines, and Prince Maurice to the Elbe to observe the Austrians. The King then evacuated Gotha and took up cantonments at Buttstadt, believing that the Allies would make no further movements until the following spring.

Meanwhile the Austrians under the Duke of Lorraine had invaded Silesia, forced the Duke of Bevern back on Breslau, and had seized Berlin. Frederick accordingly left Keith with 7,000 troops to guard the Saale and to observe the Allies, and marched rapidly to the Elbe. There he learned that the Austrians had retreated and that the Allied army, reinforced by the Duc de Broglie, profiting by his absence, had crossed the Saale into Saxony and had demanded the surrender of Leipzig, which Keith refused to abandon. He therefore turned back to Leipzig, and uniting with the corps of Ferdinand and Keith, stormed Weissenfels and forced the Allies to recross the Saale, when Hildsburghausen took position opposite Weissenfels and Soubise near Merseburg.

The strategy of Frederick previous to the battle of Rossbach may well be carefully studied and compared with that of Napoleon in 1813. Never did his genius shine out more brightly than in the dark days just before Rossbach, and seldom have troops given a greater example of fidelity and endurance than the Prussians.

On the 2nd of November, Frederick crossed the Saale at Merseburg, Weissenfels, and Halle. The Allies abandoned their plan of guarding the river and assembled their forces, their right at Mücheln, their left before Zobicker, facing south.[1] The King reconnoitered their position and decided to attack them on the following day. He therefore advanced to Shortau, but, on discovering that the Allies had changed position during the night and were then

[1] *Vide* map facing p. 36.

facing east, their right at Branderode and their left on the heights of Eplingen—a very strong position—he retrograded and camped behind Shortau, his left at Rossbach and his right toward Bedra, the cavalry in the third line. The disproportion between the two armies would probably have deterred any but a Frederick from attempting a battle. The Allies numbered nearly 64,000 and 131 guns; the Prussians had only 21,600 and 80 guns, and, moreover, had made tremendous forced marches, but the King, nevertheless, judged it unwise to permit so large an army to winter on his frontiers. Soubise and Hildsburghausen, on the other hand, attributed the retrograde movement of the Prussians to fear, and determined to attack on the next day, trusting to their immense superiority to win them a decisive victory.

On the morning of the 5th, Soubise reconnoitered the King's position, and, finding the right centre too strongly posted, decided to turn his left and take him in the rear. At 11 o'clock Soubise began his march in three columns — the reserve forming the third column. The German cavalry formed the advanced-guard and the French cavalry closed the march, whose length was about three miles. The Comte de Saint-Germain was detached, with 9 battalions, 15 squadrons, and 2 batteries, to divert the Prussians and to protect the march of the Allied army. On the plateau opposite the Prussian left the army halted, and the French cavalry—52 squadrons under the Duc de Broglie—rejoined the heads of the columns.

The ground at Rossbach may be considered as a plain, with several hills sufficiently high to cover the march of an army, but not steep enough to prevent its movements or to destroy the effect of artillery. Behind one of these hills the Allied army continued its march to Bettstedt, where it turned to the eastward.

About 2 o'clock Frederick perceived that the enemy had already passed his left flank and was continuing on

toward Merseburg to take him in the rear, and to cut off his retreat from the Saale at that point. He therefore ordered Seydlitz with the cavalry—38 squadrons—to march behind the hills to the heights between Lundstedt and Reichertswerben, followed by the infantry. Mayer, with a detachment of light-horse, alone was left at Rossbach. The Allies, seeing the Prussians suddenly quit their camp, imagined that the King was in full retreat. Accordingly they hurried forward their cavalry to force Frederick into a general action, if possible.

In debouching near Reichertswerben the Prussian cavalry was discovered on the heights behind the village. The Duc de Broglie, believing it to be only a rear guard posted there to gain time and to cover the retreat of the Prussian army, at once deployed, and, although the Allied infantry was far behind, prepared to attack. So rapid, however, had been Seydlitz's march that, on passing the Janushügel and reaching the reverse slopes of the hill of Pötzen, the Allied cavalry with one battery was seen climbing the slopes of Reichertswerben. Seydlitz promptly formed line, established his artillery on the Janushügel, charged the French cavalry, and drove it back to Freiburg. Seydlitz, however, took care not to pursue too far, for at the same time as the attack—4 o'clock—the Prussian army, marching on two lines, with a battalion of grenadiers on each flank and preceded by 18 guns, had arrived at Janushügel. The King immediately ordered the guns to open fire on the left flank of the Allied cavalry, and formed his army about, echeloned on the left. The Allied cavalry, enveloped and taken in the rear by Seydlitz, and exposed to a severe artillery fire to which its own battery was unable to reply, broke and fled. Soubise then brought up five regiments of reserve cavalry to protect the deployment of the infantry. These too were charged and broken by Seydlitz, supported by Prince Henry. Seydlitz then took position on the enemy's right flank. Soubise, taken in flank by Frederick's infantry, exposed to a deadly fire

of artillery and infantry, and repeatedly charged on the other flank by Sydlitz, was unable either to hold his ground or to form on the heads of his columns. He therefore retreated between Busendorf and Lustschiff, where he attempted to form on the rears of his columns under the protection of the French cavalry, but, when charged by the ubiquitous Seydlitz and further assailed by the infantry, broke and fled, followed by the entire army.

The Prussian loss at Rossbach did not exceed 518 men, while the Allies lost 2,700, besides 5,000 prisoners, 67 guns, and a vast quantity of standards and baggage.[1]

The loss of the battle of Rossbach is due to Soubise alone. His plan of turning Frederick's left violated two of the most important maxims in war. In the first place, he completely abandoned his line of communications. In the second place, granting that he had succeeded in gaining the rear of the Prussian army and in barring it from Merseburg, he would have had to fight, still cut off from his line of communications, with an unfordable river in his rear and without seriously endangering the King's line of retreat. A victory would have produced but slight results, and a defeat could only have been more fatal than the one which he actually suffered.

In the third place, his flank march, in view of an enemy in position, was quite enough of a blunder to have lost him the battle without any other attendant circumstances. In making the wide detour through Bettstedt, behind the range of hills which partially covered his march, he neglected completely to use his cavalry to ascertain what the Prussians were doing in the meantime. He blindly took it for granted that the King would calmly await his destruction in the same position which he had occupied that morning. The battle of the Soor should have taught him a very different lesson. It is extremely probable that had Wellington left his positions at Tala-

1 Jomini, tome 1, pp. 318-328; Decker, pp. 107-115, 131-132.

vera and at Waterloo to attack, he would have been defeated; at Rossbach, however, the case was quite different. Frederick responded to every movement of the enemy by exactly the right manœuvre; he never allowed his line of communications to be threatened, and, moreover, took advantage of all accidents of the ground and of every blunder made by his adversaries.

Napoleon commented on Rossbach as follows:[1] "The result of the battle of Rossbach is not at all extraordinary. Twenty-two thousand to 26,000 Prussians, picked and well-commanded troops, ought to defeat 45,000 to 50,000 men of the forces of the Empire and of the French forces at that time, so miserably commanded; but what has been the subject of surprise and a disgrace is to have been beaten by 6 battalions and 30 squadrons. It is not an army composed of such troops, commanded by such officers, whose courage and spirit were so feeble, all of whose resources were so weak, which could undertake a flank march before an army so well constituted."

"The manœuvre of the King of Prussia was natural and merits less praise than his adversaries do blame, for it was dictated to him by this imprudent march, made without being either protected by a corps of observation in position or covered by flankers and an advanced-guard to secure them against surprise, in a hilly country and at a foggy season."

"At the battle of Rossbach the Prince of Soubise imagined that he wished to ape the oblique order. The results of them are well enough known: Frederick at Kolin lost only his army; Soubise at Rossbach lost his army and his honor."

The battle of Austerlitz affords another excellent example of a flank march bringing disaster because the enemy replied with the correct manœuvre. The Allies at-

[1] Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 8th observation; Correspondance, tome 32, p. 183, and p. 241.

tempted to turn Napoleon's right by means of three strong columns under Doctoroff, Langeron, and Przybyschewsky, and to cut his line of communications with Vienna. The Emperor had purposely abandoned to them the heights of Pratzen, the key to the position, and had weakened his right in order to put no obstacle in the way of their turning movement. Had Kutusoff held Pratzen, Napoleon would never have fought at Austerlitz, but would have retrograded to a very strong position west of Brünn.

On the morning of December 2nd, when the Emperor saw that Pratzen had been abandoned, he ordered Soult to seize and hold it, thereby cutting the Russians and Austrians in two. His left wing, under Lannes, contained and drove back the Allied right; his left centre, under Bernadotte, contained and defeated the Allied centre, under Kutusoff; while, on his extreme right, Davout, by desperate fighting, held the defiles of Mönitz, Telnitz, and Sokolnitz, and contained the heads of the turning columns until the right centre, under Soult, reinforced by the Grenadier Reserve and the Imperial Guard, fell upon their flank and rear and drove them into the Satschan ponds, where, in the breaking ice, they perished by thousands.

GRAVELOTTE.

August 18th, 1870.

On the 16th of August the advanced troops of the German armies, having crossed the Moselle southeast of Metz, had attacked Bazaine at Vionville-Mars la Tour, turned his right, and driven him off the Metz-Mars la Tour-Verdun road.[1] During the following day the Germans continued the passage of the Moselle between Corny and Pont-à-Mousson. Von Steinmetz, with the VII. and VIII. Corps, took position between the Moselle and Gorze, while the I. Corps still remained before Metz. Prince Frederick Charles, with the IX. and XII. Corps and the Guard,

[1] *Vide* map facing p. 80. For the account of the battle, *vide infra*, pp. 74-94.

extended from Gorze to Mars la Tour. The IV. Corps was ordered on Toul and the II. Corps on Pont-à-Mousson, where the Headquarters were also carried. The greatest care was taken to prevent any serious action, as the armies were not yet concentrated, and especially to restrain the fiery von Steinmetz, whose corps were in contact with the French left. So well were von Moltke's orders obeyed that Bazaine was able to take position from Gravelotte to Roncourt, not only without being hindered, but even without being seen. The German patrols brought in such conflicting reports that the Royal Headquarters were left in serious doubts as to the French movements.

About 2 p. m. on the 17th the following orders were issued from the heights south of Flavigny "To the Commanders-in-Chief of the I. and II. Armies" for the movements of the 18th:

"The II. Army will be formed at 5 o'clock to-morrow morning, the 18th, and advance in echelon from the left between the Yron and Gorze brooks (generally between Ville sur Yron and Rézonville). The VIII. Army Corps will accompany this movement on the right flank of the II. Army. Upon the VII. Army Corps will devolve, in the first instance, the duty of protecting the movements of the II. Army against any hostile enterprises from the side of Metz. His Majesty's further arrangements will depend upon the measures of the enemy. Reports will, for the present, be sent to his Majesty on the heights south of Flavigny. (Signed) *v. Moltke.*"[1]

The purport of these orders was to place the German armies in such a position that they could stop the French if they attempted to retreat on Châlons, or, by a right wheel, to contain and envelop them if they were subsequently found in position before Metz. The ignorance displayed in these dispositions regarding the French move-

[1] "The Franco-German War, 1870-71" (translated from the German Official Account by Capt. F. C. H. Clarke, R.A., 1876), Vol. II., Part 1, p. 1.

ments is surprising. At 2 o'clock on a summer's afternoon there still remained plenty of time for von Moltke to have given orders which would have contained some trustworthy information. Moreover, the remaining hours of daylight left Bazaine time to have made many movements which would have rendered these orders dangerous. One cannot help contrasting such carelessness with the habit of the first Napoleon, who issued his orders at midnight, or later, after all the reports had been received. As a result of this ignorance the German armies were forced, on the following day, to make a long flank march in the sight of the French army in position—a movement which, as we have already seen, in the two preceding studies, is one of the most dangerous in war.

At the end of the battle of Mars la Tour the German front was perpendicular to the French left wing.[1] It occupied the same position relatively that Hohenlohe did to Napoleon at Jena,[2] with the additional disadvantage of having behind it some difficult defiles. It was absolutely necessary to remedy such a faulty disposition. The Royal Headquarters at Pont-à-Mousson were much too far away from the German armies—even the German writers admit this—and the orders issued from Flavigny were founded on conjectures which subsequent events proved to be untrue. It is extremely probable that, had Bazaine been as determined and energetic as some of his corps commanders, von Moltke would have had cause to regret his precipitation.

The night before the battle the German armies after their right wheel faced northeast, and the French west. Bazaine had posted his army as follows:[3] the left wing—2nd Corps under Frossard—was in position from St. Ruffine to Point du Jour and St. Hubert; the centre—composed of

1 *Vide* map facing p. 94.
2 *Vide* map facing p. 74.
3 *Vide* map facing p. 44.

the 3rd Corps under Lebœuf and the 4th Corps under Ladmirault—extended from St. Hubert through the farms of Moscou, Leipzig, Chanterenne, and l'Envie to Amanvilliers; and the right wing—the 6th Corps under Canrobert — from Amanvillers through St. Privât-la-Montagne to Roncourt, with detachments at the Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes and Montois. Frossard's position was naturally very strong, and this able engineer, who alone fully recognized its possibilities, had judiciously strengthened it with field-works. The centre was also fairly well intrenched. The right, depending only upon the villages and unprotected by any natural obstacle, could readily be turned. Bazaine, erroneously expecting danger on his left, posted the Guard, under Bourbaki, and all his reserves, in the rear of Frossard's Corps, at Plappeville, where his headquarters were also carried. This proved, as we shall see, a great mistake.

On the morning of the 18th von Steinmetz ordered the VII. Corps from Ars to hold the Bois de Vaux opposite Frossard's position. The I. Corps, on the right bank of the Moselle, was to support the VII. Corps and enfilade the French left. The VIII. Corps, being too far away, received orders from the Royal Headquarters to support the VII. Corps. So meagre was the information received at the headquarters that at 10 o'clock von Moltke still thought the French right near Montigny-la-Grange. At 10:30 o'clock he issued the order which brought the German armies into line facing eastward.[1] Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles had arrived at the conclusion that the French would fight, and had ordered the Second Army to march northward in echelons. The XII. Corps—the Saxons under the Crown Prince, the present king—forming the first echelon, was directed on Jarny; to its right the Guard,

1 "The Franco-German War," Vol. I., Part 1, p. 16. This order opened with the sentence: "From the reports received, it may be assumed that the enemy intends to hold his position between Point du Jour and Montigny la Grange."

under Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, the second echelon, on Doncourt; and, lastly, the IX. Corps, under Manstein, marching between Rézonville, prolonged the line of the VIII. Corps to the westward. In the rear of the IX. Corps followed the III., under Alvensleben; the II. was kept in reserve, while the X. Corps, under Voigts-Rhetz, formed the reserve for the left wing.[1] This order, it is evident, was founded on the false supposition that the French right did not extend beyond Amanvillers.

The Second Army, still in doubt as to the exact position of the French right, then made a flank march under the very noses of the French army in a strong position, leaving a considerable space between its rear and the left of the First Army. Canrobert, to be sure, was ignorant of this march, but in vain did Ladmirault send urgent messages to Bazaine about the blunder committed by the Germans. Bazaine replied from his headquarters, from which he could see nothing, and without troubling himself to ascertain its truth, "that these movements were of no importance and that it was not worth while to bother about them."

It was only at 11:30 that Prince Frederick Charles, when in contact with the French, issued the orders to the IX., Guard and XII. Corps, the dispositions for which were briefly stated in the order of noon to the X. Corps:

"The enemy is in position on the Leipzig heights from the Bois de Vaux. He will be attacked there this day by the Guard Corps via Amanvillers, by the IX. Corps past La Folie, by the VII. and VIII. Corps in front. In second line follow in support—the XII. Corps upon Ste. Marie, the X. Corps upon St. Ail, the III. Corps upon Verneville, the II. Corps upon Rézonville."[2]

This order, founded on incomplete reconnaissances, was greatly modified during the battle. The IX. Corps

[1] "The Franco-German War," Vol. I., Part 1, pp. 9-10.

[2] *Ibid.*, Appendix XXIII., p. 1.

attacked Amanvillers and La Folie, the Guard was directed on St. Privât, and the XII. Corps, instead of being kept on in the second line, had to make a long flank march to the north to turn the French right, and only arrived in position late in the afternoon.

At 11:45 Manstein attacked near Verneville, bringing up the divisional and later the corps artillery. Frossard and Lebœuf, however, were on the alert, and from the woods between the farms of Chanterenne and Moscou enfiladed and took his position in reverse. The Germans held their ground, carried the farms of Chanterenne and l'Envie, and attempted to carry the farm of Champenois, but the French from La Folie and its wood annihilated the German infantry at Chanterenne, and shortly after 2 o'clock Manstein's artillery alone had lost more than 208 officers and men. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg sent a brigade of the Guard to Manstein, and, at Manstein's suggestion, marched northward, protected by four divisional batteries deployed on his flank, to attack St. Privât. He deployed his batteries in front of Habonville, to the right of the Hessians, in order to relieve Manstein, whose artillery had then—3 o'clock—been forced to retreat. The position, however, was too exposed and the losses so heavy that they were retrograded to St. Ail. The artillery of the III. Corps was ordered up to stop the enfilading fire, and under its protection the IX. Corps' artillery rallied. Nevertheless, these batteries had to be refitted, and before 4 o'clock there existed only four companies and three batteries on the front of the IX. Corps, and a very dangerous opening between it and the VIII. Corps.

Meanwhile, the First Army, under von Steinmetz, was ordered to engage Frossard with attacking, but this intrepid officer, whom the Royal Headquarters could never restrain, took it upon himself to drive back the French left. He succeeded in partly silencing Frossard's batteries, and about 3 o'clock carried the farm of St. Hubert,

after a desperate struggle in which he was forced to employ 17 companies, and during which his losses were very severe, especially in officers. The capture of St. Hubert was almost coincident with the arrival of the Hessians at the Bois de la Cusse, and of the Guard at Habonville, and with the retreat of the artillery of the IX. Corps. From one end to the other the French line was still intact, and thus far had had much the better of the fight.

The Prussian Guard had, meantime, continued its march on Ste. Marie, supported by the XII. Corps. The artillery of these two corps bombarded the village for over an hour, and at 3:30 it was carried by assault. Canrobert failed to take advantage of the consequent disorder and to use his artillery, and the Guard was thus permitted to re-form unmolested. The XII. Corps continued its march northward to turn the French right, and the Guard prepared to attack St. Privât.

When Frossard's guns had been partly silenced, von Steinmetz believed that the decisive moment had arrived. He therefore directed four batteries and von Hartmann's cavalry to advance on Point du Jour, but scarcely had these troops got into the open before they were decimated by the French batteries and chassepôts; the French, crossing their shelter trenches, drove them back with tremedous loss, but were in turn repulsed. Von Steinmetz then reformed his troops, when the II. Corps, which had marched from Pont-à-Mousson, arrived to support him. A new attack was then ordered, but Frossard's position was far too strong to be carried, and the Germans were again repulsed with considerable loss.

At the same time, on the German left, the Guard attacked St. Privât. History affords few parallels of such a murderous and fatal attack, but still the heroic Guard held its ground, awaiting the counter-attack which never was made.

The attack of the Guard was a fatal blunder. Von Pape had forewarned Prince Augustus of its folly; the XII. Corps was far away on the march to turn the French right, while the IX. Corps had suffered very heavily, was demoralized and sadly in need of support from the III. Corps, which had itself been severely handled two days previouslyat Mars la Tour. The Guard was in hopeless confusion. Between the German centre and right there was a great open space, and von Steinmetz was barely able to hold his position under Frossard's fire. The situation was the counterpart of Austerlitz, except that Canrobert, for lack of orders, had opposed the turning movement. It was the moment to charge the German centre; the French Imperial Guard and the numerous cavalry had not as yet been engaged; and Ladmirault's corps, protected by shelter-trenches, had suffered but slightly. Frossard, like Lannes at Austerlitz, could easily have contained von Steinmetz, while these other corps, supported by Lebœuf, could not have failed to achieve what Soult did when he seized the heights of Pratzen and fell upon the flanks of the turning columns. Even granting that the French right were turned, Canrobert could have played the role of Davout at the defiles of Mönitz, Telnitz, and Sokolnitz.

This all-important charge was never made; Bourbaki, with the Imperial Guard, which Bazaine had posted at Plappeville, far from his centre, arrived too late. At 7.30 St. Privât, in flames, was carried by the Prussian Guard, and from one wing to the other the battle raged fiercer than ever. The XII. Corps turned Canrobert's right and forced him to retreat in disorder. Canrobert's retreat exposed Ladmirault's flank, which he was compelled to retire, protected by Bourbaki. That night Bazaine ordered Canrobert, Ladmirault, and the Guard to Metz; Lebœuf followed at dawn, but Frossard kept his position until long after daylight. By noon all the corps of the Army of the Rhine were at Metz, from which they were unable to depart until,

through Bazaine's treachery, they were marched off to Germany as prisoners of war.

The German armies at Gravelotte numbered 203,402 men and 726 guns. The exact French force is unknown, but was probably about 133,000 and 530 guns. The Germans lost 20,163, while the French loss was less than 7,900 killed and wounded, and 4,420 prisoners—a tremendous disproportion.

At Gravelotte the Germans made a flank march in view of the French army in position; moreover, they failed to keep intact the communications between their corps. The fatal results of such failures we have seen in the first study. Kolin was won without any effort on the part of Daun, Gravelotte was lost through the culpable negligence of Bazaine. At Gravelotte the French army had, in reality, no commander-in-chief; the officer who held that rank did nothing during the entire battle, knew nothing of the relative strength of his wings, or what the Germans were doing. He cannot even be compared with Daun at Kolin.

LEUTHEN.

December 5th, 1757.

In the three previous studies we have seen the inconveniences of a flank march made in the presence of an enemy in position.

Jomini lays down the following rules for flank marches:

"First.—If it is recognized that the most advantageous attacks are those made by a concentrated effort on a single extremity of the enemy's line, it becomes indispensable to take measures to reach that extremity by masked movements leading to that end.

"Secondly.—By neglecting this precaution, the enemy can follow the march of the columns which wish to outflank him, present his front always to them, or take them themselves in flank, just as happened to the Combined Army at Rossbach.

"Thirdly.—The march should be concealed, whether by means of darkness, by favor of the ground, or finally by a false attack on the enemy's front.

"Fourthly.—The last two methods are preferable, especially when they can be united, because night movements are less sure, less regular, than those by day."[1]

Apropos of flank marches, Napoleon adds: "Do not permit between the different corps of your line a single interval where the enemy may penetrate."[2] "The art of war indicates that a wing must be turned or outflanked without separating the army."[3]

At Kolin, Rossbach, and Gravelotte these rules were none of them observed. At Kolin, Daun made some slight movements which brought about the rupture of the Prussian echelons; at Rossbach, Frederick guessed the plan of Soubise and responded with the correct manœuvre; at Gravelotte, Bazaine, immoveable behind his trenches, did not know how to profit by the opportunity offered him by the enemy's foolhardy march.

The battle of Leuthen, on the contrary, presents a flank march made under good conditions and with admirable judgment, followed by a complete victory.

Scarcely eight days after Rossbach, Frederick was again on the march. During his absence on the Saale, the Austrians under the Duke of Lorraine had invaded Silesia, besieged and captured Schweidnitz, and had defeated the Duke of Bevern at Breslau.[4] After sixteen days of hard marching, the King was again on the Oder and reunited, at Parchwitz, to his feeble forces the *débris* of Bevern's army, now under Ziethen's command. Truly Fortune seemed to have deserted Frederick entirely; his own army was re-

1 Jomini, "Traité des Grandes Opérations militaires" (original edition of 1811), tome 1, p. 154.

2 Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," Consideration II., Correspondance, tome 32, p. 243.

3 *Ibid.*, 23rd observation, p. 221.

4 *Vide* map facing p. 52.

duced to 14,000 infantry and Ziethen's to about 15,000. Schweidnitz, the most important fortress in Silesia, had fallen, and Bevern had been captured just after Breslau. Several Silesian regiments had deserted, and the defection had reached such a state that on leaving Parchwitz eleven battalions did not contain more than 400 men. He was confronted by a victorious Austrian army, numbering about 72,000 men and 167 guns, whose commander, emboldened by his success at Breslau, had determined to crush the King and his feeble forces, which were ironically called "the parade of Potsdam." The Duke of Lorraine, however, had foolishly abandoned his strong position behind the Lohe to take up an exposed p sition on the left bank of the Schweidnitz-wasser and had left behind the greater part of his artillery. The King at once perceived this blunder. He then assembled his officers, informed them of the desperate straits in which they were placed, and in touching terms appealed to their valor and loyalty.

On the following day, December 4th, Frederick left Parchwitz for Neumarkt, resolved to attack the Austrians wherever he found them. His army—32,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry and 167 guns—marched in four columns, divided normally into two lines, the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks. Each line was in turn divided into wings. The right wing formed the heads of the columns, of which the first was composed of the cavalry of the right wing; the second, of the infantry of the right wing; the third, of the infantry of the left wing; and the fourth, of the cavalry of the same wing. The columns were preceded by an advanced-guard of hussars and dragoons of the right wing and by 10 guns. This order of march is a marked contrast to the formation of the German columns at Gravelotte. Its advantage is at once apparent. The whole army could at once deploy on two lines by means of a simple conversion by each part of the line, and form line with great rapidity.

At Neumarkt a corps of 4,000 Croats was encountered, routed, and 600 prisoners taken. The King camped about Neumarkt, and during the night learned that the Austrians had taken position to the east of Borna.

On the 5th the advanced-guard, composed of the infantry and a battery of 12 guns preceded by the cavalry, formed before Kemmendorf. A detachment was sent to hold the château of Neumarkt and another to guard the baggage train. At daybreak the army was on the march, in the same order as the preceding day, and, under cover of a heavy fog, surprised the Austrian corps under Nostitz and captured Borna.[1] From Borna Frederick reconnoitered the enemy's position. He found their right resting on Nypern and the wood before that village, their centre behind Frobelnitz and Leuthen, and their left at Sagschutz, reinforced by the cavalry of Nadasty *en potence* —a front of about five miles. Their formation was peculiar in the extreme. The infantry and cavalry were mixed up indiscriminately on two lines, as if they had come there purely by chance. The King considered their right too strongly posted to attack, and decided to turn their left between Sagschutz and the swamps near Gohlau. He therefore ordered the advanced-guard, under Wedel, to engage the enemy while he changed the direction of his columns to the southeast, thereby bringing them on two lines. They were directed on Sagschutz behind a range of hills which completely masked their march.

The retreat of Nostitz from Borna and the attack of the Prussian advanced-guard near Frobelnitz convinced Count Lucchesi, who commanded the Austrian right wing, that the King would attempt to turn him near Nypern. He accordingly demanded reinforcements from Marshal Daun, who at first refused, but, seeing no Prussian troops before his centre or left, marched with all his reserves to support Lucchesi. The Prussian advanced-guard in the

1 *Vide* map facing p. 50.

meantime had been withdrawn to resume its place at the head of the army—a movement which led Daun to think that the King was retreating. By 1 o'clock Frederick's army had arrived opposite the Austrian left without its march having been discovered. Wedel formed the advanced-guard in echelons of battalions, attacked and routed the Würtemberg infantry, and captured the battery at Sagschutz. Nadasty then attempted to re-form under the protection of another battery near Gohlau, but Wedel, supported by Ziethen's hussars and the Prussian battery near Sagschutz, which enfiladed the Austrian line, attacked and routed him also.

When Daun discovered the Prussians near Sagschutz, he at once sent off the cavalry of Esterhazy and the second line of his infantry under Maguire and Angern to reinforce his left, and endeavored to form line parallel to the King's. Frederick, however, continued to advance and to turn his broken left and rear, leaving the reinforcements no time to form, but still keeping his own left refused. Daun then attempted to extend his right between Leuthen and Borna, and, withdrawing his left on Leuthen as a pivot, to re-form his army at right angles to its original position on a very deep position. The Prussian left now came into action, and the Prussian batteries, admirably served, enfiladed both faces of the salient angle formed at Leuthen. Lucchesi, with the cavalry of the Austrian right, attempted to disengage the infantry and to charge the unprotected Prussian left, but was in turn charged and routed by von Driesen, and Lucchesi was killed. Simultaneously the Prussian Guard, after desperate fighting, carried Leuthen and decided the battle. Daun endeavored a third time to re-form between Frobelnitz and Rathen, but was again turned by his right. Abandoned by his cavalry, Daun was forced to retreat on Breslau in great disorder.

At Leuthen the Prussians lost 201 officers and 6,000 men; the Austrian losses were 317 officers and 26,500 men, 116 guns, 51 standards,[1] and 4,000 baggage transports.

"The battle of Leuthen," said Napoleon,[2] "is a masterpiece of movements, of manœuvres, and of resolution; alone it would suffice to immortalize Frederick and to give him rank among the greatest generals. He attacks an army stronger than his own, in position and victorious, with an army composed partly of troops which have just been beaten, and wins a complete victory without a loss disproportionate with the result.

"*All his manoeuvres at this battle conform to the principles of war; he does not make a flank march before the enemy,* since the armies are not in sight in line of battle. The Austrian army, which learned of the approach of the King's army by the engagements of Neumarkt and Borna, waits to see him take position on the heights opposite it, and it is during this time that, protected by a hill and by fogs, and masked by his advanced-guard, the King continues his march and goes to attack the extreme left of the Austrian army.

"*He does not, moreover, violate a second principle not less sacred, that of not abandoning his line of operations; but he changes it, which is considered the most skillful manoeuvre taught by the art of war. In fact, an army which changes its line of operations deceives the enemy, who no longer knows where are its rears and the delicate points by which he can threaten it.* By his march, Frederick abandoned the line of operations by Neumarkt and took that by Upper Silesia; the boldness and the rapidity of the execution, the fearlessness of the generals and the soldiers, responded to the skillfulness of the manœuvre. In this case Daun, once engaged, did all that he should have done and did not suc-

1"Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 50.

2Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 10th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, pp. 184-185. The italics are ours.


Leuthen. — about 1 p.m.
Nypern
Sarawitz
Borna
Heide
Guckerwitz
Probelwitz
Krampitz
Radakhof
Leuthen
Lobetwitz
Sagschütz
Karlschütz
Gohlau
Strie Gwitz
Klein Gohlau
Scale
1 p.m. - the beginning of the attack
Prussians
Austrians

ceed. Three times he attempted to refuse his left and centre by a left-to-the-rear in forming line; he even advanced his right to threaten the line of operations by Neumarkt, which he still supposed to be the King's. He therefore did everything that was prescribed by such circumstances, but the Prussian cavalry and bodies of troops continually bore down upon his troops before they had had time to form. One must in truth say that the King was marvelously aided by circumstances. All the bad troops, those of the Empire, were on the left of the Austrian army. The difference between some troops and others is immense."

Hilde
Nord
Göttinge

JENA-MARS LA TOUR-VIONVILLE.

A Comparative Study.

JENA-MARS LA TOUR-VIONVILLE.

A Comparative Study.

We have seen in the preceding studies of Kolin-Rossbach-Gravelotte-Leuthen the value of comparing operations which resemble each other, whether in the formation of the ground, the disposition of the forces, or the similarity of the manœuvres, and of discovering thereby the factor which made one set of operations a success and the other a failure. In pursuing these studies two other battles, closely resembling one another, may now be considered—viz., Jena and Mars la Tour-Vionville. At Jena the Prussian army had its communications cut with Naumburg and Berlin; at Mars la Tour-Vionville the French army found its retreat on Verdun and Paris intercepted. The French army, at Jena, crossed the Saale on the left of Hohenlohe; the German army, at Mars la Tour-Vionville, crossed the Moselle on the right and, issuing from the defile of Gorze, climbed the plateau of Rézonville just as Napoleon's army climbed the defiles of the Landgrafenberg and the Schnecke. Like Tauenzein's division at Jena surprised by the fire of Gazan, the dragoons of Murat were startled by the cannonade of von Rheinbaben's Cavalry Division. There are few battles possessing so many points of resemblance. It may therefore be useful to examine carefully the details of these two battles, to compare the astonishing success of Napoleon with the uncertain victory of von Moltke, and to endeavor to discover the merits and demerits in the plans of the four commanding generals.

JENA.

October 14th, 1806.

The vacillation and inconsistency of the King of Prussia and his minister, Haugwitz, after the battle of Austerlitz, made Prussia an easy prey to the genius of Napo-

leon. The Emperor forced her into maritime war with England in March, 1806, and then, after having established the Confederacy of the Rhine, annexed Wesel (Cleve), Essen, and Verdun, and garrisoned half of Germany with his troops, had further mocked her by offering to England the Electorate of Hanover, which had been granted to Prussia by the Treaty of Schoenbrunn—December 15th, 1805—in return for her alliance with France. It was not until August 7th that this offer was communicated to the Court of Berlin by Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris. This insult brought to the irresolute King the same spasmodic determination that Bernadotte's violation of Ansbach had produced the previous October, and it was further strengthened by the unwarranted execution of the book-seller Palm. The army was ordered to prepare for war, but, with the folly characteristic of the Prussian Cabinet, the inevitable declaration was postponed until October 8th, by which time it was expected that Napoleon would be brought "onto his knees."[1] by an ultimatum, the arrogant terms of which were "nothing less than a declaration of war."[2] The time chosen was most inopportune; Napoleon's splendid "Army of Austerlitz"—the best he ever commanded—returning from Moravia, had been quartered between the Inn and the Main within easy striking distance, whereas the Russians, Prussia's only allies, were still too far distant to render any aid. The traditions of the great Frederick and military pride blinded the King and his councillors, and it was determined to take the offensive instead of falling back to the Elbe—the natural barrier from any attacks from the west—and there awaiting the Russians; but in taking the offensive the Prussians failed to attack early in September the French cantonments scattered throughout Franconia.[3] Again, as with

1Fyffe, History of Modern Europe, Vol. I, p. 325.

2Ménéval, Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 55.

3Jomini, Life of Napoleon (translated by General H. W. Halleck, 1864), Vol. II., p. 205.

the Austrians in 1805, political considerations were permitted to outweigh strategical wisdom, and, in order to cover Saxony and Hesse-Cassel and thereby obtain from them contingents for the Prussian army, it was resolved to occupy the line of the Saale.

The main Prussian army under the superannuated Duke of Brunswick (51,000 men) was in position at Erfurt; the advanced-guard under the Duke of Weimar (11,000 men) at the defiles of the Thuringian forest; the right wing under Rüchel (22,000 Westphalians) about Gotha; the left wing under Hohenlohe (44,000, including the Saxons) at Jena on the Saale, his advanced-guard under Tauenzein observing the defiles of the Upper Saale from Hof to Saalfeld; and a reserve (15,000) under the Prince of Würtemberg behind Magdeburg.[1] The general front of the army therefore faced south. The council of war, held by the King in person at Naumburg on September 24th and 25th, brought forth only conflicting opinions, in the midst of which came the astonishing news that Napoleon himself was already on the Main. An immediate advance through the Thuringian Forest was ordered, founded upon the ridiculous presumption that the Emperor would remain on the defensive south of that forest. On October 4th, when every moment was priceless, the advance was arrested, and Hohenlohe—diagnosing correctly Napoleon's obvious plan—urged the necessity of withdrawing "from Erfurt to the Saale, or even to the east of it, in order to cover the roads to Leipzig and the Elbe."[2] Two entire days were wasted in discussion, at the end of which the Duke of Brunswick's plan prevailed. He proposed "to move Hohenlohe's army by Saalfeld and his own by Gotha, so as to bring them into communication in the forest, the first at Hildsburghausen, the other at Meiningen, on the 12th of October. Tauenzein's corps, of Hohenlohe's army,

1 *Vide* map facing p. 64.

2 Fyffe, Vol. I., p. 327

toward Baireuth, was to cover the left, while Rüchel on the right was to move on Eisenach, and, by threatening Fulda, direct the attention of the French to a false point. The main armies were then to fall on the centre of the line of the Main and cut off from Mayence all the French who were in Franconia. This movement was to commence on the 10th, and, as a preliminary, the Duke of Weimar's corps was sent into the forest to reconnoitre and form the advanced-guard. On the 9th he reported that the French were concentrating about Coburg, and the Prussian general, abandoning his offensive intentions, began to concentrate his army about Weimar."[1] The utter folly of such a plan is evident. That Brunswick should have proposed to separate the two Prussian armies during this movement by such a formidable obstacle as the Thuringian Forest, especially in the face of "the Army of the Austerlitz," commanded by "the acknowledged master of modern warfare," is a proof of his utter incapacity. With an army which "was nothing but the army of Frederick the Great grown twenty years older,"[2] commanded by such a general, the campaign was lost before a battle was fought.

Napoleon, meanwhile, had not been idle; the entire country had been carefully reconnoitered, and for some weeks previously, his marshals had been secretly withdrawing the army from southern Germany and concentrating it near the Main, on territory taken from the Emperor's German enemies to form the new Confederation of the Rhine. On October 3rd the Grand Army, composed of six corps under Marshals Bernadotte (First Corps), Davout (Third Corps), Soult, Lannes, Ney, and Augereau, the Reserve Cavalry under Murat, and the Imperial Guard under Bessières and Lefébvre, was concentrated on the angular line Würzburg-Schweinfurt-Lichtenfels-Bamberg-

1Hamley, "Operations of War," p. 85.

2Fyffe, Vol. I., p. 319; Hopfner, "Der Kreig von 1806," I., p. 48.

Nuremberg.[1] From this position three routes of attack were open to the Emperor into northern Germany: the first, from Mayence and Wesel on Westphalia and Hanover, thereby avoiding the mountains; the second, to act in mass at the centre from Frankfort by Fulda, Eisenach, Gotha, and Weimar on Leipzig; and the third, in mass by the right, by Bamberg and the defiles of the Thuringian Forest on Hof, Schleitz, and Saalfeld, thereby turning the Prussian left and cutting them off from Berlin by Gera. The first would necessarily expose his design, the second would lead to no really decisive result, while the third—as Hohenlohe had guessed—was not only the best, but the only feasible plan.[2] It is true that, by acting thus on the Prussian communications, Napoleon seemed to invite attack upon his own, but this could be done with impunity by inclining from Gera to the west, thereby covering the roads of Hof, Kronach, and Coburg, which would secure his retreat into Franconia.[3]

The Emperor formed his army in three columns. The column of the right was composed of the corps of Soult and Ney; the centre of Bernadotte, Davout and the Imperial Guard, preceded by the Reserve Cavalry; and the left of Lannes and Augereau. On the 7th Napoleon received the declaration of war, and on the following day the Grand Army crossed the Saxon frontier. The column of the right was directed from Baireuth on Hof and Plauen, the centre from Bamberg by Kronach on Saalburg and Schleitz, and the left, after making a feint toward Hildsburghausen, to countermarch by Coburg on Saalfeld. That night Murat reached Lobenstein, and the Prussian detachment, observing the defile of Saalburg, fell back on Schleitz without any resistance.

On the 9th Murat drove back Tauenzein's corps at

1Hamley, p. 82.

2Jomini, Vol. II., p. 204; Hamley, pp. 82-83.

3Jomini, Vol. II., p. 207.

Schleitz; the head of the right column (Soult) reached Plauen, the centre crossed the Saale at Saalburg, the head of the left (Lannes) was near Grafenthal, and the Emperor's headquarters were carried to Schleitz. On the 10th the centre passed Auma moving on Gera, and Lannes encountered part of the advanced-guard of Hohenlohe's army at Saalfeld, drove it back to Jena, and captured its artillery and all its magazines. The disastrous moral effect of this action, in which Prince Louis Ferdinand—the hero of the war party—was killed, was tremendous, and Hohenlohe's army at Jena became panic-stricken. The same day Napoleon wrote from Ebersdorf to Soult:

* * * * "Here is what seems to me most evident. It appears that the Prussians had planned to attack; that their left was to debouch by Jena, Saalfeld, and Coburg; that Prince Hohenlohe had his headquarters at Jena and Prince Louis at Saalfeld; the other column has debouched by Meiningen on Fulda, so that I am led to think that you have no one before you, perhaps not 10,000 men, until Dresden. If you can crush one of their corps, do so. Here are, however, my plans for to-day: I cannot march, I have too much in the rear. I shall push my advanced-guard to Auma. I have reconnoitered a good battle-field for 80,000 or 100,000 men in front of Schleitz. I am directing Marshal Ney on Tanna; he is two leagues [*i. e.*, 4.8 miles] from Schleitz. You yourself are not too far off at Plauen to be unable to arrive there in twenty-four hours.

"On the 5th the Prussian army had not yet made a movement on Thuringia, so that I believe it a great number of days in the rear. My junction with my left is not yet made, or merely by cavalry posts, which signify nothing.

"Marshal Lannes will not arrive at Saalfeld until to-day, unless the enemy be not there in considerable force. Thus the days of the 10th and 11th will be lost. If my

junction is made, I shall push forward to Neustadt and Triptis. After that, whatever the enemy does, if he attacks me, I shall be delighted; if he permits himself to be attacked, I will not fail him. If he moves by Magdeburg, you will be at Dresden before him. I greatly desire a battle. If he wanted to attack me, it is because he has great confidence in his forces; accordingly it is not impossible that he may attack me. It is the most agreeable thing he can do me. After this battle I shall be at Dresden or Berlin before him." * * * *

"Until this hour it seems to me that the campaign is beginning under the happiest auspices." * * * *[1]

The purport of this letter was the evident belief that the Duke of Brunswick was so committed to his advance that he would be unable to rejoin the left wing on the Saale, and that Gera—upon which Soult's advance had driven the Saxon cavalry—would be the point of concentration of Hohenlohe's corps, with which alone he would have to deal. If they both retreated together on Magdeburg, he purposed to push Soult on Dresden. The Emperor accordingly pivoted his left on the Saale and swung his right around in order to crush Hohenlohe and to cut off both him and Brunswick from the Elbe and the Russians, except by the long circuit through Magdeburg. His plan was, therefore, similar to that of the previous year, when he crossed the Danube at Donauwörth and, pivoting on his right, swung his left—of which Soult formed the extreme corps—through Augsburg, Landsberg, Memmingen and Laupheim to shut Mack up in Ulm.

In reasoning thus Napoleon made two mistakes: he supposed that Hohenlohe was about to attack him, and that the Prussian army was concentrating about Gera.[2] In the latter supposition the Emperor gave Brunswick infinitely more credit for military judgment than the

1 Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 13, No. 10,977, pp. 332-334.

2 Hamley, p. 94.

Prussian ever exhibited during the entire campaign. There were three lines of retreat from Weimar and Erfurt to the Elbe; the shortest by Jena and Gera on Dresden, the second by Naumburg on Leipzig, and the longest by Halle on Magdeburg. Since the Prussians had renounced the offensive movement first agreed upon, it could be reasonably supposed that, in remaining upon the defensive or in retreating, they would endeavor to keep open their shortest line of retreat to the Elbe and their Russian allies, and for this purpose Gera would be the obvious point of concentration. Brunswick, however, showed no such judgment, and on the morning of the 10th his left was turned—a fact which he did not actually discover until three days later.

On the 11th Lannes reached Neustadt, followed by Augereau, and Soult Gera. Between them, at Weida, was Davout, and the army, thus concentrated between the Saale and the Elster, covered the defiles, cut the Saxons off from Dresden, and captured most of their baggage. On the 12th the Emperor learned that Brunswick had countermarched from Erfurt to Weimar, and ordered Lannes and Augereau on Jena to close the passage of the Saale. Murat—whose light cavalry had been pushed on to Leipzig—and Davout were directed on Naumburg, on which point Bernadotte was also ordered by way of Gera, where he passed the head of Soult's column and where Napoleon's headquarters were, while Ney was kept in second line at Auma to reinforce either point. The centre line became the right, and the French army occupied the line Kahla-Jena-Naumburg, parallel to the Saale, Augereau being on the left bank at Kahla. It was now necessary to shorten the marches of the corps, in order to rest the worn-out troops, to collect the stragglers, and to mass on the heads of the columns. It was also imperative to learn the enemy's intentions. In fact, as the Emperor wrote Lannes that morning at 4 o'clock from

Auma, "All the letters intercepted show that the enemy has lost his head. They hold council day and night, and do not know what course to take. You will see that my army is united, that I bar them from the road to Dresden. The object to-day is to attack all we meet, in order to beat the enemy in detail and while he is assembling. When I say that one must attack all one meets, I mean that one must attack everything on the march, and not in a position which renders it too superior."[1]

On the 12th, after an incredible degree of vacillation, the Prussians renounced all hope of offensive movement, and it was decided that Brunswick—whose army was concentrated about Weimar, with the exception of the advanced-guard, which had not yet rejoined—should retreat on Magdeburg by Apolda and Kosen, where he intended to hold the defile on the left bank and to secure the passage of the Unstrutt. Hohenlohe, who had concentrated between Weimar and Jena, was to cover the movement to the Elbe, which was further protected by the Saale from any attack from the right bank of the latter river. Rüchel, at Weimar, was to rally to him the advanced-guard and rejoin the main army, covered by Hohenlohe. It is quite evident from this plan that the Prussian generals were laboring under the delusion that Napoleon's army was advancing by both banks. Hohenlohe's front faced south and he had obviously been deceived by Lannes' feint on Saalfeld; Tauenzein, alone, was thrown back at an angle on the heights above Jena to observe the passage there, to which heights Lannes had pushed his troops that day, after seizing the town.

On the morning of the 13th, at 7 o'clock, the Emperor wrote Murat: "If the enemy is at Weimar, my plan is to direct my army on Weimar, and to attack him on the 16th."[2] At 9 o'clock, after receiving from his marshals

1 Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 13, No. 10,982, pp. 336-337.

2 *Ibid.*, No. 10,995, pp. 346-347.

the reports of the previous day, especially that of Lannes, by which he learned Hohenlohe's exact position, he again wrote Murat:

"At last the veil is torn away. The enemy is beginning his retreat on Magdeburg. *Move as quickly as possible with Bernadotte's corps on Dornburg,*[1] a large town situated between Jena and Naumburg. * * * I believe that the enemy will try to attack Marshal Lannes at Jena, or to move by there. If he attacks Marshal Lannes, your position at Dornburg will permit you to support him. I shall be at Jena at 2 p. m." * * *[2]

At 3 o'clock, when Napoleon was still four miles from Jena, he heard the firing caused by Lannes' skirmishers, who were then making a successful attempt to carry the plateau northwest of Jena. He at once dismounted and dictated to Berthier the following characteristic orders:

"The Major-General[3] to Marshal Lefébvre (Imperial Guard):

"At the bivouac at 1½ leagues from Jena, 3 p. m.

"It appears, Marshal, that the enemy will attack the army this evening or certainly to-morrow morning. At this moment his outposts are firing. The Emperor orders you to advance as quickly as possible. Send the same advice to Marshal Soult, who follows you." * * *

To Soult: "The Emperor directs you to be told, Marshal, that the enemy is marching in force on Jena. It is even believed that he wishes to attack this evening. Hasten your march on Jena."

To Ney: "The enemy, with 40,000 men, is between Weimar and Jena. Push with all your army corps as far as you can on Jena, in order to be at Jena early to-morrow. * * * Try to be at Jena this evening in per-

1The italics are ours.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 13, No. 11,000, p. 348.

3The title at the time for the Adjutant-General.


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son, in order to be at the reconnaissance which the Emperor will make on the enemy this evening."[1]

To Davout: "The Emperor, Marshal, learns, at one league [2.4 miles] from Jena, that the enemy is in the presence of Marshal Lannes with nearly 50,000 men. The Marshal even believes that he will be attacked this evening; if you hear an attack on Jena this evening, you should manœuvre on the enemy and outflank his left. If there is no attack at Jena this evening, you will receive to-night the Emperor's dispositions for the day to-morrow."[2]

We cite these orders, not only because they are characteristic, but because they show that the Emperor was never surprised, for the reason that each hour he asked himself, "What should I do if I were attacked in front, on my right flank, on my left flank, in my rear?" "A great captain," said Napoleon, "ought to ask himself several times a day: "If the enemy's army appeared on my front, on my right, or on my left, what shall I do?"[3] Accordingly, at the first sound of the guns, he instantly gave orders to mass his army corps. The rest which he had that morning intended to give his troops was out of all question—a battle was impending.

The Emperor at once remounted and arrived, at 4 o'clock, at Jena.[4] Following the divisions of Suchet and Gazan (Lannes' corps), he climbed the heights beyond Jena and from the Landgrafenberg, saw Hohenlohe's army deployed on three lines on the heights north of the Weimar road. Rüchel, at Weimar, was, however, hidden from view, as well as Brunswick's army, which was moving in five di-

1 *Vide*, also, Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 13, No. 11,003, p. 349.

2 P. Foucart, "Campagne de Prusse, 1806, Iéna," pp. 585-586—an admirable and most exhaustive work.

3 Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, pp. 338-339. *Vide* also *infra*, p. 111.

4 *Vide* map facing p. 74.

visions on Kosen by the valley of the Ilm. He therefore believed that the entire Prussian army was before him, and determined to fight it on the following day. Murat, who had been directed to assemble his cavalry at Dornburg, was ordered on Jena. In addition to the orders sent Davout to close the passage of the Saale at Naumburg, and to Bernadotte to move on Dornburg to bar the passage there, supplementary orders were sent Davout to cross the river and to come down on the Prussian rear by Apolda. This movement the Emperor considered would permit Davout to rejoin him as quickly and much more effectively than by the right bank. To this was added: "If the Prince of Ponte-Corvo [Bernadotte] is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor trusts that he will be in the position at Dornburg which he has indicated to him."[1]

That night the Emperor, from the Landgrafenberg, hastened the march of his troops, especially the artillery, which was far in the rear and further delayed by the wretched condition of the roads. "Part of the night was spent in widening a deep defile by which to convey pieces of artillery"[2] to the heights, and at 10 p. m. the Guard was made to climb the steep path to the plateau of Closewitz, which it was imperative to occupy as a sort of *tête-de-pont*, to enable the army to ascend the mountain and to debouch from the difficult defile of the Saale.[3] Lannes and

1The "*Journal des Opérations du* 3e *Corps*" gives the exact phraseology of this extremely important sentence (*vide* Foucart, pp. 669-670). Lanfrey (nouvelle édition, 1886), tome 3, p. 486, gives substantially the same purport, *viz.*: "If the Prince of Ponte-Corvo [Bernadotte] is in your neighborhood, you may march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will already have marched for Dornburg with the cavalry of the Grand Duke of Berg." [Murat.]

Alison, Vol. II., p. 446—inaccurate as usual in quoting Berthier's orders—gives quite a different version, and this same version has also been followed by Hamley, p. 89.

Foucart declares (p. 669 and footnote, p. 604) that this order is not copied into Berthier's Register.

2Ménéval, Vol. II., p. 57.

3Jomini, Vol. II., p. 210.

Augereau were already at Jena, where Soult arrived late at night; Murat's cavalry was at Dornburg and Ney at Roda. Davout reached Naumburg, and Bernadotte, whom Napoleon supposed at Dornburg — where he had been at noon—to support Murat, was also at Naumburg. On returning to his bivouac, the Emperor dictated the short order of battle for the next day. Lannes was to attack at the centre, supported on the right by Ney, who had not yet arrived and for whom a place was reserved. Soult was directed to climb the heights to the right of Lannes by the ravine of Lobstedt. On the left of Lannes, Augereau was to follow the Weimar road along the Mühlthal; one of his divisions was to climb the Schnecke to turn the Prussian right. The Imperial Guard was placed in reserve, followed by the heavy cavalry.[1]

As we have seen, the French army, coming from the south, had occupied the principal villages on the Saale—viz., Jena, Dornburg and Naumburg. To attack it was necessary for it to cross the river, which, although fordable at those several places, runs in a valley enclosed by steep hills; on the left bank especially, where the enemy was posted, the heights, crowned by woods, could only be ascended by narrow ravines. Had the Prussians, warned by the skirmishes at Jena and Naumburg on the 13th, taken position in force on these heights, it would have been impossible to dislodge them, and the chances of a partial reverse — in which case the attacking army would be thrown back into the Saale—were too great for any general to undertake. The attempt, therefore, seemed impracticable, but Hohenlohe, on the afternoon of the 13th, judging that he was still menaced by Lannes and Augereau only, and that the main French army was moving on Leipzig and Dresden, did not even trouble himself to drive Gazan's division from the Landgrafenberg, but merely reinforced his left by sending to the defile of

[1] Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 13, No. 11,004, pp. 350-351.

Dornburg the division of Holzendorf, which failed to discover any French troops there.

Napoleon, from the heights, took in the situation at a glance and, as we have seen, at once ordered up the Guard to secure the plateau and to cover the debouching of the other corps.

The King and the Duke of Brunswick, however, still believing that the French would issue from the defiles of the Thuringerwald, failed utterly to take advantage of the very favorable ground, which, if properly occupied, would have forced the Emperor to renounce his plan of crossing the Saale under their very eyes. Their failure is entirely unaccountable, since the action at Schleitz, the skirmishes at Jena, the appearance of Davout at Naumburg, the absence of any French troops on the Saalfeld-Weimar road on their right, and their line of communications with Leipzig cut by Murat's cavalry should have exposed completely the intentions of Napoleon. Hohenlohe had guessed the Emperor's plan nine days before,[1] but it was only on the 13th that Brunswick, then convinced that he would be turned by the left, began his retreat on Magdeburg. Again he failed to take ordinary precautions, and, in spite of the fears raised in his mind by the presence of the French at Dornburg and Naumburg, he neglected to guard those passages and to secure his flank. Hohenlohe, left behind to cover his retreat, was charged to defend to the last *the defiles of Thuringia!* At the close of the 13th, the Prussian army, which had at last conformed to the French advance, was divided into three parts: Brunswick with five divisions (51,000 men) was near Auerstadt, separated from Hohenlohe by thirteen miles of muddy roads hopelessly incumbered by the baggage of the Court as well as of the army; Hohenlohe, with 44,000 men, was encamped on the heights between Jena

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 57.

and Cappellendorf, still facing south, and Rüchel, with 22,000 Westphalians, was still at Weimar.

The result of these false suppositions and preconceived ideas was that Hohenlohe's army found itself placed in *the most dangerous position in war—viz., the position in which the enemy's line is perpendicular to, and his centre opposite, the prolongation of the front of an army.* The danger of such a position is obvious. The army must deploy to the right and left of the wing attacked—this deployment takes time; it is difficult to make under fire, and is frequently further embarrassed by the accidents of the ground. In the meantime the enemy can, by throwing his entire weight on this wing, take it in front and reverse and roll it back upon the rest of the army. When the centre arrives, the wing attacked no longer exists and the other wing is still more powerless to support it. The army is thus irrevocably beaten in detail.

Such was the position of the Prussian army. As soon as Lannes had established touch with it at Jena, it was imperative for Napoleon to concentrate on its left flank. He accordingly hurried up the bulk of his army corps, and by midnight of the 13th had concentrated about Jena the corps of Lannes, Augereau, Soult, and the Guard—a total of 90,000 men. Close behind was Ney, with 20,000 men, at Roda, and Murat, with 20,000 cavalry, at Dornburg, while on the extreme right at Naumburg were Davout and Bernadotte, with 47,000 men, destined to turn the Prussian left.

The valley of the Saale, enclosed on the south by the Thuringian Mountains, widens between Jena and Dornburg, from which latter village it becomes a narrow rocky gorge to Naumburg. There are fords at Jena, Lobstedt, Dornburg and Naumburg, the latter two being the shallower and more easily guarded. Near Jena, the right bank, flat near the river, is relieved by gentle slopes, while on the left bank the heights, which can be ascended only by

difficult winding ravines, rise steeply from the edge of the river to the plateau of Closewitz. This plateau, following the angle made by the Saale and the road to Weimar and completely dominating the village of Jena, reaches its highest point about one mile northwest of the village in a hill called the Landgrafenberg, subsequently named the Napoleonsberg. From Jena, the only road of any consequence—the Weimar road—follows the narrow and difficult Mühlthal for two miles, when it profits by the gentlest slopes to ascend the heights by means of several turns called the Schnecke. From this point the heights diminish in size and steepness until, near Weimar, they become merely undulating plains. South of the Mühlthal lies the forest of Jena, while the plateau is only slightly wooded. About 500 yards south of the Landgrafenberg is the village of Kospoda, and a mile to the north the larger village of Closewitz. On an arc extending from the Weimar road northeast to the Saale through a slight depression lie the villages of Isserstadt, Vierzehn-Heiligen, Altengönne and Stolzendorf, while midway between Jena and Weimar, about one mile north of the high road, is Cappellendorf.

On the afternoon of the 13th Hohenlohe's army was posted as follows: The left under Tauenzein extended through Kospoda and Closewitz on the plateau, the Saxons were massed opposite the Schnecke, the only point it was thought the French could issue from Jena, while the main army was encamped between Romstedt and the Weimar road, east of Cappellendorf, where the headquarters were.

The battle was begun by Lannes about daybreak in the midst of a thick fog. Gazan's division, on the left, attacked the village of Kospoda, and Suchet, on the right, the village of Closewitz, driving Tauenzein's corps back on Vierzehn-Heiligen. The attack was cleverly managed, but about 8.30 Napoleon ordered it to be suspended. It had been necessary to attack early in order to prevent Hohen-

lohe from coming to the rescue of his menaced wing and rendering impossible the deployment of the French corps on the too narrow plateau won the day before, but sufficient space had, at this hour, been gained to permit the desired deployment. Ney, however, had not yet arrived, and it was also imperative to give Davout and Bernadotte sufficient time to cross the Saale and to come down on the Prussian flank and rear. The lack of artillery also formed a not less cogent reason for delaying further attacks, and the Emperor returned to the Landgrafenberg for breakfast. He had scarcely finished when the firing began again with renewed vigor, and hurrying forward to ascertain the reason for this disobedience of his orders, he discovered Ney engaged with Hohenlohe.

Meanwhile, on the right, Soult had crossed the ford of Lobstedt and had climbed the ravine in the face of Holzendorf, who had been sent the previous day to observe the ford of Dornburg and who had been forced out to the French right by Lannes' attack. On the left, Heudelet (2nd division of Augereau's corps), after making a false attack along the Weimar road by the Mühlthal, was climbing the plateau—where he had been ordered to unite with Desjardin's division from the Landgrafenberg—vigorously opposed by the Saxons.[1] In the centre, opposite the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, was Ney, who, in an excess of zeal, had hurried up in advance of his army corps with 3,000 picked men, and, arriving at 9 o'clock opposite that village, had at once proceeded to engage Hohenlohe's entire army, which, at the sound of Tauenzein's guns, had raised its camp at Cappellendorf and advanced to meet the French. Ney's impatience very nearly produced a disaster. When Hohenlohe discovered, to his surprise, that he was in the presence of the whole of the French army, he immediately ordered Grawert to retake the positions abandoned by Tauenzein and supported him by five

1Compare Marbot, Mémoires, tome 1, pp. 298-299.

battalions in reserve. A Saxon division was sent to hold the ravines by which Augereau should arrive[1] and Holzendorf was directed to drive in the French right. Rüchel was ordered up from Weimar, but, instead of waiting for him while Grawert retarded the French centre, Hohenlohe advanced in person with all his cavalry and artillery against Ney. The Marshal charged the Prussian horse artillery, but was quickly driven back and almost surrounded by the enemy's cuirassiers. To check this critical movement, Napoleon had only two regiments of light cavalry and the Guard, the latter of which he did not dare to employ, except in case of direst need, so early in the battle. The other corps had not yet arrived. Soult, on the right, and Augereau, on the left, were struggling with the difficulties of the ground, and the left-centre was open. Bertrand was ordered to charge with the light cavalry to take the pressure off Ney's infantry; Gazan's division was extended westward, and by a desperate charge carried Vierzehn-Heiligen. At the same time, Augereau's divisions, reuniting on the plateau, drove the Saxons out of Kospoda and the wood of Isserstadt, and, on the extreme right, Soult carried Stolzendorf.

The result of the battle was no longer in the slightest doubt. Hohenlohe, driven out of all the villages forming *points d'appui* along his front, overwhelmed by the French artillery, outflanked on both wings, attacked in front, and separated from Holzendorf, sent urgent messages to hasten the arrival of Rüchel, but it was then too late and Rüchel's usefulness had disappeared. Ney's corps had traversed Jena and Soult's rear divisions had all come up. The Emperor then ordered a general advance, joined by Murat's cavalry, which had arrived from Dornburg. The Prussian army was everywhere driven back and completely routed, when Rüchel, with the Westphalians, arrived from Weimar. Unable to take the French in the flank, he met

[1] Compare Marbot, Mémoires, tome 1, p. 299

them in front before the village of Romstadt; his attack, desperate though it was, proved absolutely hopeless, and Rüchel himself was killed and his troops were enveloped and swept away in the rout of the Prussian army.

Meanwhile on the extreme right of the French, Davout had crossed the Saale at Naumburg and marched on Apolda to turn the Prussian left. Bernadotte declined to march with him,[1] but, insisting on the literal interpretation of Berthier's order of the 13th, in which the Emperor hoped that "he will be in the position at Dornburg which he has indicated to him,"[2] moved by the left bank through Camburg on Dornburg, where he crossed the river. About 8 a. m. Davout unexpectedly came upon the entire army of the Duke of Brunswick on the heights of Hassenhausen near Auerstädt. "Fortune had given to the Prussian commander an extraordinary chance of retrieving what strategy had lost," and if the King and Brunswick had conducted the battle with ordinary skill and had thrown themselves in force on Davout, the Marshal must infallibly have been routed. The safety of the Prussian retreat to Leipzig and the Elbe would thereby have been assured[3] and a totally different result given to the campaign. This is quite true, but in advancing such suppositions we must carefully remember that Bernadotte disobeyed orders and took part in neither battle—fortunately with no such disastrous effects as d'Erlon's similar failure to take part either in the battles of Quatre Bras or Ligny nine years later. Had Bernadotte been at Dornburg that morning—as Napoleon supposed him to be—or had he marched with Davout—as the Emperor had ordered him to do—Davout would never have had to fight against twice his numbers. Although the march of Brunswick was unknown to Napoleon and formed no factor in his plan, yet his victory was assured provided his orders were obeyed. In the first

1 *Vide* also Ménéval, Vol. II., p. 58.

2 *Vide supra*, p. 66.

3 Fyffe, Vol. I., p. 328.

place, had Bernadotte marched with Davout, it may reasonably be assumed that they would have been able, with their 47,000 men, at least to contain Brunswick's force of 51,000 until the arrival of the Emperor with his victorious army on their flank, especially since Brunswick had placed no obstacle in the way of their crossing the Saale at Naumburg. In the second place, had Bernadotte been at Dornburg, he would have been in position to keep up constant communication with Davout and to support him if necessary. Davout would therefore never have been forced to make the most dangerous of all movements—viz., that of being detached to turn a wing without keeping up communications with the main army.[1]

The desperate battle of Auerstädt, in which Brunswick and many of the Prussian generals were killed, gained for the Marshal the title of Duke and won for him and his three heroic divisions—Gudin, Morand and Friant—undying fame. At the close of the battle, the Prussian army was not only prevented from retreating on Kosen, but routed. It retreated toward Weimar to join Hohenlohe, but was intercepted near Apolda by Bernadotte, who arrived there toward evening. The army then turned north in confusion until it met the *débris* of Hohenlohe's force flying in hopeless rout before Murat's cavalry. The panic which ensued is almost without parallel. Napoleon's pursuit was masterful, and when, on November 8th, Magdeburg surrendered to Ney, the entire Prussian army with all its fortresses was in the Emperor's hands and the military power of Prussia was annihilated.

MARS-LA TOUR-VIONVILLE.

August 16th, 1870.

The battles of Weissenburg, Wörth (Reichshofen) and Spicheren (Saarbrücken) checked the advance "To Berlin"

1 Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 23rd observation Compare *supra*, p. 46, and *infra*, p. 112.

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
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with a suddenness totally unexpected by the French. On the 13th of August, Marshal Bazaine ordered the French army to retreat westward; this retreat was interrupted by the battle of Colombey-Nouilly, which both sides claimed as a victory, although there can be no reasonable doubt that the Germans had much the better of the fight. On the 15th, the French resumed their retreat, under the protection of the cavalry divisions of Du Barail and Forton, across the Moselle and along the two main roads to the Meuse west of Gravelotte, where the Imperial Headquarters were carried. Great delay was produced by insufficient bridging of the river and by the tremendous amount of unnecessary baggage, in addition to the inevitable confusion consequent upon Bazaine's orders for the march. Early in the morning Bazaine issued the following extraordinarily laconic orders for the withdrawal of a large army from the presence of an enemy and across a river insufficiently bridged:

"The First and Third Divisions of Reserve Cavalry will quit their camps at 1 p. m. to move in the direction of Verdun, the First Division by the road Gravelotte-Conflans, the Third Division by the road Gravelotte-Mars la Tour. The Third and Fourth Corps will take the former of these roads, the Second and Sixth the latter. The Guard will follow the Sixth Corps."

This order was received by the various corps while in the following positions: The Second Corps (Frossard) at Peltre and Magny, the Sixth Corps (Canrobert) between the Moselle and the Seille, the Imperial Guard (Bourbaki) about Bellecroix, the Third Corps (Lebœuf) about Grigy, Colombey, and Nouilly, and the Fourth Corps (Ladmirault) facing the Germans before Metz.[1]

A glance at the map will be quite sufficient to explain why this order was produced at Bazaine's trial as evidence of the Marshal's utter incapacity.

[1] *Vide* map facing p. 80.

That night the French army bivouacked west of Gravelotte, its front perpendicular to the Metz-Verdun road and facing west. To the south of the road, between Vionville and Rézonville, lay the Second Corps, its front prolonged to the north of the road by the Sixth Corps; the Third Corps was between Verneville and St. Marcel, the Fourth Corps—forming the extreme right—was marching on Doncourt, while the Guard was in second line near Gravelotte and Malmaison.

On the morning of the 15th, between 10 and 11 o'clock, the clouds of dust arising beyond Metz warned the Germans of the French retreat westward. At 11 a. m. von Moltke issued, from the heights of Flanville, the following order to Prince Frederick Charles, the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army:

"French completely thrown back into Metz, and probably by this time in full retreat to Verdun. *All* three corps of the right wing (III., IX., and XII.) are now placed at the free disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. The XII. is already on the march to Noméný."[1]

The general idea of the Royal Headquarters was to move the Second Army with all possible speed to the Meuse and to intercept the French retreat, if possible, before Bazaine could take position on that river. This idea was founded upon the supposition that the French would not again be encountered on the line of the Moselle. At 6.30 p. m. the Royal Headquarters issued to the Commanders-in-Chief of the First and Second Armies the following order:

"So long as the strength of the enemy's force left behind at Metz remains undetermined, the First Army will leave a corps in the neighborhood of Courcelles, which will be relieved as soon as possible by the troops coming up from Saarlouis under Lieutenant-General von Kummer.

[1] "The Franco-German War, 1870-71" (translated from the German Official Account by Capt. F. C. H. Clarke, R. A., 1876), Vol. I., Part 1, p. 344

The other two corps of the First Army will take up a position on the line Arry-Pommerieux between the Seille and Moselle, on the 16th. A bridge over the latter river is to be thrown at once, if not already done by the Third Army Corps. Prompt intelligence of the movements executed by the Second Army on the 15th is expected; with regard to further measures, the following general remarks may be made:

"The circumstances under which the First and Seventh Army Corps, as well as parts of the 18th Division, gained a victory last evening, precluded all pursuit. *The fruits thereof can only be reaped by a vigorous offensive on the part of the Second Army toward the Metz-Verdun roads, by Fresnes and by Etain.*[1] The Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army is empowered on his own judgment to carry such into effect with all the means at his disposal.

"The heads of the Third Army have reached the line Nancy-Dombasle-Bayon this day; its cavalry is reconnoitering toward Toul and to the southward. The headquarters of H. M. the King will be at Pont-à-Mousson at and after 5 p. m. to-morrow."[2]

The reports from the various corps, especially the III. Corps, as well as the communications from Royal Headquarters, had convinced Prince Frederick Charles that the French were hastily retreating toward the Meuse and that it was quite imperative to follow them up immediately. He had reported his convictions and his purpose to cross the Moselle with the main part of the Second Army on the following day to the Royal Headquarters as early as 11 a. m. Accordingly, while the French retreated slowly from Metz, the Second Army, by forced marches, covered between two and three times the distance, and, by night, had reached the line of the Moselle. The III. Corps, forming the right flank and advanced-guard of the

[1] The italics are ours.

[2] "The Franco-German War," Vol. I., Part 1, p. 351.

Second Army, was preceded by the Sixth Cavalry Division, while the Fifth Cavalry Division had been detached to the right by the commander of the X. Corps "to feel for the enemy," supposed to be retreating to the Meuse. That night the two divisions of the III. Corps reached Novéant and Champey and the X. Corps Pont-à-Mousson, while on the left the Guard had crossed the Moselle to Dieulouard and the IV. Corps to Marlbache and Custines. The cavalry of the Second Army, too, had been sent across the river and bivouacked, on the night of the 15th, at Xonville (Redern's brigade), Puxieux (Barby's brigade), Suzemont (Bredow's brigade), and Thiacourt (Guard Dragoon brigade). Behind these corps, the IX. Corps was moved to Peltre and later to Verny; the XII. Corps, which was first destined to support the IX. Corps, was directed between Solgne and Delme, but was subsequently advanced to the Seille at Noméný, while the II. Corps reached Han-sur-Nied.

Up to 7 p. m. the Headquarters of the Second Army had received from the Royal Headquarters no orders contradictory to the intentions of Prince Frederick Charles to cross the Moselle on the following day. Accordingly, at that hour, the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army issued the following arrangements for the 16th: The III. and X. Corps and their cavalry divisions were ordered to advance in force against the Metz-Verdun road. The III. Corps and the Sixth Cavalry Division were directed to cross the Moselle below Pont-à-Mousson, and the former was to move on Vionville and Mars la Tour by way of Gorze, while the cavalry could, at the discretion of the corps commander, be directed from Pagny (on the Moselle) to the Metz-Verdun road by way of Thiaucourt. The X. Corps, after assembling the troops in the valley of the Moselle, was ordered from Thiaucourt on Saint-Hilaire and Maizeray, and the IX. Corps on Sillegny to follow the III. Corps to Gorze on the 17th. Of the troops moving

west, the XII. Corps was directed to concentrate at Pont-à-Mousson and to push on to Regnieville-en-Haye and Buxerulles; the Guard to Bernécourt; the IV. Corps to Les Saizerais and Jaillon, and the II. Corps to Buchy.

The plan was therefore a general movement to the Meuse. "In the Headquarter of the Second Army there was the belief that serious fighting with the French was no more to be anticipated on the Moselle."[1] There was indeed quite enough reason for this belief. Bazaine failed utterly to make any demonstration or to destroy any of the bridges at the several points on the Moselle at which the German corps had crossed, and such action naturally led the Germans to believe that he had so hastened his retreat that the line of the Moselle no longer menaced his flank and that he would therefore be found on the Meuse. Accordingly when, at 10.30 p. m., the Royal Headquarters' orders[2] reached Pont-à-Mousson, Prince Frederick Charles thought two army corps and two cavalry divisions quite sufficient to occupy the Metz-Verdun road. It was not until noon on the day following that this supposition was found to be false, and, as a result of it, the Second Army found itself placed, in relation to the French army, in the same position as Hohenlohe to Napoleon at Jena sixty-four years previously.

The battle-field of Vionville-Mars la Tour is best described in the German Official Report. It "lies to the west of Rézonville, on both sides of the southern main road from Metz to Verdun. This leads between Gravelotte and the river Yron over an open and broad plateau, bounded on the east and southeast by large connected woods, which more particularly clothe the upper parts of the slopes falling toward the Moselle. Smaller woods extend northward of the high road along the so-called Roman

1 Von Moltke, "The Franco-German War" (translated by Archibald Forbes, London, 1893), pp. 34-35.

2 *Vide supra*, pp. 76-77.

road, presenting also towards that side a screen to the movements of troops. In other respects the plateau, especially at the highest points of its long and broadly swelling ridges, permits of an extended view in all directions. Cover under fire is offered in general only by the natural undulations of the ground and by some large hollows, in which the villages of Rézonville, Flavigny, Vionville, and Mars la Tour are situated, and which, more or less deeply depressed, divide the plateau into separate positions. The most remarkable of these and the two parallel valleys, one of which falls to the east of Rézonville, the other through this village toward the south, and the flat valley commencing near Flavigny, which after first intersecting the plateau in a southwesterly direction, bends around through the Bois de Gaumont to Gorze, and forms the southern boundary to the battle-field.

"Another equally important position is that between the Tronville heights and the plateau of Bruville and St. Marcel on the north. This passes at first as a gentle depression from the vicinity of Tronville toward the Roman road, then on the northern edge of the Tronville copses becomes a deeply sunken valley, which unites to the north of Mars la Tour with a parallel valley of the Yron."[1]

On the morning of the 16th, before sunrise, the Emperor and the Prince Imperial left the French army for Verdun and Châlons, under the escort of De France's brigade of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. The retreat of the army was to have been resumed at 6 a. m. The left wing was quite ready, but the right still had three divisions in the valley of the Moselle, and, at the earnest request of Marshal Lebœuf, the movement was postponed until noon. Bazaine ordered the troops to resume their camps and to repitch their tents, since "it might possibly be afternoon before they would move off." The peasants reported the approach of the Germans, and about 7 a. m.

1 "The Franco-German War," Vol. I., Part 1, p. 362.



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the outposts had signalled the approach of the German cavalry, yet at 8.30 Bazaine issued the following note: "The cavalry has returned from reconnaissances. The enemy was nowhere seen. Soup may be made."

The results of the Marshal's carelessness and apathy were soon to be felt. At 5 a. m. the III. and X. German Corps, preceded by their cavalry divisions, were on the march toward the Metz-Verdun road from the several points on the Moselle at which, in spite of their strategic value, Bazaine had so considerately placed not the slightest obstacle. The 5th Infantry Division, preceded by the 6th Cavalry Division, formed the first column of this flank march and was directed from Novéant to Vionville by way of Gorze, while the 6th Infantry Division, with the corps artillery, forming the second column, was ordered through Onville and Buxières on Mars la Tour. General von Voigts-Rhetz (X. Corps) had thought it advisable to combine with his march on St. Hilaire a reconnaissance in force toward Rézonville, where a French encampment had been reported on the 15th. Von Rheinbaben, with the 5th Cavalry Division (X. Corps) was detailed for this duty; at 8 a. m. he was rejoined by the 6th Cavalry Division southeast of Tronville, and, with its four batteries of horse artillery, proceeded in an arc toward Vionville. The artillery took up a position on the height northeast of Tronville and at 9.30 a. m. opened a most effective fire upon the camp of Murat's dragoons, who were still cooking breakfast. The French cavalry abandoned their camp amid great confusion and fled back through the lines of their own Second Corps. Simultaneously the horse artillery of the 6th Cavalry Division opened fire from the south, but failed entirely to discomfit the French infantry. The Second and Sixth Corps at once fell in under arms; Frossard sent Lapasset's brigade to occupy the Bois de St. Arnould, Vergé's division to hold the defile from Gorze near Maison Blanche, and Bataille's

division to Flavigny and Vionville, while Canrobert also sent Lafont de Villiers' division to Vionville, kept Tixier in second line, and posted Levassor-Sorval in reserve behind Rézonville. These movements quite checked the German advance, and forced the 5th Cavalry Division to retrograde beyond the Tronville copses, although the artillery—which was under fire from the French batteries on the heights between Vionville and Rézonville, north of the road—held its ground for some time, but was at last retired to Tronville, while the 6th Cavalry Division was withdrawn to the Anconville farm.

Meanwhile, at 9 o'clock, General von Stülpnagel had reached Gorze by the forest valley. "This valley so capable of defense was found unoccupied by the enemy who, indeed, had taken very few precautions."[1] At Gorze it was learned that the French occupied the top of the Vionville ravine. St. Thiébault and Côte Mousa were occupied and the advanced-guard was pushed on to the plateau, which was carried later by the aid of all the divisional artillery (four batteries). The 5th Infantry Division—which was reinforced about 11.30 by Lyncker's demi-brigade (37th brigade, X. Corps)—thus found itself opposed to the division of Vergé and to the brigade of Lapasset. The combat swayed backward and forward until after noon, when the 6th Infantry Division carried Flavigny, and the French were accordingly forced to retire their exposed flank.

Meanwhile, the 6th Infantry Division, forming the second column, was marching through Onville and Buxières on Mars la Tour and Etain "to bar the enemy also from the northern road to Verdun."[2] The march-orders were founded on the false supposition held both by the Royal and Second Army Headquarters that the French were retreating beyond the line of the Moselle. At Buxières, at 9.30, General von Alvensleben, after reconnoiter-

1 Von Moltke, p. 35.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 36.

ing, became more thoroughly convinced than ever that the French were retreating northward, and, accordingly, ordered the division on Jarny to bar any attempt to retreat westward. Although unknown even to the general commanding, this column was now in a critical position; neither the cavalry nor the corps artillery had yet come up in force, and between it and the first column there existed a great gap. Moreover it was quite ignorant of the French positions beyond knowing that their outposts were at Vionville and Rézonville. Just before 10 o'clock, when the horse artillery had been forced to retire to Tronville and the 6th Cavalry Division to the Anconville farm, the heads of the columns of the III. Corps appeared at the extremities of the arc formed by the cavalry, and it became evident that the strong rear-guard, which both von Moltke and Prince Frederick Charles had assumed would retreat along the northern road to Verdun, was, in reality, the entire French army on the southern road.

As a result of all these movements, the Second Army, in debouching on the plateau, found itself on a front perpendicular to the French army. In hastening to extricate itself from a difficult and dangerous country, in reconcentrating after the dispersion necessary to cross the Moselle, and in climbing the valleys which led on to the plateau the German army manœuvred like Napoleon before Jena. On the plateau, however, it occupied, in relation to Bazaine, a line exactly similar to that occupied by Hohenlohe before Napoleon at Jena, with the single difference that the prolongation of the German front cut the French left wing, while at Jena, Hohenlohe's front, if projected, would have intersected Napoleon's line exactly at its centre. For this one reason the German position was the less dangerous. On the other hand, the X. Corps had sent one brigade to the north to support the 5th Infantry Division (III. Corps) and another to the left to search for the French, while the 20th Infantry Division was still far

in the rear. Under such circumstances Bazaine's true course is evident; he should have advanced his entire left wing, thereby taking the III. Corps in front and reverse, before the arrival of the X. Corps. This latter corps would have arrived on the battle-field to gather up the remains of the III. Corps just as, at Jena, Rüchel was forced to reassemble the *débris* of Hohenlohe's army. The corps of Lebœuf and Ladmirault, which were on the march in the valley of the Moselle, would have arrived at the proper moment just as Soult at Jena, and, in order to facilitate the movement, it would have been quite sufficient to send a single division on Ars—to which the road was open—or on Vaux, in order to menace the bridges over the Moselle. This was just what Bazaine did not do. "The position of the French was one of great advantage. Their left flank leaned on Metz, their right was protected by formidable batteries on the old Roman road and a strong force of cavalry; and so they could await with confidence a frontal attack on the part of the venturesome enemy."[1] Yet, despite this advantage of position as well as superiority of numbers, and despite the fact that the Germans made a flank march before the French in position—the fatal effects of which are shown by the battles of Kolin, Rossbach, and Austerlitz[2]—Bazaine was beaten.

At 10.30 the 6th Infantry Division reached Tronville and von Alvensleben learned for the first time that the opposing French troops were by no means merely a rear-guard retreating along the northern road. The division was accordingly wheeled to the right toward Vionville to support the divisional artillery, which had taken up position southwest of Vionville and which was soon joined by the corps artillery and horse artillery, and, under cover of their fire, it was deployed. The 11th brigade attacked Vionville along the Mars la Tour road and the 12th along

1 Von Moltke, p. 37.

2 *Vide supra*, pp. 24-37.

the Tronville road. The artillery going before formed a powerful line of batteries, the fire which so shook the *morale* of Lafont de Villiers' division that, at 11.30, the village was carried in spite of the heavy losses, but the French artillery on the heights between Vionville and Rézonville, north of the road, soon made the position untenable. It was therefore imperative for the Germans either to retreat or to advance, and von Alvensleben, with the customary audacity, ordered a charge; a mad rush was made on Flavigny—which was already in flames from shell-fire—and the plateau was carried after a desperate struggle with Bataille's division. Bazaine had previously posted the division of Lavassor-Sorval, the Zouaves of the Guard, and a cavalry brigade northeast and east of Rézonville, facing south, the Grenadiers of the Guard nearer Gravelotte, and the Voltigeurs of the Guard at Malmaison as a last reserve. Three divisions of infantry and cavalry were thus held in reserve at this point, which was never seriously threatened, and, in addition, the reserve artillery was placed at Rézonville behind the Sixth Corps, flanked by the cavalry divisions of Forton and Valabrègue. While Bazaine was thus anxiously occupying himself about his left wing, the Germans had carried Vionville and Flavigny, and had forced his entire right wing to retreat on Rézonville. The Germans, however, were in hopeless confusion after the attack. Their front, too, which was greatly extended, contained all the troops present; nearly all the reserves were engaged and, moreover, were pitted against superior forces with no prospect of immediate support. A vigorous counter-attack would have resulted in the rout of the 6th Infantry Division, but again did Bazaine fail to take advantage of his opportunity; this counter-attack was never made and the Germans were permitted to reform unmolested. At Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz' suggestion, the retreating brigades of Pouget and Colin were gallantly charged by two squadrons of the Dragoons of

the Guard and the Brunswick Hussars, with great loss. Although it did not prevent the good retreat of those brigades, this charge had an immense moral effect; a fatal counter-charge was thereby averted, and time was gained to re-form the brigades and to reunite the III. Corps by closing up the dangerous opening which had existed between the two divisions. Vionville, Flavigny, and the northern end of the Bois de St. Arnould now constituted the points of support of the German front, which faced east. Of these Flavigny was the most important for an attack toward the east, since it formed the center of the line of battle of the III. Corps and, by permitting a concentration on the chord, was especially valuable to the right wing of the 6th Infantry Division. The German line, however, was everywhere vulnerable; on a front of more than four miles long, the infantry and artillery were engaged up to the hilt and all on one line. The only second line which von Alvensleben had been able to form consisted merely of the 5th Cavalry Division behind the Tronville copses, the 6th Cavalry Division near the Anconville farm, and Lehmann's demi-brigade (37th brigade, X. Corps), which had arrived at Tronville at 11.45—the other half (Lyncker) being already in action with the 5th Infantry Division near the Anconville farm.

Almost simultaneously with the retreat of the French wing and with the charge of the German squadrons on the brigades of Pouget and Colin, Frossard ordered du Preuil to charge to take the pressure off the infantry. The 3rd Lancers advanced, were recalled, and again sent forward; they charged into a void, and failed therefore to accomplish their mission, "because no definite object of attack had been pointed out to them."[1] Five squadrons of the Cuirassiers of the Guard were deployed in three lines and, at 12.30, in spite of du Preuil's vigorous remonstrance, started "at a wild gallop," in obedience to Frossard's per-

[1] French Official Report.

emptory order to "Attack immediately, or we are all lost." The return of the Lancers and some baggage wagons and camp equipment, abandoned between Flavigny and Rézonville by Bataille's division an hour earlier, threw the Cuirassiers into confusion. They quickly recovered and rode heroically home into the face of a murderous fire, delivered by the 10th brigade at 250 paces, and when this gallant regiment returned, it had lost 22 officers, 208 men and 243 horses.

To this charge von Alvensleben's judicious disposition of the cavalry in second line permitted Redern's hussars (5th Cavalry Division) to reply from its position at the Tronville copses. A French Guard battery, brought up in the meantime by Bazaine in person, opened on their right and diverted the charge to this battery, which was at once captured. Bazaine narrowly escaped being himself killed, but the French cavalry promptly forced Redern to retire. General von Alvensleben, wishing to profit by the retreat of the Second (Frossard's) Corps, ordered the 6th Cavalry Division to pursue. The order could not be promptly executed, and in the interim the French artillery had deployed beyond Rézonville, Canrobert had ordered Tixier's division up from St. Marcel to outflank the German left, and the Voltigeurs of the Guard were ordered from Malmaison to Gravelotte to replace Picard's division, which was advanced into the line of batteries south of Rézonville to reoccupy the positions vacated by the Second Corps. Thus when, at 1 o'clock, the 6th German Cavalry Division charged, it was received by such a hot fire from the fresh French troops and from the artillery that it was forced to retreat almost immediately. This charge, however, permitted the German artillery to be advanced opposite Rézonville and the infantry to re-form; but when the latter attempted to advance beyond Vionville, it was terribly shaken by the cross-fire both from the artillery at Rézonville and from the VI. Corps on its left flank, and found

it impossible to cross the Roman road where Tixier's division was posted.

At 1.30 the position as momentarily becoming more and more critical. The French were greatly superior and, moreover, had received fresh troops. So far von Alvensleben had succeeded in deceiving the enemy in regard to the slenderness of his forces by acting constantly on the offensive. The battle was at a standstill; the German battalions were noticeably thinned and exhausted by four hours' hard fighting; the ammunition of the infantry was almost all gone. Lehmann's demi-brigade had advanced on Tronville and had been driven back into the wood by the artillery at St. Marcel, and now not a single battalion, not a single battery remained in reserve. The German line was over five and three-fourths miles long and the left wing was in especial danger, being under the fire of a powerful line of batteries deployed on the Roman road, while superiority of numbers was enabling the French to extend their right and threaten thereby to envelop completely the German left flank. Marshal Canrobert, in the French centre, had seized the right moment to advance on Vionville with all his strength, and yet, in the face of all these dangers, it was absolutely necessary to hold open the road from Chambley by which the only support possible could come from the X. Corps. It was one of those situations in which the *sine qua non* is, as Napoleon once said, "*L'audace, toujours l'audace!*" It was a last and desperate resource when the order was sent to General von Bredow, "To silence the enemy's batteries on the Roman road, cost what it may, and to break through the French infantry there as far as possible, in order to give breathing-time to our own infantry. The fate of the battle depends perhaps on your attack."

Von Barby advanced to the westward of the copses, while von Bredow trotted his six squadrons for nearly two miles up the hollow east of the Tronville copses and,

at 2.20, when 800 yards from the French, formed line, the Lancers being in echelon to the right rear of the Cuirassiers. Under an overwhelming fire of artillery and infantry, those gallant squadrons rode home over the first line, through the line of the guns, over the second line, putting to flight the batteries on the heights in the rear, and even down the valley from the Roman road to Rézonville, until, after a mad career of over 3,000 paces, surrounded and outnumbered five to one by the French cavalry, von Bredow ordered the recall and fought his way back again. Half his troopers lay dead upon the field—379 men and 419 horses — and, of his original forces, scarcely 2 squadrons were mustered under the protecting heights of Flavigny, after a charge unsurpassed in history.

Von Bredow's charge is a most remarkable example of what cavalry can do under the most adverse circumstances. That six squadrons, after trotting two miles and galloping two and one-half miles, should have succeeded in wrecking six batteries, dispersing four battalions, and stopping the advance of an army corps, are achievements which might be reasonably considered impossible. Yet these were the results of von Bredow's charge. It checked the advance of Canrobert (VI. Corps) and so intimidated Bazaine—who, throughout the fighting around Metz, was unnecessarily apprehensive of attacks on his left—that he ordered all such advance to be abandoned. At any rate, the French made no fresh movement from the direction of Rézonville that day and the pressure was again completely taken off the 6th Infantry Division on this side.[1]

Again did Bazaine utterly fail to take advantage of his opportunities. The Third Corps was in sight and the Fourth Corps was on the march from Doncourt; then was the time to have cleared the Metz-Verdun road, but the

[1] "The Franco-German War," Vol. I., Part 1, pp. 386-389; also Sir Evelyn Wood, "Achievements of Cavalry," pp. 224-233.

Marshal hesitated, in his anxiety about his left, and failed to seize his advantage.

At 3 p. m., during the lull in the battle, the Germans occupied the long-contested edge of the heights opposite the Roman road, and the 64th Regiment was withdrawn behind Vionville in reserve. Both sides awaited reinforcements. The French at Bruville and St. Marcel, who had hitherto fought a waiting fight against the Tronville copses, shortly after 3 o'clock, received reinforcements from a large part of the Third and Fourth Corps and advanced against the copses. Beginning on the French right, the divisions of Grenier, Cissey, Aymard and Tixier were thrown forward—while Nayral was kept in reserve—with result that about 4 o'clock the entire German left wing was outflanked on the west and forced back from the copses. This movement was made quite without orders from Bazaine, being the natural result of Ladmirault's corps (the Fourth) coming into action and therefore assuming the initiative. The Marshal never sent in a single order, and at his trial acknowledged that it was only by chance that he learned that evening that the Fourth Corps had come into line at all! Lebœuf (Third Corps) had already arrived and the French artillery south of St. Marcel and the Roman road northeast of Vionville forced the German batteries west of Vionville, whose ammunition was almost exhausted, to retrograde southwest of Vionville. Three batteries of Grenier's division now came into action northeast of Mars la Tour and took the German batteries in reverse, but the two batteries on the left formed front to the left rear and held their ground until Lehmann's demi-brigade (37th brigade) had retreated to Tronville.

The situation was now most critical for the Germans. The French advance across the high road was momentarily expected, but again an opportunity was lost. About 4 o'clock, the 20th Infantry Division (X. Corps), which had

marched twenty-seven miles, arrived at Tronville. Part of the division was directed toward Flavigny to fill in what seemed to General von Kraatz "a visible want of infantry in the centre of the line of battle of the Third Army Corps!" and to support the 5th Infantry Division (III. Corps). The corps artillery was directed on Vionville to reinforce the five batteries there, and the rest of the division was sent to reinforce the left wing. The Germans immediately crossed the high road. The 38th brigade, which had been directed on Etain, but which had halted at noon at St. Hilaire and had received new orders in hopes of turning a flank or rear, was formed up in a quarter-circle northeast of Mars la Tour to attack the French right.

Meanwhile, Prince Frederick Charles arrived on the field, at 4 o'clock, from Pont-à-Mousson, and ordered the right to stand fast while the left was to make a vigorous attack upon the French right. The 60 guns between Flavigny and Vionville were accordingly increased to 102 by those of the X. Corps, the cavalry divisions, and the VIII. Corps now debouching from Gorze. Bazaine had ordered all offensive action to cease[1] and had reinforced his left, once again, by Montaudon's division and had directed Lebœuf to hold his ground and to rally the Sixth Corps, thus letting slip the favorable opportunity caused by the confusion on the German left to which we have already alluded. The 38th brigade, supported by the 2nd Heavy Battery, attacked the farm of La Greyère, but was thrown into confusion in crossing a deep ravine, and when charged by Cissey's division—which had hastened up to support Grenier—was forced to retire on Tronville, after losing 72 officers and 4,546 men. The situation of the X. Corps was the counterpart of Rüchel's division at Jena, but again the German cavalry saved the day. It was 6 o'clock when von Rheinbaben and Brandenburg, with the Dragoons of the Guard, charged across the road east of

1 *Vide supra*, p. 89.

Mars la Tour to disengage Wedell (38th brigade), and drove the French back into the ravine. Behind and to the left of the Dragoons, von Barby, with all the disposable cavalry—16 squadrons—wheeled to the left of Mars la Tour and charged the cavalry which Ladmirault had collected to protect his right flank, composed of Legrand's division, de France's brigade, and the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique. At 6.45 the opposing cavalry met—5,000 horse—and a desperate fight ensued, hid, however, from view by the clouds of dust; gradually the French line was driven back, and, in spite of the heroic efforts of its officers, retreated to Bruville. The German advance, nevertheless, was stopped by infantry fire from the Ville-sur-Yron copse and the farm of La Greyère, and by a 12-pounder battery, and forced to retire to Mars la Tour. As the darkness came on General von Voigts-Rhetz (X. Corps) withdrew his artillery to the southern side of the road, and at 7 o'clock established his divisions north of Tronville and Mars la Tour.

To the east the fight was more prolonged. At 3.30 the advanced-guard of the 16th Infantry Division (32nd brigade, X. Corps) reached Gorze, preceded by the artillery. At 5 o'clock the foremost battery came into action at the northern edge of the Bois de St. Arnould to support the two batteries of the Body Guard regiment, whose ammunition was almost exhausted after six hours' fighting. The 72nd Regiment attacked the heights of Maison Blanche, but failed to hold them. At 6.30 the Grenadiers of the Guard and Lapasset's brigade (Second Corps) made a fourth desperate assault and drove the Germans out from the wood, but, finding the position untenable, contented themselves with preventing the Germans from retaking it.

The 25th Hesse-Darmstadt Division (IX. Corps)[1] had meanwhile advanced from Gorze through the Bois des

[1] This division was much nearer to the battle-field than the XII. Corps—as is quite evident. The VII. and VIII. Corps—the latter of

Chevaux and the Bois des Ognons. Von Manstein, the corps commander, had not originally intended to cross the Moselle on the 16th, owing to the hard preceding marches; but when, at 3 p. m., he received the midday orders of the Commander-in-Chief, he directed the IX. Corps to cross at Arry and Corny and to get on as far as possible to the destinations ordered for the 17th.[1] At 4.30 he began his march, and about 7.30 drove the Chasseurs of the Guard and the French reserves back on Rézonville. No further success was possible, and at 10 p. m. von Manstein ordered the contest to cease.

Prince Frederick Charles, from his position at Flavigny, saw the first firing on his right grow more vigorous and received the news that the IX. Corps could be expected on his right wing. At 7 o'clock he ordered a general artillery advance on Rézonville, and at 8 o'clock the German artillery occupied the heights west of Maison Blanche and south of Rézonville, followed on the north of the Metz-Verdun road by the infantry and supported by the 6th Cavalry Division from the southwest of Flavigny. The artillery had no sooner covered the heights than Bourbaki opposed them with nine batteries of the Imperial Guard from the farther side of the Rézonville valley and inflicted upon them such losses that the German guns were forced to retrograde to their former positions. Von Smidt with the Hussar brigade attempted to advance on Rézonville, but was also compelled to retire with heavy loss. The French were, beyond doubt, too superior to be attacked in force, and the firing died down. By 9 o'clock of this hot sultry day the battle was over, after one of the hardest day's fighting ever known. The German outposts stretched in a broad bow across the plateau from the Bois de Ognons through

which had a brigade engaged—were also considerably nearer. The proximity of the IX. Corps had little or nothing to do with the action of the commander of the Second Army, the Staff History to the contrary notwithstanding. (*Vide* also Von Moltke, p. 45, footnote.)

1 *Vide supra*, p. 78.

the Tronville copses to the Yron brook on the left. The French had been driven off the Metz-Verdun road, their retreat closed, and, on the morning of the 17th, they abandoned their positions.

At the battle of Mars la Tour-Vionville the French numbered about 125,000 men and 390 guns, while the Germans had only 77,000 men and 246 guns. The Germans lost 711 officers and 15,079 men, and the French 879 officers and 16,128 men.[1]

Von Alvensleben's determination to continue the action, after the arrival of the cavalry divisions and the III. Corps at 10.30 a. m., was justified by his success alone. It is true that the strategical success, which might, and which actually did, change the campaign, was of great importance, but the responsibility and risk of annihilation were more than proportionately great. The only reinforcements to be counted on were from the X. Corps, which was worn out with marching. On the other hand, the possibility of the French continuing on to Verdun that day under the protection of a strong covering rear-guard was undoubtedly out of the question. Had Bazaine been really desirous of effecting his retreat, he could have done so only by hard fighting and by freeing himself from the enemy opposing it. It is difficult to understand from a purely military standpoint why such an attempt was not made. It was almost absolutely certain that only part of the German corps could have crossed the Moselle, and when, later in the day, the III. and IV. Corps, which had been delayed about Metz, arrived in line, the French were greatly superior. At Mars la Tour Bazaine had every advantage of position—at Jena Napoleon had none, but his formations neutralized the disadvantages of the ground. All occurrences of the battle of Jena are reproduced in

[1] "The Franco-German War," Vol. I., Part 1, p. 421 (footnote), and Appendix XXI., p. 142.

the same order and with the same regularity at Mars la Tour, except the last. Bazaine failed utterly to grasp his opportunities—Napoleon seized every advantage. The results are well enough known.

NAPOLEONIC STRATEGY.

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Strategy is the art of manœuvering troops in the theatre of operations and beyond the presence of the enemy.[1]

"The Theatre of War is the province of Strategy—the Field of Battle is the province of Tactics."[2] The principal object of Strategy is so to direct the movements of one's own forces as to be superior to one's adversary at the decisive point, or points, in the theatre of operations.[3] "All operations must ultimately rely for success upon power of fighting; for it is of no avail to conduct an army into situations which it cannot maintain in battle,"[4] and a careful study of the works left by the great Napoleon cannot fail to convince one that the fundamental principle upon which he laid the most stress, for him the whole art of war and secret of success, consists in being the strongest at the decisive point.[5]

It is an acknowledged maxim in war that, while Tactics are constantly being modified, the object of Strategy never changes. It therefore follows that the reasons for the success of the operations of some commanders and the failure of others are to be found in the different means by which they sought to attain the same object.

Prior to 1796 Strategy can hardly be said to have been thoroughly comprehended except by a few master minds. The scarcity of detailed works on the campaigns of Alex-

1Compare Jomini, "Art of War," p. 13; Bigelow, "Principles of Strategy," p. 17; Derrécagaix, "Modern War," Part 1 (Strategy), pp. 3 and 4; Dufour, "Principles of Strategy," pp. 7 and 8; Halleck, "Elements of Military Art and Science," p. 37.

Von der Goltz, "The Conduct of War," p. 25.

2Hamley, "Operations of War" (5th edition), p. 59.

3Compare Jomini, p. 113; Hamley, p. 59; Mercur, "Elements of the Art of War," p. 16.

4Hamley, p. 59.

5Compare Hart, "Reflections on the Art of War," p. 72. *Vide* especially Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," in his Correspondance, tome 31, pp. 347-365.

ander the Great, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, and Turenne—those great masters of the art of Strategy—and the military education of the times made the study of Strategy exceedingly meagre and difficult. Of the campaigns of Eugene more was known, but even in the middle of the eighteenth century so little comparatively was understood of the principles of Strategy that an authority so great as Marshal Saxe wrote that "All the other sciences are established upon fixed principles and rules, while this alone remains destitute."[1] War was learned by actual practice in the field, and amid the constant warfare but little opportunity could be found to study the fundamental principles underlying the formal and pedantic rules brought into vogue by blind addiction to arbitrary maxims and ancient precedent. Political reasons, moreover, played such an important rôle that true Strategy became so subordinated as almost to be forgotten.

The advent of Frederick the Great shed new light upon the art of war and soon attracted the attention of Europe to his system of extending and perfecting all the physical means in war. With the blindness in which mediocrity always follows genius, the most minute details in the equipment and dress of the Prussian army were adopted *in extenso* under the erroneous supposition that therein lay the secret of his success. Great as the military ability of Frederick unquestionably was, he cannot be compared dispassionately with the great masters of Strategy. "He often put into practice the principles of these great captains,"[2] but even Napoleon and Jomini, his two most devoted admirers, do not consider him a master of the strategic art. "He put his especial confidence in

1Marshal Saxe, "Reveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War," preface to the edition of 1757.

2Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p 355

the discipline of his army."[1] "Out of sixteen battles,[2] Prussia gained eight and lost eight. There is not one of these battles in which the King employed new tactics. He did nothing which has not been practiced by ancient and modern generals in all centuries."[3] The oblique order over which Europe went mad, until Austerlitz dealt its deathblow, is as old as the battle of the Granicus.[4] This oblique order was used by Cyrus at the battle of Thymbrus, by the Gauls and Belgians at the Sambre against Cæsar, by Turenne at the battle of the Downs, by Marshal Luxembourg at Fleurus, by Marlborough at Höchstädt, by Prince Eugene at Ramillies and Turin, and by Charles XII. at Pultawa. "If Frederick invented this manœuvre, he invented war, which, unfortunately, is as old as the world."[5] In reality, the King laughed in his sleeve at "the parades of Potsdam" and the infatuation of the young European officers for this movement. "A profound examination of the manœuvres of this war ought to have enlightened these officers, and this should have succeeded in making their illusions vanish—viz., that Frederick never manœuvred except by lines and by the flank, never by deployments."[6] "The secret of his success lay, not so much in judicious movements in the theatre of war, as in the use he made of the flexibility of his army as compared with the armies of his adversaries. It was by his successes in the fields of battle, rather than by his plans of campaign, which were often faulty, that he finally emerged victorious from the struggle, with a military renown un-

1Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 355.

2Fought during the Seven Years' War.

3Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," Correspondance, tome 32, p. 239.

4Fought by Alexander the Great against the Persians, B. C. 334.

5Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," Correspondance, tome 32, p. 239.

6*Ibid.*, p. 243.

rivalled in his generation."[1] In the Silesian wars he demonstrated, by the freedom of action given to his cavalry leaders, the capability of horsemen, with the result that no army has since had a leader or cavalry superior to the immortal Seydlitz and his splendid squadrons. Frederick's *forte* lay in his remarkable exposition of the possibilities of Tactics and discipline, and his place in military history is that of their greatest exponent.

The history of every era has been dominated by the influence of some master spirit, and, just as Frederick the Great stands preëminent in the realm of Tactics, Napoleon embodies the highest development of Strategy. It is comparatively easy to trace in the growth of every great scientific movement the gradual steps leading to its maturity, and, as a rule, it is only in the last stage of its development that a science finds its greatest exemplar. A dormant movement may be brought into activity by a genius, but a greater genius and a concurrence of favorable circumstances are necessary for the attainment of perfection. Military engineering, awakened by Micheli, Albrecht Dürer, and Maurice of Nassau, culminated in Vauban;[2] Tactics revived by Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, and Marlborough reached a remarkable state of perfection under the Prussian King; Strategy, beginning with Alexander the Great and Hannibal and brought into renewed activity by Turenne and Prince Eugene, attained its zenith in Napoleon. The study of war was taken up with new interest and some semblance of system in the middle of the sixteenth century, with the result that Tactics reached an extraordinary state of efficiency under Frederick the Great. Since the scope and magnitude of Strategy is so much greater than that of Tactics, its development nec-

1 Hamley, p. 340.

2 At St. Helena, Napoleon declared that "the principles of campaign fortification need to be perfected. This part of the art of war is susceptible of making great progress." ("Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," No. 32, in Napoleon's Correspondance, tome 31, p. 416.)

essarily and logically followed that of Tactics. The tremendous convulsions of the French Revolution created opportunities for, and brought to light, men who, for number and ability in diplomacy, statesmanship, and war, both terrestrial and maritime, made the subsequent era one of the most remarkable in history. The Revolution, as sceptical of military as of political traditions, asserted in practice the most subversive creeds, and the great struggles which ensued called into activity all the military energy and talent of Europe, with the result that the metaphysics of war, the science of vast operations conducted on a scale hitherto unknown, the massing and manœuvering of great armies, which had previously been in a state of comparative infancy, advanced in a surprisingly short time to a remarkable degree of perfection. In truth, this period afforded examples of the utmost limits to which man can reasonably be expected ever to attain, either in his capacity of general or of simple soldier.[1] The result was the production of a commander of the most consummate genius the world has ever seen. Napoleon, the child and servant of the Revolution, became its master and proved to be "the man of destiny."

Before his appearance, Strategy had been reduced to rules as pedantic and arbitrary as Tactics had been prior to the time of Frederick. These rules, founded upon precedents laid down by mediocre generals, were regarded as immutable principles from which there could be no departure. Napoleon applied to the science of Strategy the Revolutionary doctrines with which he had been imbued, taking great care, however, never to violate the few great fundamental principles which he had learned from the campaigns of great generals like Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick, of which he had made a most profound study. At the close of his life he said at St. Helena, that "the

1Graham, "Elementary History of the Art of War," p. 202.

history of these eighty-three campaigns would be a complete treatise on the art of war; the principles which one should follow in a defensive and offensive war would flow from them as from a spring."[1] Rejecting the arbitrary rules with which the pedantry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had trammelled the subject, his vast insight, originality, and power enabled him to evolve its true principles, and, by a judicious application to the art of war, to found a new system of Strategy which has justified the use of new terms, new rules, and new exceptions.

The most important of the general principles which he learned from his exhaustive study of previous great commanders are embodied in his criticism of Cæsar's campaigns: "The principles of Cæsar were the same as those of Alexander and of Hannibal: *to keep his forces united, not to be vulnerable on any point, to move with rapidity on the important points,* to rely on the moral means, the reputation of his arms, the fear which he inspired, and also the political means to keep his allies loyal and conquered peoples obedient; *to give himself all the chances possible to assure his victory on the field of battle—i. e., to unite there all his troops.*"[2] The application of these rules to Napoleon's own campaigns and the system which he inaugurated have been thus described: "Rejecting old systems, which were satisfied with the capture of one or two points, or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army, since States and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them.[3] To detect at a glance the relative

1 Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 347.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354. The italics are ours.

3 Compare Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, "Letters on Strategy," p. 101, Axiom 2: "The hostile army is the first object of Strategy." Also Derrécagaix, Part 1, p. 205: "The principal army of the enemy ought always to be the first objective."

advantages presented by the different zones of operations; to concentrate the mass of the forces upon that which gave the best promise of success; to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the enemy; to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his centre, if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could more readily seize his communications; to outflank him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces—such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first campaigns."[1]

It has been asserted that Napoleon once declared that he recognized no system or rules of Strategy beyond operating with a view to victory.[2] This, however, is not quite correct.[3] It is true that the Emperor himself wrote at St. Helena that "Tactics, evolutions, the science of the engineer and of the artilleryman can be learned in treatises, almost like geometry; but the knowledge of the higher branches of war can only be acquired by the study of the history of the wars and the battles of great captains, and by experience. There are no exact determined rules; all depends upon the character which Nature has given to the general, upon his qualities, his defects, upon the nature of the troops, upon the range of the arms, upon the season, and a thousand circumstances which result in things never concurring."[4] By this statement Napoleon undoubtedly meant that, in war as in everything else,

1Jomini, "Art of War," p. 89.

2Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, p. 99.

3Prince Kraft has confused system with plan, for in support of his statement he quotes Napoleon as saying: "I never had a plan." Plan and system are quite distinct. In the campaign of 1796, when Würmser advanced south, Bonaparte, on the defensive, had no plan until the Austrian attack had sufficiently developed for him to comprehend its direction and force. (*Vide infra*, p. 125.) No one could, however, possibly accuse him of having no system by which to operate when he learned of Würmser's blunder.

4Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 365. The same idea is expressed by Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen when he says (p. 101) that "one may not follow a fixed system, but must always rely on sound judgment." (Axiom of Strategy, No. 4.)

circumstances modify principles, and that it is impossible to formulate rules which admit of no exception. His Commentaries, however, are full of the "rules of war" and principles to be observed which demand "on the part of the general a profound knowledge of the art,"[1] and he has expressly told us that "All war ought to be methodical, since all war should be conducted, in conformity with the principles and the rules of the art and with reason, to have one object: it should be made in accordance with the forces one has."[2] The essential principles which must be observed are, as we have already seen—viz.:

1. To keep one's forces united;
2. Not to be vulnerable on any point;
3. To move with rapidity on important points; and
4. To give one's self every chance possible to assure victory on the battle-field by there uniting all one's forces.[3]

These essential principles Napoleon applied to his own campaigns, which are remarkable for five important characteristics—viz.: 1. *The initiative at the commencement of hostilities;* 2. *One line of operations;* 3. *The unity of forces;* 4. *The rapidity of movement on decisive points;* and 5. *The concentration before battle.*

I. It is not our purpose to enter here upon an elaborate discussion of the relative merits of offensive or defensive operations. To make war is to attack, and the offensive at the beginning of operations offers the most favorable means for making a combined movement upon a decisive point with greatly superior forces.[4] Tactically considered the defense may or may not be the more advantageous according to circumstances; strategically, the of-

1Napoleon, "Événements des six derniers mois de 1799," Correspondance, tome 30, p. 302.

2Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 418.

3*Vide supra*, p. 104.

4Compare Jomini, "Treatise on Grand Military Operations" (edition of 1865), Vol. II., pp. 367, 368, 449, and 455.

fense always has been, and probably always will be, the superior, since the defense must necessarily always await with uncertainty the development of the attack and subsequently conform to it.[1] Even as a means of defense, the initiative is greatly preferable to a passive attitude.[2] The principal inconveniences of the offensive lie in its ever-decreasing power, in the comparative difficulty of supply, and in the necessity of guarding a long line of communications when the invader has penetrated far into the enemy's country, as did Napoleon in 1805, 1809, and especially in 1812.[3] These disadvantages are more than counterbalanced by the great advantages conferred by the initiative consistently and thoroughly pushed through to its full fruition.[4] Throughout his campaigns Napoleon always made it a rule to take the initiative, whether acting on the offensive or the defensive—an invariable characteristic of all great commanders.[5] He, however, took great care never to neglect any means which might give him information as to the movements and intentions of his adversaries, and, moreover, prior to the commencement of hostilities, he always sent officers in disguise to reconnoitre with greatest care the theatre where he proposed to op-

1Compare Hamley, p. 44; Von der Goltz, p. 24; Jomini, "Art of War" (1854), p. 83.

2Hamley, p. 47; Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," p. 84. "A deliberate defensive is generally right only when all the conditions are so unfavorable that practically there is no alternative." Hart, "Reflections on the Art of War, p. 127," and footnote on p. 84.

3Hamley, pp. 46-47. "All offensive war is a war of invasion." Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 417.

4Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, p. 101, 5th Axiom of Strategy: "To change strategical plans when not forced to by circumstances leads to disaster."

5"*Make offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick. Read, re-read the history of their eighty-three campaigns. Model yourself on them. It is the only way to become a great captain and to master the secrets of the art. Your genius thus enlightened will make you reject the maxims opposed to those of these great men.*" Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p 418.

erate.[1] To his elaborate system of spies,[2] and to his careful reconnaissances, his ability to keep the initiative was, beyond doubt, largely indebted.

II. The second great principle of Napoleonic Strategy is that of One Line of Operations. "*An army should have only one line of operations.*"[3] This important fundamental principle was strongly emphasized by the great strategist in whose campaigns it was most clearly exemplified. Independent of the proper selection of roads to be traversed by the different columns of an army, its truth has been recognized by military men in all ages.[4] The difficulty of ascertaining, at the opening of hostilities, the exact decisive point at which two or more lines of operation should converge, makes it almost impossible to obtain *that unity of action which is a sine qua non in war*, and thereby invites the enemy to be the stronger at the decisive point and to defeat in detail the forces operating by different lines. "*To operate by distant directions and without communication,*" Napoleon has told us, "*is an error which generally leads to the commission of a second. The detached column has orders for the first day only. Its operations for the second day depend upon what has happened to the principal column. It either loses time in awaiting orders, or it acts by hazard.*"[5] A cursory glance at the operations of Frederick the Great in 1756, of Würmser and Alvinzi, Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, the

1 *Vide* Derrécagaix, Part 1, pp. 167-171. Also study on "Jena-Mars la Tour-Vionville," *supra* p. 58.

2 *Vide* Muller, "L'Espionage militaire sous Napoléon I."

3 Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 9th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, p. 344.

4 Derrécagaix, Part 1, p. 244. The singleness of a line of operations has no reference to the smallness of the base. On the contrary, the larger the base the greater the advantage to be derived therefrom. The true meaning of this principle is that one must not debouch from the base except by a single zone, nor operate but by a single line.

5 Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 3rd observation, Correspondance, tome 29, p. 331. In commenting upon the operations of Frederick in 1756, he said, "This manner of invading a country by a double line of operations is faulty." ("Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 2nd observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 165.)

Allies in 1813, 1814, and 1815, and the Union armies in 1861 and 1862 will quite suffice to show the vicious principle of double lines of operation.[1]

One of the great advantages conferred by a single line of operations is in the use of "interior lines," upon which Jomini had laid such stress,[2] and which have been well defined as "the communicating ways which most directly join the different parts of the theatre of operations."[3] "Single and interior lines have for their object to place in action, at the most important point and by means of strategic movements, a greater number of divisions and consequently a greater mass than the enemy."[4] "An army whose lines are interior and nearer than those of the enemy can, by a strategic movement, overwhelm those of the enemy successively by concentrating upon his lines alternately the mass of his forces."[5] The principle of interior lines is, in reality, that of the closest communication between the fractions of the forces engaged in the theatre of operations, by which a commander is enabled to preserve intact

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1For the campaigns of 1796, 1814, 1815, 1861, and 1862, *vide* Hamley. Although, through fortunate circumstances, neither Frederick nor the Allies in 1813, 1814, and 1815 were beaten, their double lines of operations were nevertheless faulty. The Allies in 1815 operated from divergent bases, but their lines of operation, although concentric, were nevertheless distinct and separate. The French Republican armies in 1792 and 1793 were also victorious in spite of double lines; but, as Napoleon said: "There are two sorts of plans of campaign, the good and the bad. Sometimes the good ones fail through fortuitous circumstances; sometimes the bad ones succeed by a caprice of Fortune." ("Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 417.)

2Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. I., pp. 249-250.

3Derrécagaix, p. 269.

4Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 39.

5Jomini, *ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 249. Of these lines the campaigns of 1796, 1797, and 1814 are perhaps the best examples. Their advantageous use is also evident in the manœuvres at Abensberg and Eckmühl in 1809. *Their full value can, however, never be realized unless the general will* (1) *"always manœuvre offensively and in force,"* and (2) *"take the offensive upon only one point at a time."* (Derrécagaix, p. 270, and A. G., "Maximes de Guerre de Napoléon I.," pp. 136 *et seq.*) The italics are ours.

III. *The Unity of Forces*, the third and certainly one of the most characteristic principles of Napoleonic Strategy. Throughout his career in the field and in his subsequent writings the Emperor laid the greatest emphasis upon *the absolute necessity of keeping one's forces united and in close inter-communication.* His correspondence teems with reiterated orders to his marshals and generals to assure, as often as possible, the touch between the juxtaposed corps. The unity of forces was for him a *sine qua non*, without which strategical and tactical advantages could neither be gained nor maintained except by mere chance.[1] In this respect his system of Strategy was a marked innovation at the time and a notable contrast to the invariable and faulty system of dispersion which the military men preceding him had carried to such a remarkable extent. Napoleon was undoubtedly the greatest exponent of concentration, both strategical and tactical, of all times, and if he found it so uniformly and wonderfully effective, we can but accept his dictum as conclusive. *"The unity of command,"* he was convinced, could only be attained by close connection between the forces engaged in the same theatre of operations,[2] and, for this reason, he always preferred to operate with one large army rather than with two or more smaller armies.[3] It is true that his corps were often separated for subsistence, but the intercommunication was scrupulously preserved, and wherever they reached the presence of the enemy they were invariably

1"The fundamental principle upon which every military combination rests is to operate with the greatest mass of our forces, *a combined effort, upon a decisive point.*" Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 448. The italics are ours.

2In the march to Traisen in 1805, after the capitulation of Mack at Ulm, Napoleon kept 100,000 on the one main chaussée on the south bank of the Danube rather than march them by roads nearer the Tyrol, where the intercommunication would have been difficult.

3"There must be only one army, for *the unity of command is the first necessity in war.*" Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 418.

"concentrated to strike."[1] The readiness for every eventuality which he considered such an important quality in every good general[2] can only be taken advantage of when troops are well in hand and not scattered over the theatre of war. The fundamental principle of the unity of forces, upon which he laid so much emphasis, was based upon the fact that it prevents one's own forces from being isolated and beaten in detail, and, conversely, it helps one to be ready for every eventuality and enables one to be superior to, and thereby defeat in detail, all fractions of the hostile forces which may be encountered when separated from the principal army.[3] So thoroughly did Napoleonic campaigns demonstrate the truth of this principle and the fatal effects of its violation in the presence of a skillful adversary that there is to-day scarcely a text-book on war in which it is not to be found as a maxim.

In discussing this fundamental principle of the unity of forces, Napoleon laid down the following important maxims—viz.:

1. *"Never separate the wings of your army, one from the other, in such a way that your enemy can place himself in the intervals."*[4] Any failure to observe this important rule of the unity of forces must necessarily de-

1"Genius in the art of war consists in knowing when to scatter your forces and when to unite them." Sargent, "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign," p. 71. An admirable work.

2*"A great captain ought to say to himself several times a day, 'If the enemy's army should appear on my front, on my right, or on my left, what shall I do?'* If he finds that he is embarrassed, then he is badly posted, he is not correct. He ought to remedy it." Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, pp. 338-339. The italics are ours.

3"If there was one distinguishing peculiarity of Napoleon's system of war, it was that of so manœuvring as to divide the forces of the enemy and then to defeat them in detail." Sargent, "Campaign of Marengo," p. 131.

4Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 11th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 196. The same maxim he likewise applied to Tactics, when he charged us, *"Do not put between the different corps of your line of battle a single interval where the enemy can penetrate."* "Quelque Considérations sur la Guerre de Sept Ans," *ibid.*, p. 243.

stroy the intercommunication and the ability of the fractions to support each other and be a flagrant violation of "the great principle which wishes an army to be, every day and at every hour, ready to fight; * * * * since, *in order for an army to be ready to fight, it must be united.*"[1] "It is, therefore, a principle that *an army ought always to keep all its columns united in such a way that the enemy cannot introduce himself between them.* When, for any reasons whatever, one diverts from this principle, the detached corps must be independent in their operations, and direct themselves, in order to re-unite, on a fixed point toward which they are marching, without hesitation and without new orders, so that they should be less exposed to attack while isolated."[2]

No other general has made such extensive turning movements as did Napoleon,[3] who has told us, "*Do not attack in front positions which you can obtain by turning them.*"[4] In great turning movements, it is evident that the intercommunication and unity of forces are much more difficult to preserve than in direct attacks, and the cardinal rule to be observed is found in the maxim

2. "*The art of war indicates that a wing must be turned or outflanked without separating the army.*"[5]

A not less important rule, and one on which the Emperor laid the greatest stress, is found in maxim

1Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, etc.

2Napoleon, *ibid* 3rd observation, p. 331. Compare p. 108. Vide direction of march, etc.'

3The campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806 were all great turning movements in which the fundamental idea was identical, but the execution modified by circumstances.

4Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres du Maréchal Turenne," 18th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 133.

5Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 23rd observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 221. Excellent examples of the truth of this maxim will be found in the operations of Kolin (1757), Crevelt (1758), Maxen (1759), Liegnitz and Torgau (1760), Rivoli (1797), Kulm and Bautzen (1813), and Laon (1814). *Vide* also the writer's Study on "Oblique Attack," *supra*, pp. 23-51.

3. It is "*a principle which admits of no exception that all junctions of army corps should be made in the rear and far from the enemy.*"[1] This principle is reiterated in Napoleon's Commentaries with great force as an important part of the fundamental rule of the unity of forces.[2] The junctions of fractions of an army in the presence of an enemy invites their defeat in detail before they can be reunited, and in such cases "*it would be better to make three or four marches more and to unite one's columns in the rear and far from the enemy than to operate their reunion in his presence.*"[3] A violation of the principle that an army should have only one line of operations will often cause an infraction of this maxim, as is shown by the operations of Würmser, Alvinzi,[4] Moreau, and Jourdan in 1796, Moreau and Macdonald in 1799, the Allies in 1805, 1813, 1814, and 1815. Napoleon, however, throughout his career never employed but one line of operations[5] and always preserved with scrupulous care the unity of his forces.[6]

IV. The fourth great feature of Napoleonic Strategy is the *Rapidity of Movement.* It was he who perhaps first fully realized that the mobility of an army is the essen-

1Napoleon, "Précis des Événements des six derniers mois de 1799," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 30, p. 298. The soundness of this principle is demonstrated by the operations of Moreau and Macdonald in 1799, Frederick in 1757, Turenne in 1646 and 1648, and the Allies in 1815.

2The same maxim is found slightly differently worded in the "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 3rd observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 172. Applied to cantonments. Napoleon said ("Précis des Guerres du Maréchal Turenne," 4th observation, *ibid.*, p. 98), apropos of the battle of Marienthal: "It is one of the most important principles of war, which one rarely violates with impunity: To assemble one's cantonments on the point the most distant and sheltered from the enemy."

3Napoleon, "Précis des Événements des six derniers mois de 1799," Correspondance, tome 30, p. 289.

4*Vide infra*, pp. 124-135.

5Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 11.

6The campaign of 1813 is perhaps the most notable exception. Its disastrous results for the French Emperor are well known.

tial condition for its success. Contrasted with the elephantine movements of his immediate predecessors, which were due largely to a blind following of pedantic rules, his manœuvres were like those of an agile tiger, which attacks on every side. *"The strength of an army,"* he declared, *"like the amount of movement in mechanics, is estimated by the mass multiplied by the rapidity. This march, far from weakening the army, augments its morale. It increases its chances of victory."*[1] The most brilliant strategical plan is useless unless it is put into active operation before the enemy has had time to comprehend and to reply to it with the correct manœuvre.[2] It is equally futile to mass troops without imparting some direction and energy to them. Moreover, it is of no avail to discern that the enemy has made a mistake or by a faulty movement laid himself open to defeat unless one will be quick to seize the opportunity thus offered and by rapidity of movement upon the decisive point, punish him for his blunder.[3] *Rapidity of movement* is not merely the only way of reaping the full advantage of taking the initiative, but it *is the natural and necessary complement of the unity of forces.* This great truth was first demonstrated in a most conclusive manner by Napoleon's earlier campaigns, and it is the union of these two important principles which is the distinguishing feature of Napoleonic Strategy. Whether employed to produce strategical ruptures or in extensive turning movements, whether used in the theatre of operations or on the field of battle, its truth is equally evident. *"The greatest secret of war consists in becoming master*

1Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 2nd observation, Correspondance, tome 29, pp. 327-328. The italics are ours.

2Compare Von der Goltz, p. 34: "Rapidity of movement and surprise are thus the life and soul of strategical offensive."

3Compare Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 453: *'It is not sufficient to bring about a good operation in war, to bring our masses skillfully to bear upon the most important point. It is necessary to know how to engage them there."* The italics are ours.

of the communications of the enemy,"[1] but the accomplishment of such an important object is almost impossible without rapidity of movement by united forces. In all Napoleon's many campaigns the predominating rule is the invariable use of these two principles employed together against the decisive points which he knew so well how to select.[2] In the annals of war there are few, if any, campaigns in which such decisive results have been gained as in Napoleon's campaigns of 1796, 1797, 1800, 1805, and 1806, all of which were won by the unity of forces, rapidity of movement, and a single line of operations so chosen as to sever the enemy's communications.[3]

V. The fifth important characteristic of Napoleonic Strategy is the invariable *concentration just before every battle,* and never has any other commander carried to greater extreme the massing of troops for a decisive action than did the first Napoleon. The full advantage of the most ably conceived strategical plan can seldom be obtained without successful and decisive battle to complete the dispersion and destruction of the hostile forces.[4] So impossible it is, as a rule, to foresee the exact points at which decisive collisions will occur that the only way to assure superiority is to outnumber the enemy.[5]

"*One can never be too strong for a decisive battle,*"[6] and

1Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 59, quoting a remark made to him by Napoleon at the beginning of the campaign of Jena.

2"It is a fundamental rule in war to know how to sacrifice secondary to primary points." A. G., "Maximes de Guerre de Napoléon I." p. 98.

3"According to Napoleon and the Archduke Charles, *the most advantageous direction of the lines of operation is that which permits an army to threaten the communications of the enemy without compromising its own.*" Derrécagaix, Part 1, pp. 230-231.

4Compare Hamley, p. 59: "All operations must ultimately rely for success upon power of fighting; for it is of no avail to conduct an army into situations which it cannot maintain in battle."

5Compare Von der Goltz, pp. 10-11.

6Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, p. 101, 3rd Axiom of Strategy. "A battle sometimes decides everything." Napoleon quoted in O'Meara, Vol I, p. 193.

this idea was for Napoleon the whole art and secret of success.[1]

On this subject the Emperor has laid down the following important rules—viz.:

1. *"The first principle of war is that one ought not to deliver battle except with all the troops which one can unite on the field of operations."*[2]

2. *"General rule: When you wish to fight a battle, assemble all your forces. Do not neglect a single one; a battalion sometimes decides the day."*[3]

3. *"It is a principle that one should never make any detachment on the eve of a battle,* because in the night the state of things may change, either through movements of retreat by the enemy or through the arrival of large reinforcements, which enable him to take the offensive and to render fatal the premature dispositions which you have made."[4]

4. *"Never do what the enemy wishes, for the simple reason that he does wish it. Avoid the field of battle which he has studied, reconnoitred, and, with even more care, that which he has fortified or where he has entrenched."*[5]

The fact that during all his long and marvelous career Napoleon seldom fought a battle in which he was

1 *Vide supra*, p. 99.

2 Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 26th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 227.

3 Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 17th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 210. Although in the campaign of Waterloo Grouchy undoubtedly disobeyed orders, Napoleon's failure to rally him to him probably cost him the battle. Had the Prussians failed to arrive at Waterloo and had the English lost the battle, Wellington would have bitterly felt the consequences of his violation of this maxim in leaving so large a detachment at Hal.

4 Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, p. 338. The First Consul violated this maxim when, on June 13, 1800, he detached Desaix's division. It is true that he was ignorant of Melas' intentions, but it was only the good judgment and timely arrival of Desaix at Marengo which saved the battle from consequences very disastrous to the French.

5 Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres du Maréchal Turenne," 18th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 133.

numerically inferior to the forces of his adversaries, and never lost one in which he was the superior is conclusive evidence of the soundness of his principle of concentration. In fine, as the Emperor declared, "*One must keep the army united, concentrate the greatest forces possible on the field of battle, profit by every occasion, for Fortune is a woman; if you miss her to-day, do not expect to find her again to-morrow.*"[1]

Throughout these above-enumerated principles runs the fundamental idea of simplicity. No one has ever realized more thoroughly the enormous difficulties and perplexities which must necessarily beset the operations of every general than did Napoleon. Every military man has learned through experience how extremely difficult it is to execute the least complicated manœuvre, even under the most favorable conditions. With large forces and in the actual theatre of war the difficulties increase in such proportion as to make intricate movements almost impossible. Napoleon has himself told us that "*The art of war is a simple art and one entirely of execution. There is nothing vague. Everything in it is good sense; nothing in it is ideology.*"[2] In the characteristics of his Strategy, which we have already examined, is not the fundamental idea that of *simplicity?* The initiative is the simplest way to force an adversary to conform to one's own attack; one line of operations is the simplest manner of bringing to the decisive point a stronger force than the enemy; the unity of forces is the simplest way to assure one's own unity of action, to be always ready to fight, and to be numerically superior to the enemy in the event of an encounter; rapidity of movement is the simplest manner of surprising and outmanœuvring the hostile forces; and concentration before a battle is the simplest way to assure one's own superiority by outnumbering the enemy

1Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," 40th conclusion, Correspondance, tome 31, p. 418.

2*Ibid.*, "Précis des Événements des six premiers mois de 1799," 1st observation, Correspondance, tome 30, p. 263.

at the time and place of actual and decisive conflict. Efficiency in war, as in everything else, consists in obtaining the maximum amount of effect with the minimum amount of effort for which *the sine qua non is simplicity. "As war is an art of execution, all complicated combinations should be discarded. Simplicity is the first condition of all good manoeuvres."*[1]

In the brief review which we shall make of the two most masterful campaigns of this greatest of all strategists—viz., those of 1796 and 1797, we propose to consider them with especial reference to the five great characteristics already enumerated—*i. e.*, (1) the initiative, (2) the singleness of the line of operations, (3) the unity of forces, (4) the rapidity of movement, and (5) the invariable concentration for battle.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1796.

First Stage.

The command of the French "Army of Italy," extending along the Apennines between Nice and Genoa, was given by the Directory, in March, 1796, to General Napoleon Bonaparte with instructions that "the most immediate interest of the French Government should be to direct its principal efforts against the armies and territories of the Austrians in Lombardy."[2] Bonaparte's army, consisting of about 42,000 half-starved and ill-clad men, held the passes of the Col di Tenda, Ormea, San Giacomo, Cadibona, and Savona, with an advance brigade at Voltri, and its operations were to be further seconded by a force of 20,000 men under General Kellermann, which was to cross the French Alps by the pass of Mont Cenis. The French line of communications was by the Corniche road from Savona through Nice to France. Opposed to Bona-

1Napoleon, "Précis des Événements des six derniers mois de 1799," 1st observation, Correspondance, tome 30, p. 289.

2Quoted by Hamley, p. 142.

parte was the Allied army, under the octogenarian Beaulieu, consisting of 20,000 Sardinians and 30,000 Austrians, the former extending from Coni through Ceva (headquarters) to Millesimo, and the latter from Sassello through Ovada to Voltaggio (headquarters)[1]—with whom Beaulieu was to be found. The base of the Sardinians was Turin, and the base of the Austrians, the river Mincio. The object of Bonaparte was to separate the Sardinians from the Austrians—who concerned themselves but little about their allies—and to make peace with the former, so as to gain a safe base for further operations against the Austrians, whose sole object was to cover Lombardy.[2] The French army was necessarily greatly extended, but the divisions were, however, assembled at the points mentioned and in good inter-communication. The Allies were also extended over a front of seventy miles, but the nature of the ground was such that their forces were much more disseminated, since "the Austrians, pursuing the system common at the time, sought to guard all the avenues by occupying all; and thus their forces were greatly subdivided and separated from each other by intervening ridges, while the French had the Nice-Genoa road (the Corniche) by which to communicate."[3]

On April 10th both armies assumed the offensive.[4] Beaulieu, deceived by the presence of Cervoni at Voltri,

1 *Vide* map facing p. 132.

2 "It is, in fact, easy to perceive that every military movement against the Piedmontese and on their territories becomes, in some degree, indifferent to the Austrians, who appear, as was seen in the last campaign, to give themselves very little concern about the disasters of their allies; and who, in the hour of danger, instead of endeavoring to afford them effectual protection, separate from them immediately, and seem only solicitous to cover the country which belongs to themselves, and abundantly supplies them with the resources for which they have occasion."—*Instructions for the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, from the Directory, Paris, 16th Ventose, year IV.* (*5th March*, 1796).

Vide Memoirs of Napoleon, Vol. IV. (dictated to the Count of Montholon), p. 373.

3 Hamley, p. 139.

4 The initiative was, in this case, taken simultaneously.

expected to be turned by his left. He accordingly directed all his force against the Corniche between Genoa and Savona, but while Cervoni contained and retarded his advance, Bonaparte had united his forces[1] and had defeated Argenteau, on the 12th, at Montenotte, and the Sardinians on the 13th, driving the former back on Dego and the latter on Ceva. A strategical rupture had been made, and the Allied centre was pierced on the 13th. On the following day Masséna and La Harpe attacked the Austrians at Dego, where Beaulieu had ordered all his forces to concentrate, and forced them to continue their retreat down the Bormida. "It was always characteristic of Napoleon to direct his troops where their action would be most effective,"[2] and, on the 15th, he decided to crush the Sardinians who had been concentrated by General Colli in the entrenched camp at Ceva. This same day La Harpe and Masséna defeated four Austrian battalians directed by Beaulieu on Dego, and the divisions of Augereau and Surrurier were concentrated in close intercommunication[3] on the principal spurs of the Apennines between Ceva and Millesimo. La Harpe was directed on San Benedetto to prevent any attack upon Bonaparte's rear, or to anticipate any attempt to rejoin the Sardinians which might be made by the Austrians then concentrating at Acqui; a brigade was also left at Cairo to protect his communications.[4] Masséna, Augereau, and Surrurier were directed on Ceva,[5] from which Colli was driven on the 17th and forced to retire to the position Lesegno-

1Note the union of the French divisions which was made in the rear of the army, and not in the presence of the enemy. *Vide* maxim on p. 113.

2Hamley, p. 143.

3Note the careful observation of the maxim: "Never separate the wings of your army, one from the other, in such a way that your enemy can place himself in the intervals." *Vide* p. 111, *supra.*

4*"Preserve with care and never abandon with a light heart your line of operations."* Napoleon, "Quelques Considérations sur la Guerre de Sept Ans," II., Correspondance, tome 32, p. 240.

5The invariable concentration for battle.

St. Michele-Vico, before Mondovi. On the 19th Bonaparte attacked him, but was repulsed; nevertheless, in spite of the fatigue and discouragement of his troops, it was decided, in a council of war held on the 20th, to make a second attack before the enemy could recover.[1] On the 22nd, the French attacked the Sardinians, who had retrograded to Mondovi, and, driving them from their position, forced Colli to retreat to Fossano. Bonaparte then changed his line of operations, and his communicatins with Nice to the line Ceva-Ormea,[2] and, notwithstanding the overtures for peace made by Colli on the 23rd and the consequent *pour parlers*, continued to advance. On the 24th, Beaulieu moved from Acqui through Nizza, *en route* to Alba, from which he hoped to rejoin Colli, but he was anticipated at Alba on the 25th by Augereau, while the Sardinians, in full retreat on Turin, had this day reached Carignano. The entire French army was concentrated on the following day at Alba, ready, if necessary, to fight Beaulieu, and Bonaparte opened communications with Nice by Fossano, Coni, and the Col di Tenda. The Sardinian army was now interposed between Kellermann at Mont Cenis and the Army of Italy on the Tanaro, and it was to prevent operations against the French analogous to those which he had just so successfully employed against the Allies that Bonaparte, before his departure from Fossano on the morning of the 25th, sent urgent messages to the commander of Kellermann's right to is-

1"It is not enough to pierce and divide the enemy's army; the advantage thus gained must be promptly followed up, or a subsequent reunion of the parts may nullify all the previous operations. * * * That is to say, the first stroke must be followed up by successive blows on one or both sides, which shall at once keep the enemy asunder, and destroy his force." Hamley, p. 144.

2*"He does not violate a second principle not less sacred, that of not abandoning his line of operations; but he changes it, which is considered as the ablest manœuvre taught by the art of war."* Napoleon, "Précis de Guerres de Frédéric II.," 10th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 184.

sue from the Alps toward him.[1] Beaulieu, finding his advance barred at Alba, had meanwhile retreated, and the French accordingly continued their movement on Turin in pursuit of the Sardinians;[2] but, on the 28th, Victor Amadeus III. signed an armistice at Cherasco, which brought to a close the brief first stage of this remarkable campaign. By the terms of the treaty of peace the Sardinian king was detached from his allies, and not only surrendered to the French the frontier fortresses of Coni, Tortona and Ceva, but granted them the line of Mont Cenis for their communications with France, in subsequent operations against the Austrians in Lombardy, as well as permission to cross the Po at Valenza.[3]

Second Stage.

On the 30th of April, Bonaparte set his army in motion toward Alessandria. Beaulieu, misled into believing that he would attempt to cross the Po at Valenza, had massed his troops—which had then been reinforced to 42,000 men[4] and 120 guns—on the Ticino and had occupied Valeggio, Pavia and Mantua. On May 5th the French took the offensive; Bonaparte with his advanced-guard, composed of all his cavalry, 3,500 grenadiers and 24 guns, marched rapidly from Alessandria down the Po to Piacenza, where he forced a crossing on the 7th, and, com-

1The Sardinians not only lacked the military foresight to seize such an opportunity, but even if they had, it is doubtful whether they could have operated successfully; (1) because they would have been inferior in forces to either army, and (2) because the distance from Mont Cenis to Turin is so short that Kellermann, unless vigorously opposed, could have reached their capital in one march, and by seizing it surround their armies. *Vide* Hamley, p. 145.

2The rapidity of Bonaparte's movements is too evident to require comment.

3A ruse employed by Bonaparte to deceive Beaulieu as to his real point for crossing that river in subsequent operations.

4Of these 42,000 troops, 12,000 were left in Mantua to guard the Austrian communications.

pletely deceiving Beaulieu, turned the Ticino.[1] The lack of a pontoon train considerably delayed his divisions, but he promptly attacked Liptai at Fombio on the 8th and drove him back on Lodi, where Beaulieu had posted his rear-guard, 12,000 strong, to cover his retreat to Brescia. On the 9th, however, Beaulieu took the offensive and that night attacked the 1st division, but, although La Harpe was killed, the French ultimately compelled him to retire. On the 10th, after a desperate fight at Lodi, the French, led by Bonaparte in person, forced the passage of the Adda and hastened Beaulieu's retreat to the Mincio.[2] Leaving Serrurier at Cremona—to observe the troops in Mantua—and Augereau at Pavia, Bonaparte, on May 15th, made a triumphal entry into Milan, whose citadel, occupied by 2,000 Austrians, was at once invested. A few days only were spent in Milan to force the Italian princes to sue for peace, and, on the 28th, he moved his entire army through Brescia against Beaulieu, who had meanwhile occupied the line of the Mincio from the Lago di Garda to Mantua. To conceal his real intention, the French general made a demonstration against Peschiera, and, on the 29th, hurled all his available forces against Valeggio, forced the Mincio, and pierced the Austrian centre. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat into Tyrol to Roveredo, and to abandon not only Peschiera, which was immediately occupied, but Mantua, in which he had left 12,000 troops.

The first Austrian army was now hors-de-combat, and Bona-

1 *In* 36 *hours Bonaparte marched* 40 *miles*, followed by his divisions in echelon, the leading division farthest from the river—a wise precaution made with even such remarkable rapidity.

2 "Napoleon on his nightly round encountered a bivouac of prisoners where there was a garrulous old Hungarian officer. He asked him how their affairs were progressing. The old captain could not deny that they were going very badly. 'But,' he added, 'there is no longer any way of understanding it. We have an affair with a young general who is now before us, then in our rear, then on our flanks. One never knows how one should place one's self. This manner of making war is insufferable and violates all custom.' " Napoleon, "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29. p. 102.

parte promptly directed his energies elsewhere. He descended the Adige and occupied Verona and Legnago, appanages of Venice, in order to compel that republic to ally itself with France. On June 4th the investment of Mantua was begun, for which Serrurier was given 15,000 men. To support him 5,000 more were left on the Adige, and Bonaparte then marched southward against the States of the Church in order to force the Pope into an alliance. Modena, the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, Genoa, Leghorn and Florence were occupied in turn and heavy contributions exacted, with the result that on June 24th, Pius VI. concluded an armistice at Foligno, and the second stage of this campaign came to a close, leaving Bonaparte master *ad interim* of all Italy except the fortress of Mantua and its beleaguered garrison.

Third Stage.

The Austrian monarchy had no idea of relinquishing its valuable Italian possessions after merely one disastrous campaign, and determined to make a vigorous attempt to relieve Mantua and to recover Lombardy. The defeated army, reinforced by 30,000 picked men from the Rhine, was organized by General Melas, and Beaulieu was superseded in command by Marshal Würmser. The army at Trent now numbered 60,000, exclusive of the 12,000 blockaded in Mantua, opposed to which Bonaparte had scarcely 45,000, of which 15,000 were engaged in investing Mantua and 10,000 in keeping open his communications.

During the last week of July, Würmser began has advance southward. Quasdanovich, with 25,000 men, was sent down the west side of the Lago di Garda to seize the French communications simultaneously with the attack of his own force of 35,000 on Verona by the eastern side of the lake—a plan by which Würmser expected to

envelop and capture the entire French army.[1] Bonaparte had meanwhile posted Masséna with 15,000 men at Rivoli, Despinoy with 5,000 at Verona, Augereau with 8,000 at Legnago, and Sauret with 4,000 at Salo, but, "not being strong enough to take the offensive, had no plan."[2] On the 29th, Masséna was driven back from Rivoli by Würmser, and Sauret from Salo by Quasdanovich moving on Brescia—facts which Bonaparte learned on the 30th. In a council of war held that day all his generals, except Augereau, advised retreat, but Bonaparte, recognizing the blunder made by his adversaries,[3] decided to fight at once, and ordered Serrurier to raise the siege of Mantua and to rejoin him, while all his other divisions were ordered to concentrate near Peschiera, which they did on the following day. On August 1st he left Masséna on the Mincio to observe and contain Würmser and moved to the Chusa, driving Quasdanovich out of Brescia. Würmser, however, succeeded in evading Masséna and in crossing the Mincio, and sent a division on Lonato and another on Castiglione, but continued his march with the bulk of his army on Mantua.[4] On the 2nd he relieved the fortress and re-provisioned the 12,000 men there blockaded and marched for Castiglione, but meanwhile Bonaparte, re-

1"It was a mistake to make the corps which had not a single communication with each other operate separately, against an army centralized and whose communications were easy." Napoleon's comments on Würmser's operations in his "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 137.

2Sargent, "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign," p. 48. His numerical inferiority forced Bonaparte to remain on the defensive, and his plan was therefore necessarily postponed until the Austrian attack had developed. Compare *supra*, p. 105, footnote 3.

3"To operate by distant directions and without communications is an error which ordinarily causes the commission of a second," etc. (*Vide* p. 108.) "It is therefore a principle that an army ought always to keep all its columns united in such a way that the enemy cannot introduce himself between them." (*Vide* p. 112.) Napoleon's comments on Würmser's mistakes, "Observations des Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 3rd observation, Correspondance, tome 29, p. 331.

4"The plan of Würmser at the beginning of August was defective." Napoleon, *ibid.*, p. 330.

joined by Serrurier, had concentrated his forces at Lonato—to which Masséna retrograded—and directed Augereau on Castiglione. On the 3rd, Augereau contained and succeeded in driving back Würmser at Castiglione, while Bonaparte, who had assembled over 25,000 troops at Lonato,[1] pierced Quasdanovich's centre and forced him to retreat in great disorder on Riva. Quasdanovich was now disposed of, and Bonaparte again concentrated his army with such wonderful rapidity that on August 5th, at the second battle of Castiglione, his forces were but little inferior in numbers to Würmser. While Masséna and Augereau attacked in front, Serrurier turned the Austrian flank and fell upon his rear,[2] with the result that Würmser was badly defeated and compelled to retreat across the Mincio. Routed again on the 6th at Peschiera, the Austrians fled into Tyrol to their former position at Roveredo.

The French army was again established on the Adige and Mantua was re-invested after this brief and remarkable campaign. "*In six days Bonaparte had captured, killed or wounded nearly twenty thousand Austrians, and had lost but seven thousand French. In six days he had fought and won three pitched battles, and had almost annihilated Würmser's army, and had for the second time driven the Austrians out of Italy*"[3]

For the next three weeks both armies remained inactive, and both were reinforced. In the beginning of September, Würmser again began his advance southward. Notwithstanding the salutary lesson he had just received, he persisted in dividing his forces again, leaving the di-

1By his skill in manœuvering Bonaparte actually outnumbered Quasdanovich.

2"The art of war indicates that a wing must be turned or outflanked without separating the army." (*Vide supra*, p. 112.)

3Sargent, p. 51. The reader will note the masterful way in which Bonaparte employed "interior lines." The rules laid down on page 109, footnote 5, should be borne in mind in considering these movements.

vision of Davidovich, composed of 20,000 men, scattered in detachments through the Tyrol, while he descended the valley of the Brenta with 26,000 men. His plan was to cross the Adige between Verona and Legnago, to relieve Mantua, and in case the French should advance into the Tyrol, to sever their line of retreat, while Davidovich should attack them in front in the defiles of the Adige.

Meanwhile Bonaparte had been reinforced to 42,000 men by a detachment from Kellermann's army and had also taken the offensive, his purpose being to drive the Austrians from the Tyrol and to effect a junction with the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, who were fighting the Archduke Charles on the upper Danube. Leaving garrisons at Verona and Legnago, and Sahuguet to continue the siege of Mantua, he directed Vaubois up the west shore of the Lago di Garda through Riva on Roveredo,[1] for which place Bonaparte marched by the eastern side, with the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, in total ignorance of Würmser's movement. On August 31st he united these three divisions,[2] and, on September 4th, attacked and defeated Davidovich at Roveredo and Calliano, and, driving him into the Tyrol, seized Trent on the 5th. Here Bonaparte was first informed that Würmser had advanced down the Brenta.[3] It was one of those situations in which Fortune favors genius rather than mediocrity. Würmser had involuntarily produced a strategic rupture between his army and that of Davidovich into which the French general had unconsciously penetrated. Far from threaten-

1Vaubois had been stationed at Salo to prevent the Austrians in the Tyrol from seizing the French communications by the west side of the lake. His advance through Riva to Roveredo secured them on that side, but it may seem that it gave the Austrians the opportunity to crush in detail the French forces just as Bonaparte had done with Quasdanovich and Würmser. In case of attack, Vaubois was to rejoin Bonaparte by the southern end of the lake, which would have prevented such an operation.

2Notice the careful observance of the principle that "all junctions of army corps should be made in the rear and far from the enemy." (*Vide supra*, p. 113.)

3*Vide* map facing p. 140.

ing the French rear, the French communications with Turin were secured by the possession of Roveredo and Riva, while the occupation of Trent enabled Bonaparte to debouch through the valley of the Brenta directly upon Würmser's rear. Finding himself unexpectedly in a most favorable position and with one of his enemies routed, Bonaparte renounced his original plan of uniting with the Army of the Rhine, and with splendid audacity determined to follow and crush Würmser before he could reach Mantua.[1] Leaving Vaubois to observe and contain Davidovich, he hastened with Augereau and Masséna through the Brenta Pass and, *marching 50 miles in two days*, attacked the Austrian rear-guard at Primolano on the 7th, and captured more than 4,000 men. The advanced-guard was this day engaged with the French garrison at Verona, and Würmser was utterly astonished and dismayed to find Bonaparte in his rear. He at once recalled and assembled the bulk of his forces, and, on September 8th, he fought the battle of Bassano, in which Quasdanovich's division was separated from him, annihilated and forced to retreat with barely 3,000 men to Friuli.[2] Würmser, with 12,000 men, then made a dash for Mantua, and a race for that fortress ensued; Bonaparte directed Masséna to cross the Adige at Ronco and Augereau to move through Padua and Legnago, and ordered Sahuguet at Mantua to destroy all the bridges about that town. Würmser halted one day at Legnago, where he left a garrison of 2,000 men, and this delay would have been fatal to him, but Masséna had unfortunately no pontoon train for a prompt crossing of the Adige, and Sahuguet did not receive the order until late and was so unnecessarily slow that Würmser,

1"True wisdom for a general is in an energetic determination." Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 16th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 209.

2In this battle Bonaparte had, as usual, by his skill in manœuvering, assembled more forces than the Austrians. The French numbered 22,000 and the Austrians 20,000.

notwithstanding his several hard night marches, succeeded in entering Mantua on the 14th.

In the meantime, Augereau and Masséna had capturned the Austrian garrison left at Legnago on the 13th, and Bonaparte had again concentrated his three divisions. On the 15th he once more defeated Würmser, who had advanced with the garrison of Mantua to meet him at San Georgio. The Austrians were driven within the walls, and, for the third time, the place was invested. *In less than a fortnight the third Austrian army had been annihilated and hopelessly dispersed. Of a fourth army of 46,000 men, a part was in the Tyrol, another part in Friuli, 15,000 had been killed, wounded or captured, and the Commander-in-chief, with one-fourth of his forces, was blockaded in Mantua,* while Bonaparte's army was concentrated after losing only 7,500 men.[1]

Fourth Stage.

After the defeat of the third Austrian army, Bonaparte occupied himself with the reconstitution of northern Italy and the erection of the Lombard Republic, but before the deliberations of the Assembly of Deputies had concluded, another Austrian army had taken the field. The Court of Vienna, surprised and disgusted, prepared for a desperate effort to regain its possessions and its prestige. The Emperor Francis II. appealed directly to the patriotism of his people, and a new and enthusiastic army was equipped under command of General Alvinzi. The prospect for the Austrians was decidedly favorable. Davidovich, with 20,000 men, was in the Tyrol; Alvinzi, with Quasdanovich's corps of 30,000, in Friuli, and Würmser, with 20,000 men, besieged at Mantua, a total of 70,000, opposed to which Bonaparte had scarcely 40,000 men, of which 8,000 under Kilmaine were besieging Mantua, 10,000 under Masséna were at Bassano observing Alvinzi, 9,000

1Napoleon, "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 148.

under Augereau at Verona, 10,000 under Vaubois near Trent, and about 2,000 cavalry in reserve.

Alvinzi's plan was that Davidovich should drive Vaubois from the Lavis and that Quasdanovich should defeat Masséna at Bassano by reason of their respective numerical superiority, both advancing on Verona, the former down the Adige and the latter from Bassano, whence with all his forces united Alvinzi purposed to relieve Mantua.[1] Bonaparte's plan was to repeat the same manœuvre which he had just so successfully used against Würmser, but reversing the side on which the attack should be made. "In other words, while Vaubois was holding Davidovich in check, Bonaparte intended to attack Alvinzi in force at or near Bassano and defeat him if possible; then to ascend the Brenta and unite with Vaubois for a combined attack against Davidovich."[2]

On November 1st the Austrian advance began. Vaubois fell back toward Rivoli and Masséna toward Verona;[3] Bonaparte then directed Vaubois to check Davidovich's movement, and, by the 5th, had himself concentrated Masséna and Augereau's divisions to resist Alvinzi, whom he attacked on the 6th at the Brenta near Vincenza with only partial success. The information that Vaubois was hard pressed forced him, moreover, to abandon the attack planned for the following day and to retire to Verona, where he learned that Vaubois, after losing one-third of his forces, had been forced back from Trent to Corona.

1"Nothing is more faulty than this plan." Napoleon's comments on Alvinzi, "Observations sur les Campagnes 1796 et 1797," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 336.

2Sargent, p. 78.

3These manœuvres enabled Alvinzi to communicate with Davidovich along the valley of the Brenta by the road Bassano-Trent, but he strangely neglected this great opportunity and continued to operate by separate lines.

"He should, as soon as he was master of Bassano and Davidovich of Trente, have made him come by the gorges of the Brenta on Bassano, leaving the Tyrolese militia on Trente, and have presented himself on the Adige with all his army united." Napoleon's "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, p. 336.

Thither Bonaparte hurried with a few hastily collected battalions to restore by his presence their *morale* and to check Davidovich, and then as hurriedly returned to Verona, but during his absence Alvinzi had advanced on the 9th to Caldiero and had there taken up a very strong position. On the 12th the French attacked in a severe rainstorm, but were repulsed with considerable loss.

Bonaparte's situation was now extremely critical,[1] since the two Austrian armies had nearly succeeded in effecting their junction. For two days both armies remained inactive and Bonaparte prepared a master-stroke of audacity. On the night of the 14th he evacuated Verona, crossed the Adige with about 20,000 men, and, marching down the right bank to Ronco, recrossed the river and reached the Alpon in the early morning of the 15th to turn Alvinzi's left flank. At Arcola[2] a division of Croats was encountered and a severe fight followed, which caused Alvinzi to change front to the Alpon. For three successive days both armies fought desperately for the possession of the causeways over the marches, but it was not until the 17th that Bonaparte, who had given his soldiers an example of extraordinary personal bravery, succeeded, by means of a stratagem, in gaining this remarkable battle of Arcola and in forcing Alvinzi to retreat to Vincenza and Bassano.

Meanwhile Davidovich had defeated Vaubois at Rivoli and had compelled him to retrograde toward Verona. In spite of the fatigue of his own soldiers, Bonaparte sent his cavalry to pursue Alvinzi and himself turned with characteristic rapidity back to Verona, where he united with Vaubois, attacked Davidovich at Rivoli on the 19th and drove him back into the Tyrol.[3] During this time Al-

1Napoleon, "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 154.

2"The country between Arcola and the Adige had not been guarded at all." *Ibid., p.* 158.

3The advantage of interior lines and central position had now shifted from Alvinzi to Bonaparte, whose masterful use of them contrasts strongly with Alvinzi's failure to appreciate and employ them.

vinzi had ascertained that he was pursued by cavalry only and had renewed his advance on Verona, but, upon learning of Davidovich's defeat, resumed his retreat behind the Brenta.

Although Alvinzi's forces had outnumbered the French in the proportion of 7 to 4, and although he had several times had victory within his grasp, he failed utterly to seize these advantages. *In three weeks Bonaparte, by keeping his forces carefully united, by the rapidity of his movements, and by concentrating before every battle, had outmanoeuvred, defeated, and dispersed the fourth Austrian army, and had moreover kept Würmser shut up in Mantua an idle spectator of events.*[1] The desperate fighting had caused heavy losses amounting to about 13,000 men on each side. Although victorious, Bonaparte was sadly in need of reinforcements and "the army stood more than ever in need of rest."[2] He therefore made overtures for peace, which resulted in an armistice and a suspension of hostilities until January, 1797, and brought to a close *this marvelous campaign in which Bonaparte had invaded a hostile territory, and, notwithstanding his continual inferiority of forces,*[3] *had routed in succession five distinct armies.*

CAMPAIGN OF 1797.

Although four Austrian armies had been defeated, yet the Aulic Council persevered in its efforts to regain its Italian possessions. By the 1st of January, 1797, Alvinzi's armies in the Tyrol and Friuli were increased to 65,000, and Würmser with 20,000 starving men still held out in

1Throughout the fighting Würmser remained immovable in Mantua and made only a few half-hearted sorties. Alvinzi had not expected to arrive there until November 23rd, and requested Würmser not to make any attempt to get out until that date—a request which was obeyed to the letter. Before the 23rd Kilmaine had resumed the siege.

2Napoleon, "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 163.

3*Vide* Sargent, p. 168, on which the forces are tabulated and compared.

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

Mantua. The Pope was incited to disregard the Armistice of Foligno[1] and to raise the Italians in revolt against the French. Alvinzi proposed a new plan; he purposed to advance with 28,000 men from the Tyrol on Rivoli, while Provera with 17,000 should move from Friuli on Verona and Legnago by an independent line[2] and attack the French, during which Alvinzi should defeat Bonaparte near Rivoli, sever his communications and relieve Mantua.

Bonaparte, whose army had now been reinforced by 7,000 troops from Provence,[3] had about 44,000 men, of which 10,000 were besieging Mantua and the remainder were on the Adige, between Corona and Legnago. The French commander had no plan, but, keeping his forces united and in good intercommunication, awaited in his central position the development of the Austrian attack.[4] On January 12th, Alvinzi's advanced-guard drove in Joubert's outposts near Corona, but Provera was repulsed by Masséna near Verona with such ease that Bonaparte became convinced that the principal attack would not be made in this direction—a conviction which was confirmed by the information received next day of Alvinzi's attack and the scarcity of Austrian troops on the lower Adige or on the west side of the Lago di Garda. His decision was at once made, and this day he left 2,000 of Masséna's division at Verona and directed all the other forces at his disposal to concentrate by forced marches on Rivoli, where Joubert was ordered to stop the Austrian advance. Alvinzi had expected to find the French in force at Rivoli, but he made the mistake of separating his six columns

1 *Vide supra*, p. 124.

2 One would think that by this time the Austrians should have seen the inconveniences of operating by two lines, especially in the presence of Bonaparte. This was evidently not the case with soldiers so wedded to the past as they.

3 Napoleon, "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 211.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214. Compare *supra*, pp. 125 and 105.

by impassable obstacles.[1] Bonaparte reached Rivoli after midnight on the 13th, and made a thorough reconnaissance which at once enabled him to comprehend the blunder made by his adversary. Notwithstanding his inferiority of forces, he resolved to attempt to prevent the simultaneous arrival on the battlefield of Alvinzi's columns and to crush them in detail. On the 14th of January he fought the celebrated battle of Rivoli, the greatest of all his tactical victories,[2] in which with only 22,000 men[3] he utterly overwhelmed Alvinzi with 28,000. The battle cost the Austrians more than 8,000 men. The pursuit by Joubert was prompt and energetic; on the following day 7,000 more Austrians were captured, and on the 16th Alvinzi, in his retreat to the Tyrol, could barely muster 13,230 men.[4]

From the battlefield of Rivoli, Bonaparte turned southward with Masséna's division on a forced march for Mantua, to anticipate Provera, who had already forced Augereau's centre on the Adige, crossed the river and had marched for Mantua, hotly pursued by that general. On the 15th, Provera reached Mantua, and on the morning of the 16th attacked Serrurier on one side while Würmser, issuing from the fortress, attacked him on the other. Under ordinary circumstances Serrurier would have been crushed, but in war, as in all great crises, even the min-

1"An army ought always to keep all its columns united in such a way that the enemy cannot introduce himself between them." *Vide supra,* p. 112.

2"His tactical manœuvres at Rivoli were very similar to his strategical manœuvres within the theatre of operations. In both cases he brought a stronger force against his adversary at the vital point, while he held back with small forces the enemy's isolated columns." Sargent, p. 121.

3The battle was begun with 10,000 men. Joubert's division was soon reinforced by Masséna with 8,000 and later by 4,000 under Rey, who arrived just in time to attack Lusignan, who had separated himself from the main army in making a flank movement to surround Bonaparte. *Vide* maxim, *supra,* p. 112.

4Sargent, p. 104.

utes count, and the Austrians[1] had reckoned without the boy-general of 27, who had marched from the battlefield of Rivoli with Masséna's weary division, *night and day*, and on the morning of the 16th had arrived before Mantua.[2] While Serrurier drove Würmser back into Mantua, Bonaparte united with Augereau and attacked Provera at La Favorita. The retreat of Würmser disengaged Serrurier, who promptly took Provera in reverse, with the result that his entire force of 5,000 men was compelled to surrender.[3] For sixteen days longer Würmser's starving garrison held heroically on to a desperate hope, but on February 2nd it capitulated.

With the surrender of Mantua terminated manoeuvres "which for brilliancy and completeness remain unsurpassed by any single military operation in history."[4] *With only 44,000 men, Bonaparte had killed, wounded or captured nearly 43,000 Austrians,*[5] *and had annihilated the fifth Austrian army.* For the first time Mantua was in possession of the French, and Bonaparte was at last the absolute master of all Italy.

1"The Austrians in general do not know the price of time." Napoleon, Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 339.

2Masséna's division had in addition marched and fought continuously for twenty-four hours previous to the battle of Rivoli.

3"The strategy and tactics which Bonaparte displayed in these three days' fighting in Italy give us, perhaps, a clearer insight into his system of war than any other single campaign in his remarkable career. His divisions were centrally situated. Strategically, the Austrians almost surrounded him; twenty-eight thousand were marching from the Tyrol upon Rivoli, seventeen thousand from Bassano upon the lower Adige, and twenty thousand were in his rear at Mantua. Having decided that the main Austrian army was approaching Rivoli, he concentrated there his available forces, took the offensive, and, though actually surrounded upon the battlefield, succeeded by his superior tactics in crushing Alvinzi's army; then, before the smoke of battle had died away, he led his weary but heroic troops toward Mantua, where he concentrated once more his forces, took again the offensive, overwhelmed and captured Provera's army, drove Würmser within the walls of Mantua, and forced him to capitulate." Sargent, pp. 121-122.

4*Ibid.*, p. 122.

5The Austrians lost 15,000 men at Rivoli and in the subsequent pursuit; Masséna had captured 1,000 at Verona and Augereau 2,000 near Legnago, Provera surrendered 5,000 at La Favorita, and Würmser 20,000 at Mantua. Compare "Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 86.

Second Stage.

The fall of Mantua, coupled with the defeat of five distinct Austrian armies, threw Austria into consternation lest its own territory should next be the scene of war. The sixth army was raised to 100,000 men, and the Archduke Charles Louis of Lorraine, the brother of the Emperor and the ablest of all the Austrian generals, fresh from his victorious campaign against Moreau and Jourdan, superseded Alvinzi in command. The projected reinforcements reached his army either late or never, so that when, on February 11th, he assumed command, his forces comprised only 42,000, composed of 10,000 Austrians and 10,000 Tyrolese militia in the Tyrol, and 22,000 on the Piave. The Aulic Council had moveover greatly hampered his operations by insisting that he should remain on the Piave to cover the seaport of Trieste. He was therefore reduced to the defensive, and compelled to await the slow arrival of his reinforcements.[1]

Before the fall of Mantua, Bonaparte had formulated a plan for future operations, in which he purposed to use the Mincio as a base, and, defeating the Austrians, to cross the Tyrolean Alps and invade Austria, reinforced by 30,000 men, and with the coöperation of Moreau and Jourdan. He had communicated his plan to the Directory, which promptly ordered the divisions of Delmas and Bernadotte, numbering over 20,000 men, to cross the Alps to join him, thus bringing his effective forces up to 70,000 troops.

1When the Archduke was appointed to command the Austrian armies in 1797, Bonaparte remarked to Maesfield, the Austrian envoy, "Your cabinet has sent against me three armies without generals. It now sends a general without an army."

The Archduke had proved himself a really great soldier. He was young—younger even than Bonaparte—but his views on war were the result of profound study and his own successes in the field. Throughout his career his manœuvres were nearly always sound, and he was, beyond doubt, the ablest of all the generals opposed to Napoleon.

Early in March the Archduke had assembled 35,000 men on the Piave and 15,000 in the Tyrol, to oppose the French army of 52,000.[1] To oppose the Austrians in the Tyrol, Bonaparte sent Delmas and Baraguey-d'Hilliers to reinforce Joubert, whose command thus numbered 18,000, and ordered him to hold the Austrians in check and, if possible, to drive them over the Tyrolean Alps. Bonaparte retained the divisions of Masséna, Serrurier, Guieu (replacing Augereau), and Bernadotte, in all 34,000 men, on the Piave, and on March 10th began his advance. On the 12th Masséna, moving from Bassano, crossed the Piave and defeated at Longaro the division under Lusignan and captured that general. This exposed the Austrian right flank, and the Archduke accordingly withdrew behind the Tagliamento. On the 13th Bonaparte, with his three divisions, crossed the Piave, moving on Valvasone, where he arrived on the morning of the 16th to find the Archduke deployed for battle. Keeping Serrurier in reserve, he directed Guieu and Bernadotte across the ford of the Tagliamento, and by a very skillful movement turned the Archduke's left flank and compelled him to retreat to the Isonzo at Gradisca with the bulk of his forces. The Archduke, however, directed Baylitsch with a large convoy through Undine on Tarwis to anticipate Masséna, who was moving on Pontebba, and ordered him to unite with the débris of Lusignan's division under Ocskay, and to hold the passes of Pontebba and Tarwis, by which the reinforcements expected could most directly join him.

Meanwhile the French advance had continued. On the 17th Bonaparte had occupied Palma Nova and had driven the Archduke back to Gradisca, where he captured the garrison there entrenched on the 19th, and forced the

[1] The Directory had positively refused to ratify the Treaty of Bologna, signed March 1st, and thus deprived Bonaparte of a contingent of 8,000 Sardinians. The refusal of Venice to conclude an alliance forced him, moreover, to leave Victor and Kilmaine with 18,000 troops in Italy to protect his rear.

Archduke, whose left was supported by those entrenchments, to retreat across the Isonzo through Adelsberg on Laibach in order to avoid being thrown into the valley of that river and his retreat severed. Bernadotte was ordered to pursue him while Bonaparte with the divisions of Serrurier and Guieu turned northward after Baylitsch. Masséna had, in the meantime, defeated Ocskay, and, by seizing the Pass of Tarwis, had completely enveloped Baylitsch. This was just what the Archduke had feared in the critical situation in which he now found himself. All of his forces had been defeated and scattered, and were everywhere retreating. He accordingly ordered his main force to follow as fast as possible through Krainburg while he hastened in person to Villach, where his reinforcements had already begun to arrive. Assembling 6,000 fresh troops, he united them to Ocskay and made a desperate effort amid the ice and snow, above even the clouds, to dislodge Masséna from the Tarwis Pass. His attempt was partially successful, but the stubborn Masséna eventually regained the possession of the pass and forced the Archduke to retreat to Klagenfurt. Then turning on Baylitsch, he attacked the head of his column simultaneously with Bonaparte's attack upon his rear, and forced that general to capitulate with 4,000 men and an immense quantity of baggage and ammunition. Bonaparte then occupied Villach.

Joubert had, meanwhile, ascended the Adige, routed the Austrians at St. Michael on the 20th and at Neumarkt on the 22nd, at which latter battle he had separated Laudon and Kerpen, driving the former on Meran and the latter on Brixen. Following up Kerpen, he again defeated him in spite of reinforcements at Klausen on the 24th and at Mittenwald on the 28th, and forced him to retreat over the Brenner Pass. Turning then toward Brixen, he made preparations to crush Laudon, but, on learning that

Bonaparte had reached the Drave, moved through Innichen to rejoin him at Klagenfurt,[1] which Bonaparte had occupied on March 31st.

Notwithstanding the revolt of the Venetians which had threatened his communications and the failure of the French armies on the Rhine to advance into Austria, Bonaparte put on a bold front and wrote to the Archduke suggesting peace, to which a reply was made that the Archduke had no authority to treat. Bernadotte, who had advanced through Krainburg, had now rejoined him; but, without waiting for the arrival of Joubert, Bonaparte attacked the Austrian advanced-guard at St. Veit on April 1st, overthrew it, and pursued it to Neumarkt, where he encountered the concentrated army of the Archduke reinforced by four divisions from the Rhine. After a desperate fight, the Austrians were again compelled to retreat with a loss of 1,000 men. At Unzmarkt, on the 2nd, the Archduke made another stand, but was once more forced to retreat with loss down the Mur, followed by Bonaparte, who entered Leoben on the 7th.

The Austrian Court in consternation requested a suspension of hostilities for ten days, of which five were granted. On the 12th envoys arrived, and on the 17th was signed the preliminary Peace of Leoben, whose terms

1It has been declared that Bonaparte violated the principle upon which he laid so much emphasis himself—*viz.*, that an army must have but one line of operations. Although at the outset he purposed to rally Joubert to him by the valley of the Drave, yet had he never crossed the Julian Alps, Joubert would never have entered the Drave. Joubert was ordered to act merely to protect the communications of the Army of Italy from attacks by the Austrians from the Tyrol by holding them in check That he should drive them over the Tyrolean Alps was a secondary consideration. (*Vide supra*, p. 137, and Derrécagaix, Part 1, pp. 256-258.) His role was that of a containing force—like Vaubois in the campaign of 1796 (*vide supra* p. 130)—while "in reality, the decisive movement, that of the army proper, was to take place upon a single line of operations, the line of Friuli." (*Vide* Derrécagaix, Part 1, p. 259.) Although it may appear that there were two lines of operation, there was, however, only one. Napoleon never operated but by one single line. (Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 11.)

were generally embodied in the definitive Treaty of Campo Formio (October 17th, 1797).[1]

The last stage of these two wonderful campaigns was ended. *In one month Bonaparte had captured, killed or wounded more than 20,000 Austrians and had defeated in every battle the sixth Austrian army, commanded by the greatest soldier whom Austria has ever produced.*[2] "The Preliminaries of Leoben crowned Bonaparte's great victories, and the monarchs of Europe quickly recognized that they had no longer to deal with the French Republic, but with the young Corsican general."[3]

Such was the Napoleonic Strategy. Its chief characteristics were, as we have seen, (1) the initiative at the commencement of hostilities, (2) one line of operations, (3) the unity of forces, (4) rapidity of movement, and (5) concentration before battle. The principles which have been laid down for their observance may be condensed briefly into two great maxims—viz.: (1) *Surprise and, by rapidity of movement, outmanoeuvre your enemy*, and (2) *Never be vulnerable on any point.*[4] These principles are nowhere better demonstrated in all Napoleon's great operations than in the campaigns of 1796 and 1797. "In that single year, the first in which he commanded an army, he illustrated completely the system of war which deserves to be styled the Napoleonic, since he was, if not its inventor, its greatest exemplar."[5] The world had never before seen, and probably will never again see, another such consummate master of the art of Strategy as Napoleon Bonaparte.

1 *Vide* Stephens, "Revolutionary Europe," p. 192.
2 Sargent, p. 144.
3 Stephens, p. 186.
4 Compare Napoleon's comments on Cæsar (*vide supra*, p. 104).
5 Hamley, p. 471.


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THE CAMPAIGN OF ECKMÜHL, 1809.

Napoleon's Most Brilliant Manoeuvres.

THE CAMPAIGN OF ECKMÜHL, 1809.

Napoleon's Most Brilliant Manoeuvres.

I.

The military disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz coupled with the Treaty of Pressburg (December 26th, 1805) had reduced Austria to a state of defenseless humiliation which was felt most poignantly by the entire nation. Coblenzl had been succeeded as premier by Count Philip Stadion, and this enlightened statesman, strongly convinced that Napoleon would soon renew his irresistible conquests and further extend his empire at the expense of the House of Hapsburg, had labored unceasingly to prepare for a renewal of the struggle with France. In spite of the extraordinary temptation offered by the Polish campaign (1806—1807) to strike a decisive blow, Stadion had held the Austrian Cabinet to the strictest neutrality, and the wisdom of his course was recognized when at Friedland (June 14th, 1807) a crushing defeat was inflicted upon the Russians, and at the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7th and 9th, 1807) Napoleon reached the zenith of his power and became the unquestioned master of western Europe. During this entire period the Austrian War Office, under the able administration of the Archduke Charles, had directed the most unremitting, but unostentatious, efforts to reorganizing the army which had been so demoralized by the campaign of 1805; the arsenals were replenished, the cavalry and artillery re-equippped, and the infantry—which is always the real basis for a powerful military establishment—recruited up to its full complement and remodelled upon that admirable system introduced by Napoleon by which troops were divided into *corps d'armée*, under the command of Marshals, composed of divisions with such cavalry and ar-

tillery as to make each one a small army complete in itself. The younger and more ardent officers, under the leadership of the Archduke John, devoted their energies to forming the plans for national defense, especially by the militia, to fostering to its fullest extent the national enthusiasm and inciting heroic sacrifice in the event of another war.

The proximity of the French "Grand Army" to Austria during the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 had completely overawed the Austrian Cabinet and rendered it alive to the necessity of giving Napoleon absolutely no umbrage at its policy. On June 9th, 1808, when the news had been received at Vienna that the French Emperor had declared war on Spain, had withdrawn most of his corps from Germany, and was directing the bulk of his forces into the Peninsula, the Government decided that a guarded policy was no longer requisite and at once decreed the organization of the militia into a Landwehr of 200,000 men. So ardently had the enthusiasm for national unity been provoked that the Hungarian Diet had already voted 12,000 recruits for the regular army for 1807 and 80,000 for the year 1808, in addition to a levy *en masse* of 80,000 volunteers, of which 30,000 were excellent cavalry.[1] To a standing army of 300,000[2] were thus added 280,000 militia[3] which for the first time was trained for offensive as well as defensive war, and the popular enthusiasm coupled with the activity of preparation for war was sufficient to render these forces much more formidable than they would otherwise have been. So ominous were these armaments that when news of them reached Napoleon in Bayonne he immediately made strong remonstrances and demanded an explanation from Austria, at the same time ordering the princes of the Confederation

1Alison, "History of Europe," Vol. III., p. 175.

2"Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 105, the official list of Austrian forces, battles and losses since 1495.

3The Hungarian insurrection under the Archduke Joseph produced only 18½ battalions and 98 squadrons, a total of 20,810 infantry and 15,107 cavalry.

of the Rhine to make ready their contingents and prevent a war without a pretext as without an object, by showing Austria that they were prepared for it.[1] The Spanish insurrection followed by the capitulation of Dupont at Baylen, on July 19th, 1808, the first great disaster to the French arms, "created the deepest impression in every country of Europe that still entertained the thought of resistance to France,"[2] and delayed Napoleon's return to Paris; but on August 15th he publicly remonstrated with Metternich, the Austrian ambassador, in the presence of all the European diplomats attending the Court at the Tuileries. With the defeat of Junot by Wellesley at Vimieiro on August 21st and the evacuation of Portugal by the French forces as a result of the Convention of Cintra, August 30th, following close on the heels of Dupont's surrender, the statesmen of Austria and Prussia awoke to a realization that the impotency of the previous coalitions against Napoleon was due to the fact that they "had always been the affair of the cabinets, and never the affair of the people."[3] While Metternich made loud professions of his sovereign's pacific intentions,—which in no wise deceived Napoleon,—Austria continued her preparations for war with an energy then unprecedented and on a scale rivalling that of France, while in Prussia, where the people had been goaded into desperation by the indignities suffered, the contributions extorted by the French, and the hard conditions imposed by Napoleon in return for his evacuating the country, Stein, the Prime Minister, had done his utmost to provoke a war to relieve her forlorn condition. To neutralize these influences, Napoleon arranged a conference with the Tsar Alexander at Erfurt, on October 7th, 1808, to which neither Francis II. nor Frederick William were invited in person. This brilliant congress of vassal kings

1Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 14,230, tome 17, pp. 417-418.
2Fyffe, "History of Modern Europe," Vol. I., p. 386.
3*Ibid.*, p. 387.

and princes accomplished little beyond temporarily cementing the bonds between France and Russia, and forcing the Prussian envoy, Goltz, to sign a treaty making Prussia unreservedly dependent upon France, and thereby compelling the King to dismiss Stein, the leader of the patriotic party. TheAustrian envoy, Baron de Vincent, was so adroit in his addresses that he completely persuaded Napoleon that no danger was to be expected from his State, and on October 12th-14th the Rhenish princes were instructed to dismiss their assembled contingents with the proviso that they should be reassembled only in the event of a resumption of hostile attitude by Austria.[1] Napoleon then, convinced that he had regained such an ascendency over the Tsar that Alexander would keep Europe overawed until the vexing Spanish problem had been solved, disbanded the "Grand Army," sent the corps of Ney, Soult and the Guard across the Pyrenees, whither he proceeded and remained until January 17th, 1809, to direct himself the operations which resulted in the occupation of Madrid (December 4th, 1808), the expulsion of the English, and the almost complete conquest of the Peninsula.

Meanwhile Austria continued her preparations for war with the greatest energy, encouraged by the reverses experienced by the French in Spain, by the withdrawal of the French corps from central Europe, by the ever-growing patriotism of the Prussians fanned into flame by Fichte the philosopher, Arndt the poet, and Schleiermacher the theologian, and propagated by the secret society of the Tugendbund (League of Virtue), which later proved one of the principal factors in the fall of the French Empire. The intrigues of the English agents, the subsidies of English gold, and the fact that Napoleon was deeply engrossed in Spain induced the war party under the sanguine Stadion no longer to conceal its openly hostile intentions, much

[1] Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 14,382, tome 17, p. 559.

against the far-sighted advice of the Archduke Charles, who had striven so earnestly to create a force far superior to anything Austria had hitherto possessed and "had infused into the mass of the army that confident and patriotic spirit which he saw in others rather than felt in himself."[1] Napoleon in Spain became decidedly alarmed and abandoned the pursuit of Sir John Moore to Soult; on January 7th he reached Valladolid, and eight days later despatched a multitude of orders to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to prepare their forces for war,[2] and to Davout, commanding the "Army of the Rhine" at Erfurt,[3] to direct General Oudinot's corps[4] and Espagne's division of cuirassiers to Augsburg.[5] On the 17th he left Valladolid and reached Paris on the 24th, and for the next three weeks divided his attention between Austria and Spain. He openly charged the Austrian Government with hostile purposes, which Metternich, the Austrian ambassador, could not categorically deny and had no alternative but to protest that they were rendered necessary for defense only by the hostile attitude taken by the princes of the Rhenish Confederation. Austria had endeavored to draw Russia into the coalition by sending Prince Schwarzenberg to St. Petersburg, but the Tsar merely expressed his astonishment at the Austrian policy and declared that he would remain faithful to his agreements made to Napoleon, and when the news of this reached Paris on February 19th, orders were at once sent to recall General Andréossy, the French ambassador at Schoenbrunn. Great umbrage had been taken by Francis II. in that he had not been invited

1Fyffe, Vol. I., p. 403.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, Nos. 14,718 to 14,724, tome 18, pp. 228-233.

3Davout's army numbered 80,032 in January, 1809.

4Oudinot formed with 26,480 men, 2,646 cavalry and 18 guns, the "Corps of Reserve" stationed at Mayence.

5Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 14,711, tome 18, p. 220.

to participate at the Congress of Erfurt,[1] and Metternich further reported that Napoleon intended to divide Turkey after finishing Spain, and counselled his sovereign that sooner or later Austria must strike in self-defense.[2] By the 21st war was so inevitable that Napoleon wrote his stepson, the Viceroy of Italy, that "it appears that Austria wants war; if she wants it, she shall have it;"[3] but neither Napoleon nor Francis cared to take the initiative, because neither army had had sufficient time to concentrate.

By the beginning of March, Austria had more than 207,000 men ready to take the field in Germany alone,[4] divided thus:

First Corps, Count Bellegarde. .	25,700 inf. and	2,100 cav.
Second Corps, Count Kollowrath.	23,300	2,700
Third Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Prince Hohenzollern..	23,913	1,010
Fourth Corps, Lieut.-Gen Prince Rosenberg..	24,914	2,894
Fifth Corps, Lieut.-Gen. H. I. H. Archduke Louis..	24,383	2,042
Sixth Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Baron Hiller..	23,374	2,139
First Corps of Reserve, Lieut.-Gen. Prince Jean Lichtenstein ..	12,998	2,564

1 *Vide* Napoleon, Correspondance, tome 18, pp. 303-307. Report of Count Champagny, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, on an interview with Metternich.

2 Metternich, Memoirs, Vol. II., pp. 176-184, 194-201.

3 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 14,797, tome 18, p. 279.

4 In Italy, under the Archduke John, were the Eighth (Lt.-Gen. Count Albert Gyulai, *vice* Lt.-Gen. Marquis Chasteler) and Ninth (Lt.-Gen. Ignatius Gyulai) Corps, 41 battalions and 40 squadrons, a total of 42,598 infantry, 4,700 cavalry and 148 guns, and 26,000 landwehrs (33 battalions) from Carinthia, Carniola, and Istria, a grand total of 73,278 men. In Poland, under the Archduke Ferdinand, were 25 battalions and 44 squadrons, 30,200 infantry and 5,200 cavalry, and 94 guns. The grand total of the Austrian troops of the line at the opening of the campaign was therefore 238 battalions, 243 squadrons and 800 guns, 265,092 infantry and 29,488 cavalry. Reserves, 188,528 infantry and 3,318 cavalry, which, added to the Hungarian insurrection, gives 229,794 men.

Compare Sutterheim, "Feldzug von 1809," pp. 38-46; Jomini, "Life of Napoleon" (translated by Halleck), Vol. III., pp. 17, 27-29; Alison, Vol. III., p. 180

Second Corps of Reserve, Lieut.-Gen. Baron Kienmayer	6,950	2,460
Division under General Baron Jellachich	9,962	1,009
	175,494	18,918
Artillery—518 guns.	12,976	
Total,	188,470	and 18,918[1]

The original plan was to mass this entire army on the northwestern frontier of Bohemia behind the Böhmer Wald, and by sudden incursion, seconded by the general uprising against the French led by Stein and the Tugendbund, to overwhelm Davout's isolated corps, and, advancing between the valley of the Main and the Black Forest, to threaten the French frontier of the Rhine before Napoleon could assemble the necessary troops to oppose them.[2] In view of the exceptional superiority of the Austrian preparations, this plan was undoubtedly a wise one, and "for the first time since the creation of the Consulate it appeared as if the opening advantages of the war must inevitably be on the side of the enemies of France."[3] Bavaria thus isolated

1Compare Pelet, "Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809 en Allemagne," tome 1, pp. 167-170. Throughout this study the writer follows mainly this admirable and accurate history of General Pelet—at that time a captain on the staff of the Duke of Rivoli (Marshal Masséna)—qualified by Jomini's "Life of Napoleon."

2The instructions of the Aulic Council in the outset of the campaign were, "to advance in large masses, and attack the French army wherever it might assemble, either on the Main, the Nab, or the Danube. Should a French corps enter Bavaria, the grand Austrian army *was not to swerve from its direction*, but to trust to arresting the movement on Bavaria by threatening the advancing corps on the side of Ratisbon or Donauwörth. If Marshal Davout retired in order to avoid any engagement before the arrival of his reinforcements, *the grand Austrian army was*, nevertheless, *to continue its advance with all possible expedition, and take up a central position between the Black Forest and the Main*, and there be regulated by the forces of the enemy and the chances of successful operations which were afforded. The issue of the war depends on this operation and on the issue of the first battle, which will, in all probability, if successful, rouse the malcontents of Baireuth, overawe Saxony, and bring round to the standards of Austria a great part of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine which are now arrayed against her." Stutterheim, pp. 64-69

3Fyffe, Vol. I., p. 408.

could again be subjugated while the base would secure their line of operations. To that end Bellegarde concentrated his corps at Saaz, Kollowrath near Pilsen, Hohenzollern at Prague, Rosenberg and the Archduke Louis at Budweis, Lichtenstein at Iglau and Neuhaus in Bohemia, while on the right bank of the Danube were Hiller near Wels, Kienmayer near Enns, and Jellachich near Salzburg, so that on March 19th all except the Fourth Corps (Rosenberg) were in line.[1] Had the Archduke taken a vigorous offensive at that date, the consequences for the French would indeed have been disastrous; but the concentration of Oudinot at Augsburg and Masséna at Ulm led them to believe that Napoleon would mass his forces on the Lech behind the Bavarian army on the Isar,[2] and the fatal mistake of changing their plan was committed.[3]

"The Austrian 'Army of Germany' (the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 1st and 2nd Reserve Corps) should cross the Inn, enter Bavaria, and operate along the Danube. Two *corps d'armée* (the 1st and 2nd) should debouch from Bohemia into the Upper Palatinate, advance and attack the French armies which they may encounter, but in all cases so to direct the operations as not to get too far away from the Danube. These corps were destined principally to cover Bohemia and to assure the communications which lead toward the Danube. That of the two parts which was master of the two banks of the river from Ratisbon to Donauwörth becoming likewise master of Bavaria, * * * * the Archduke having felt in 1796 the importance of Donauwörth, key to a part of Germany. The object of the two parts of the Austrian army assembled on the Inn and the frontier of Bohemia (April 9th) should be to unite on the Danube and during their march to endeavor

1 Pelet, tome 1, p. 189.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

3 "To change strategical plans when not forced to by circumstances leads to disaster.' Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, "Letters on Strategy," 5th axiom, p. 101.

to beat in detail the different corps of the French army which might be in their road."[1]

This second plan was by no means devoid of merit when one considers that in the opening days of April all information known to the Archduke pointed to the fact that the two principal masses of the French army were still assembled at Bamberg[2] and at Ulm, and that between these two widely divergent points lay a force of only 30,800 Bavarians,[3] fair troops, but scarcely equal to the Austrians. The Archduke's course was therefore clear—to cross the Isar at and near Landshut and move rapidly on Kelheim and Neustadt, seizing at the same time the important point of Ratisbon, and then, crossing the Danube, to march to the Altmühl, whither Bellegarde and Kollowrath should be directed. With this river as a new base, doubled by the Danube, he could manœuvre on the Rednitz in such a way as to sever Davout from Masséna, and even if the former were not annihilated, it would be probable that he could not rejoin Masséna east of Dinkelsbühl when the Archduke, having occupied all Bavaria in conjunction with the Tyrolean levies, would be fully prepared for a pitched battle. Even if the movements were so delayed that the French should be found massed at Donauwörth, the plain at the confluence of the Lech would offer the best theatre to anticipate them, especially since the Austrians would then have possession of all the points of passage on the Danube from Ingolstadt to Linz. From the Inn to Landshut is only about 43 miles and from Landshut to Neustadt or Kelheim about 28 more, which should require only five days at the extreme to traverse, but although no one realized more than the Archduke the imperative necessity of striking a vigorous blow, he had already

1Stutterheim, pp. 64-69. Pelet, tome 1, p. 204.

2Davout's headquarters were not moved to Nuremberg until the 7th.

3Divisions of Lt.-Gen. Baron Deroy, Lt.-Gen. Baron Wrede, and the Prince Royal (*vice* Sibein), 11 battalions, 8 squadrons and 18 guns, stationed at Munich (headquarters), Augsburg and Altdorf.

begun to experience the inconvenience of mobile magazines and unnecessarily heavy equipages.[1]

Meanwhile Napoleon had not been idle. The "Army of the Rhine," under Marshal Davout, with headquarters at Erfurt, numbering about 80,000 men, was quartered in northern Germany as far as the Oder, thus separated by a great interval from the French frontier, and from the contingents of the Confederation about 100,000 strong. On February 21st Clarke, the Minister of War, was directed to form the Fourth Corps, composed of 4 infantry divisions and the light cavalry under the command of Marshal Masséna at Strassburg, and on March 4th Boudet and Molitor of that corps were directed straight on Ulm. Davout was instructed to assemble the Saxons at Dresden, the Poles at Warsaw, and the French of his corps at Bamberg. The Baden troops were ordered to concentrate at Rastatt and Pforzheim, the Würtembergers at Aalen, Neresheim and Heidenheim, the Hessian contingent at Mergentheim; the King of Bavaria was requested to establish dépôts at Ulm, Ingolstadt, Passau, Munich and Augsburg. Marshal Lefébvre was sent to assume command of the Bavarians at Landshut and Straubing, and Bernadotte to Dresden to command the Saxons. The 17 regiments of light cavalry beyond the Rhine were complemented to 900 to 1,000 men each,[2] and the French corps in Germany numbered, on April 1st, 117,220, independent of 4,200 from the Hanseatic towns and the 101,840 from the Confederation.[3] Marshal Lannes was ordered to relinquish his command at Saragossa to General Junot, and Marshal Bessières with the Imperial

1Pelet, tome 1, pp. 226-228. Compare Lejeune, Mémoires, tome 1, pp. 260-261: "Continual rains (and) frightful weather then swelled the rivers, damaged all the roads by which we were going to enter the campaign, and made the Danube overflow, which, for more than a century, had not caused so much ravage. These circumstances had doubtless contributed to delay the aggression of the Austrians."

2Napoleon, Correspondance, Nos. 14,795, 14,844, 14,848, 14,852, 14,853, 14,855, 14,849, 14,866, 14,864, 14,868, tome 18, pp. 277-327.

3Pelet, tome 1, pp. 172-185. Compare Alison, Vol. III., pp. 604-605.

Guard recalled from Spain and directed from Burgos to Strassburg *en route* to the Danube between Donauwörth and Ingolstadt—the *rendezvous* for this immense force—while the Emperor's provident care was not less actively employed in collecting magazines on the projected line of operations and in replenishing the fortresses both for secondary bases and for places of refuge in the event of a repulse. Berthier was made chief of staff (March 17th) and Bertrand sent to reconnoitre along the Danube. Reserve dépôts also were formed at Mayence and Strassburg.

The arrest of a French officer bearing despatches from the French Embassy at Vienna to the Legation at Munich sealed with the Napoleonic arms convinced the Emperor that war was inevitable, although Metternich had not then demanded his passports. Napoleon did not believe that the Austrians would move before April 15th—of which his correspondence affords abundant proofs; he hoped himself to be ready by that date, and his preparations were pushed forward even more actively than before. On the 28th Oudinot was instructed not to occupy Augsburg, which was to be left free for Masséna,[1] and in the orders issued that day it was expressly stipulated that "*If the Austrians attack before the 10th of April, the army should concentrate behind Lech, the right occupying Augsburg and the left the right (bank) of the Danube on Ingolstadt. Donauwörth should be the most central point of the army.*"[2] On March 31st Berthier left Paris for Strassburg to take command of the "Grand Army of Germany," and on the 30th, in his "Instructions for the Major-General,"[3] Napoleon wrote:

"The war is, without doubt, imminent with Austria, which cannot long supply so great a quantity of assembled troops. Everything indicates, however, that about April 15th their army will be ready to enter the campaign. It is

1Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 14,963, tome 18, p. 395.
2*Ibid.*, No. 14,965, p. 397.
3The title given at that time to the Adjutant-General

therefore proper that we should also be at this epoch and by comparison with the management we are too.

"On April 15th, 1,500 horses of the Guard, 16 pieces of artillery, 6,000 infantrymen, my horses and my Guard will be at Strassburg.

"The 1st of April, the Duke of Auerstädt[1] will be assembled with his 20 infantry regiments between Nuremberg, Bamberg and Baireuth, and Saint-Hilaire's division between Nuremberg and Ratisbon.

"The Bavarian Army has one division at Straubing, one at Landshut, and one at Munich.

"On the 1st of April, General Oudinot will have 18,000 men under arms between Augsburg and Donauwörth.

"The Marshal Duke of Rivoli[2] is assembled at Ulm with more than 25,000 Frenchmen.

"The Baden contingent is assembled at Pforzheim; that of Hesse-Darmstadt at Mergentheim; but the Duke of Rivoli is authorized to have these contingents go to Ulm, as soon as he believes hostilities imminent. Thus, from the 1st to the 15th of April, I shall therefore have three *corps d'armée*, which must be assembled on the Danube, either on Ratisbon, on Ingolstadt, or on Donauwörth. * * *

"My object is to carry my headquarters to Ratisbon and there to centralize my whole army.

"*The headquarters of Donauwörth and the line of the Lech is a position to occupy in case the enemy should anticipate me*,[3] but if the Austrians do not move, I desire General Oudinot and General Saint-Hilaire to assemble at Ratisbon. From Augsburg to this city there are five ordinary marches and four war marches; by making General Oudinot leave Augsburg on April 5th he will be at Ratisbon on the 10th, and, supposing that General Saint-Hilaire had reached Nuremberg on April 5th, he will be on the 8th or the 9th

1Marshal Davout.

2Marshal Masséna.

3The italics are ours.

Compare Berthier to Marshal Masséna, March 21st: "In case of an unexpected attack by the Austrians, the Emperor has ordered the Duke of Auerstädt to fall back on Donauwörth and on Neuburg; in this situation you will yourself fall back on the Lech. The three divisions of the Bavarian army at Munich, Landshut and Straubing will do as much; the Würtemberg corps, which is at Heidenheim and Aalen, under orders of Gen. Vandamme, ought likewise to move to the Lech." *Vide* Pelet, tome 1, p. 381.

at Ratisbon, where, about April 10th, I shall have 30,000 infantrymen and 7 cavalry regiments.

"The Duke of Istria[1] will arrive there the same day and will assemble his entire Reserve Cavalry.

"The Duke of Auerstädt will carry his headquarters to Nuremberg; he will not occupy Baireuth and the debouches on Egra, except by his extreme left. His headquarters will therefore not be but twenty-four leagues[2] from Ratisbon—*i. e.*, three marches.[3]

"The three divisions of the Bavarian army will also be about Ratisbon at one, two, three days' march at the most.

"The Duke of Rivoli will carry his headquarters to Augsburg, and will not be but four or five marches from Ratisbon.

"Thus the General Headquarters will be at Ratisbon in the midst of 200,000 men, *à cheval* on a great river, guarding the right bank of the Danube from Ratisbon to Passau, and they will then be in a position secured from all anxiety about the enemy's movements, with the advantage of the Danube, which will carry promptly to the army all that will be necessary for it.

"What can the enemy, who is ready, undertake to-day against the army? It will be to move from Pilsen on Ratisbon by Waldmünchen and Cham. From Pilsen to Ratisbon there are five marches. This case happening, the Bavarian division at Straubing will fall back on Ingolstadt, the Bavarian division at Landshut will make the same movement; the corps of the Duke of Auerstädt will move on

1 Marshal Bessières.

2 57.6 miles.

3 Compare Berthier to Davout, March 25th: "Small import to the Emperor, Duke, whether the enemy debouches from Silesia or elsewhere; the important point is to unite on the Danube." *Vide* Pelet, tome 1, p. 391.

Also Berthier to Davout, March 27th: "His Majesty supposes, Duke, that you have directed Saint-Hilaire's division, Nansouty's old division, the regiments of light cavalry of Montbrun's division on your right, that you have also taken every precaution for your hospitals, stragglers, etc., in such a way as to be able, without leaving anything, to effectuate your movement on Ratisbon, Ingolstadt or Donauwörth, according to circumstances.

"If the enemy has a plan, it is probable that he will seek to put himself between you and the Danube—it is what must be prevented above all things." *Vide* Pelet, tome 1, p. 394.

Ingolstadt and Donauwörth, and this will be then a case of placing the General Headquarters at Donauwörth.

"Once the army thus cantoned about Ratisbon, what will the enemy do? Will he move on Cham? One will be ready to unite all one's forces against him to stop him in the positions, which shall have been reconnoitred on the Regen.

"Will he move on Nuremberg? He will be cut off from Bohemia.

"Will he move on Bamberg? He will likewise be cut off.

"Finally, will he take the course of marching on Dresden? Then one will enter Bohemia and will pursue him into Germany.

"Will he operate against the Tyrol at the same time that he will debouch by Bohemia? He will doubtless reach Innsbruck, but the 10 or 12 regiments which he will have at Innsbruck will not be in line at the debouches of Bohemia, and these troops at Innsbruck will learn of the defeat of their army in Bohemia by our arrival at Salzburg.

"*Finally, if the enemy appears to want to take the extreme left and right to operate, one must accept the centre, having the Lech for retreat and keeping Augsburg as a garrison in order to be sure always to have this city at one's disposition.*[1]

"Thus the Engineer service is accordingly obliged to fortify the bridge-heads on the Lech, to fortify Passau, Augsburg, Ingolstadt. * * *

"To-day the Duke of Auerstädt commands the entire first line—a delusive command—since he cannot foresee in time what will occur on the Inn. Thus the Major-General will make the general organizations according to circumstances, such as putting General Oudinot under the Duke of Rivoli's orders. The 20 regiments of infantry on the left of the Danube will remain under the orders of the Duke of Auerstädt."[2]

On April 1st Napoleon instructed Berthier at Strassburg to order Davout to carry his headquarters to Nuremberg and to direct Saint-Hilaire, the heavy cavalry of Nansouty and the 7 regiments of light cavalry under Montbrun

1The italics are ours.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No: 14,975, tome 18, pp. 403-416.

on Ratisbon, in addition to leaving one division at Baireuth, a second at Nuremberg and a third between it and Ratisbon, and April 2nd to form Oudinot's corps, then numbering 18,000, into 3 divisions of 8 to 10,000 men, and to direct all the officers and engineers of the Imperial Headquarters on Donauwörth.[1] On the 5th *the line of communications was fixed after the 15th through Strassburg, Stuttgart and Ulm, and for Davout from Strassburg through Stuttgart, Ellwangen and Ansbach,*[2] and on the following day reiterated to Berthier the orders to be given to Dupas[3] and Davout, and instructed him, as soon as he learned of the arrival of Saint-Hilaire, Nansouty and Montbrun at Ratisbon, to order "the General Headquarters and the engineer and artillery parks to proceed from Donauwörth to Ingolstadt."[4] In his despatch of the 8th Napoleon gave Berthier the composition of the "Army of Germany" and of the various corps in Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw, and notified him that "The dépôt of the army in France is Strassburg. It is at Strassburg that the Rhine will be crossed; it should no longer be crossed either at Mayence or at any other point. The route should henceforth be through Stuttgart and Ulm; thence it should pass through Nuremberg for the corps of the Duke of Auerstädt, and through Augsburg for the other corps. After Strassburg, the first dépôt of the army will be Ulm; the second dépôt will be Augsburg; the third, Donauwörth; the fourth, Ingolstadt. Augsburg and Ingolstadt should be protected against a *coup-de-main.*"[5]

The premature outbreak of hostilities did not permit the desired organization to be affected, and the Campaign

1 Napoleon, Correspondance, Nos. 14,990, 14,992, 14,993, tome 18, pp. 426-428.

2 *Ibid.*, No. 15,012, p. 436. The italics are ours.

3 Dupas, commanding the French division (4,936 men) of Bernadotte's "Corps of Observation of the Baltic," had been ordered from Hanover to Würzburg to join Davout.

4 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,021, tome 18, pp. 439-440

5 *Ibid*, No. 15,029, tome 18, pp. 445-448.

of Eckmühl was therefore fought with the French "Army of Germany" thus composed:

Third Corps—The Duke of Auerstädt (Marshal Davout).		
Infantry divisions of (1) Morand, (2) Friant, (3) Gudin, (4) Demont, and (5) Saint-Hilaire.[1]		
Light cavalry divisions of Jaquinot and Montbrun.[2]		
Heavy cavalry division of Saint-Sulpice.[2]		
66 guns and about	46,000	men
Fourth Corps—The Duke of Rivoli (Marshal Masséna).		
Corps of General Oudinot[1]—Infantry divisions of (1) Claparéde and (2) Tharreau. Light cavalry of Colbert, 18 guns and	29,000	"
Infantry divisions (1) Legrand, (2) Carra Saint-Cyr, (3) Molitor, and (4) Boudet.		
Light cavalry of Marulaz.		
Heavy cavalry of Espagne.[2]		
70 guns and about	30,000	"
Seventh Corps—The Duke of Danzig (Marshal Lefébvre). Bavarian divisions of (1) Deroy, (2) Wrede, and (3) The Prince Royal (*vice* Sibein), 30 guns	30,800	"
Eighth Corps—General Vandamme.		
Würtemberg Army—18 guns	12,000	"
Contingents from the Confederation of the Rhine	29,240	"
Dupas' division	4,936	"
Nansouty's heavy cavalry division[3]	1,500	"
Total	183,476	"[4]

1Saint-Hilaire and Oudinot subsequently formed the Second Corps under the Duke of Montebello (Marshal Lannes).

2Montbrun, Saint-Sulpice and Espagne were later under the command of the Duke of Istria (Marshal Bessières) as Reserve Cavalry.

3Nansouty was subsequently attached to the Reserve Cavalry.

4The Imperial Guard (22,000) is not included in the total, for the reason that it did not leave Strassburg until April 18th and did not reach

In addition to the "Army of Germany," the French forces—exclusive of the flower of the army in Spain—were thus disposed:

Polish Army, under Prince Poniatowski, about Warsaw	19,200	men
Saxon Army, under the Prince of Ponte-Corvo (Marshal Bernadotte), near Dresden[1]	15,800	"
Dutch contingent	5,900	"
Westphalian Army, under the King of Westphalia (Jerome Bonaparte)	14,000	"
Army of Italy, under the Viceroy, Prince Eugene, and General Macdonald	47,000	"
Troops of the Interior	15,000	"
Eleventh Corps, under General Marmont, in Dalmatia	12,000	"
Total	128,900	"
Grand Total—428 guns and	312,376	"

The diplomatic relations between France and Austria became strained to the utmost, and in return for the seizure of his despatches on the person of one of his officers Napoleon retaliated by intercepting letters from the Austrian ambassador to the Court of Vienna, the contents of which left no doubt that war was imminent. On April 10th Metternich demanded his passports,[2] and the Emperor promptly sent the following "Telegraphic Despatch"[3] to Berthier at Strassburg:

"I think that the Emperor of Austria should attack soon. Proceed to Augsburg to *act conformably to my instructions, and if the enemy has attacked before the 15th, you*

Dillingen until the 22nd. Compare Roguet, "Mémoires militaires," tome 4, pp. 30-31.

The contingents from the Confederation were only in part actively engaged during the campaign. Brigades were attached to Masséna's corps.

1The Russian army of 15,000 did not arrive until almost the end of the war.

2Lanfrey, "Histoire de Napoléon Ier," tome 4, p. 505.

3Napoleon had caused Guilleminot to establish a network of stations throughout central Germany, extending from Passau and Munich to the

ought to concentrate my troops on Augsburg and Donauwörth,[1] and let all be ready to march.

"Send my Guard and horses to Stuttgart.

Napoleon."[2]

This despatch was followed by a letter repeating substantially the instructions already given for Masséna, Lefébvre, and Davout, and of the last Napoleon wrote:

"Notify him that everything leads one to think that the Austrians are going to begin the attack, and that *if they attack before the 15th, all will fall back on the Lech.*[1] You will communicate all this confidentially to the King of Bavaria. * * * Since the Austrians are very slow, it might be possible that they may not attack before the 15th; then it will be different, for I am going to depart myself. * * *

"*If the enemy does not make a single movement,* you will always have that of the Duke of Rivoli made on Augsburg, that of the Würtembergers on Augsburg or Rain, according to whether you judge it proper, and that of the light cavalry of the divisions of Nansouty and Saint-Hilaire on Landshut and Freising, according to circumstances. The Duke of Auerstädt will have his headquarters at Ratisbon;[3] his army will gather into groups at a day's march around the city, and that in every event. The Bavarians

telegraph at Strassburg, by which messages were signalled from one to the other by a system of semaphores. (Compare Lejeune, Mémoires, tome 1, p. 261, and Sloane, "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," Vol. III., p. 159.) The Baroness de Courtot (Memoirs, p. 161) describes her visit to the station at Strassburg, and relates that there were "forty-two of these windmill-like stations between Strassburg and Montmartre, near Paris, and supposing each attendant to be at his appointed post, one can send a message from here to Paris in forty-five minutes." For a description of semaphore signalling, *vide* Myer, "Manual of Signals," pp. 195-198.

1The italics are ours.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,047, tome 18, p. 459. This despatch did not reach Berthier until he arrived at Augsburg on the 16th at 6 A. M.

3The italics are ours. Thiers ("Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," tome 10, p. 121) has blundered sadly by conjuring up an imaginative ambiguity which directed Berthier to leave Davout at Ratisbon *under all circumstances.* This order is perfectly clear, and the phrase which we have italicised qualifies and dominates the rest of the paragraph. Compare Lanfrey, tome 4, p. 506.

will not make a single movement if the enemy makes none. * * *"[1]

On the evening of the 12th despatches from the French Minister to Bavaria and from Berthier informed Napoleon that the Austrians had crossed the Inn and declared war. At 8 o'clock that night a short letter was sent to Berthier at Augsburg:

"My Cousin:

"It is 8 o'clock in the evening and the telegraph gives me half of your despatch, from which it is evident, according to a letter from Otto, that the Austrians will have crossed the Inn and declared war. *I suppose that you are at Augsburg and that you have centralized my whole army on the Lech.*[2] You must send orders to Dupas' division to proceed in a straight line and by hard marches on Donauwörth, as well as General Rouyer.[3] I shall be *en route* in two hours; the 14th I shall be at Strassburg."[4]

On the morning of the 13th the Emperor left Paris, and, traveling with unheard-of speed for those days of coaches and fours, reached Strassburg on the 15th and Donauwörth on the morning of the 17th, following Berthier, who had left Strassburg on the 11th for Donauwörth, where he arrived on the morning of the 13th.

The plan of the Archduke Charles was, as we have observed, to cross the Inn, drive back the Bavarians from the Isar, to recross the Danube between Donauwörth and Ingolstadt in order to cut off Davout from the French army and, in conjunction with Bellegarde, to crush him, and then, uniting with Bellegarde, to advance on Mayence. But, as Napoleon subsequently observed, "the Austrians in general do not know the price of time,"[5] and the immense advantage which would have accrued to them had their

1Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,048, tome 18, pp. 459-460

2The italics are ours.

3Rouyer commanded a division of four regiments, composed of contingents supplied by the smaller princes of the Rhenish Confederation, attached provisionally to Davout's corps.

4Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,059, tome 18, p. 466.

5Napoleon, "Campagnes d'Italie," Correspondance, tome 29, p. 339.

advance been begun in March[1] was in a great measure neutralized by Napoleon's prompt dispositions. Instead of making a direct march requiring only five days on Ratisbon, by which he could easily have overwhelmed Davout's isolated divisions, the Archduke left Bellegarde with 54,000 men in Bohemia and with the bulk of his army, 153,000 men, made "a long detour to cross the Danube at Linz and to present himself on the Inn in conformity with the ancient routine of the Austrian wars."[2] Even then the advantage of the initiative remained with the Archduke, for, without any more formal declaration of war than letters addressed on the 9th to the King of Bavaria, to Otto and to Lefébvre,[3] his leading divisions crossed the Inn on the 10th, in columns at Scharding (Rosenberg and Lichtenstein), Mühlheim (Hohenzollern), and Braunau (Hiller, Archduke Louis, and Kienmayer).[4]

The letters thus addressed to the King and to Lefébvre were received at Munich on the evening of the 9th, and the latter at once communicated the contents to his generals and informed both Berthier and the Emperor. The news was sent with such remarkable celerity that it was received by Berthier at Strassburg early on the morning of the 11th and by Napoleon at Paris on the evening of the 12th. Berthier promptly wrote to Masséna giving him command of all the troops on the left bank of the Danube—*i. e.*,

1On March 20th Davout's headquarters were at Würzburg, Friant at Baireuth, Morand at Bamberg, Gudin at Nuremberg, Saint-Hilaire between Nuremberg and Ingolstadt; the Bavarians were stationed at Straubing, Landshut and Munich, Oudinot's corps at Augsburg; Masséna at Ulm, his divisions at Ulm (headquarters), Memmingen, Günzburg and Donauwörth, and the Würtembergers behind Ulm at Heidenheim, Neresheim, etc.

2Lanfrey, tome 4, p. 504.

3"According to a declaration of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria to the Emperor Napoleon, I inform the general-in-chief of the French army that I am ordered to advance with troops under my orders and to treat as enemies all who will resist me." For the Archduke's proclamation to his army, April 6th, *vide* Alison, Vol. III., p. 605.

4Jellachich, moving from Salzburg on Munich, crossed at Wasserburg.

the Bavarians under Lefébvre and Oudinot's corps in addition to his own, and informed him that he was writing to Davout to give him command of all the divisions north of the Danube.

"You ought without losing time, Duke, to move your *corps d'armée* on the Lech to take this line. I leave in two hours for Donauwörth, where the headquarters will be. * * * The Bavarian division which is at Straubing is falling back on Ingolstadt. Saint-Hilaire's division and the Reserve Cavalry are at Ratisbon. I am ordering the Duke of Auerstädt to assemble on Ingolstadt, and I am now notifying him that, according to circumstances and conformably to the instructions of the 21st, given by His Majesty, the assembling of the army will be made on Donauwörth."[1]

Berthier's departure was delayed that entire day, and at 10 p. m. he again wrote to Masséna:

"I have received, Duke, the letter by which you inform me that your last troops will be on the Lech on the 13th or the 14th, and that you count on taking position on the right of Augsburg. I observe to you that the Emperor's intention is that Augsburg should be his right; it is therefore necessary to cover Donauwörth well. The Bavarian division which is at Straubing should have fallen back on Ingolstadt, where it will take position; Saint-Hilaire's division and all our cavalry are at Ratisbon; the enemy must not therefore reach Ingolstadt, Neuburg or Donauwörth. Augsburg is your extreme right; you must end its arming and put it in a state of defense. You know that the Emperor does not want to engage himself in the mountains and that he will permit the enemy to do what he wants in the Tyrol. His plan is to unite his whole 'Army of Germany.' It is accordingly always by your left that you must manœuvre in such a way that we shall be united on Donauwörth, the Lech and along the Danube. In four or five days the Emperor will be with his army, which he desires to find in position so as to be able to unite. I leave at midnight for Donauwörth, where I shall surely be on the 13th very early. * * * Don't you think you ought

[1] Pelet, tome 2. p 386

to carry the three Bavarian divisions on Ingolstadt and Donauwörth? * * * *"[1]

At midnight Berthier left Strassburg for the front, but, not making such progress as he had anticipated, was at Gmünd at 7 a. m. on the 13th, when he wrote to Davout:

"I received *en route* yesterday, Duke, your despatches of the 10th. The Duke of Danzig had other instructions, which he has followed, and which were in case we were not in possession of Ratisbon, but I do not conceive that General Wrede will have left Straubing without being forced by the enemy[2] and that he has not stopped on Ratisbon. In the present instance the Emperor's plan to concentrate in this city [Ratisbon] seems to me impossible of execution in view of General Saint-Hilaire and the cavalry's having surely retired from Ratisbon. I shall reach Donauwörth this evening and shall see what is the news from the army. I shall move with General Oudinot on Neuburg.[3] We must now think of uniting the army to give battle to the enemy if he does not await the Emperor's arrival. I am very impatient to know whether we are always at Ratisbon. Since we are going to be in line, Duke, correspond often with me, so that we may concert upon what we shall have to do. I hope that the dispositions shall have been made so that our cavalry will follow Saint-Hilaire's movement. If we have an engagement, it must be decisive. Would we not have a good position between Neumarkt and Beilngries?[4] Tell me where are Saint-Hilaire and our cavalry."[5]

On the road Berthier evidently did considerable thinking, but the judgment shown appears to have been in inverse proportion to the amount of thought expended, and when he reached Donauwörth that evening he wrote at 8 o'clock to Masséna an order which inaugurated the vacillation, dissemination, and consequent confusion which proved so nearly fatal to the French army:

1Pelet, tome 2, pp. 387-388.

2Wrede had been ordered to fall back on Ingolstadt.

3Observe this disposition—the first of the many conflicting orders and movements prescribed for this corps.

4On the Sulz, north of the Danube.

5Pelet, tome 2, pp. 390-391.

"*I notify you, Marshal, that I am ordering General Oudinot to leave with all that composes his corps to proceed to Ratisbon.*[1] You will remain alone to guard Augsburg and the Lech. The Würtemberg division arrives to-morrow, but I keep it here until further order. Give me news of yourself and tell me how you guard Ulm."[2]

A half an hour later he wrote to Davout:

"I have this instant reached here, Duke. I have just ordered Wrede to retake the position on Straubing, and the Duke of Danzig to retake that of Landshut, which they should defend. General Saint-Hilaire, with the division and Reserve Cavalry, should remain at Ratisbon, as well as the corps of General Oudinot, which leaves to-morrow at daybreak, to proceed there in four days. Occupy your positions as I told you in my letter of the 9th, and, according to circumstances, try to get news of the enemy. It seems that he is manœuvring on our wings. His Majesty wants to centralize his troops at Ratisbon; he even has the plan of establishing his headquarters there, to manœuvre thence against the enemy; he shows great interest in the occupation of the place."[3]

During the evening he received Napoleon's letter of the 10th noon, with complete instructions for the movements of the various corps,[4] and accordingly changed his mind, so that at 11 o'clock he again wrote to Masséna:

"I inform you, Marshal, that the Emperor has changed his dispositions.[5] I am consequently writing to General Oudinot to regard as null and void the order which I had addressed to him this evening, to leave at daybreak. He will continue to occupy the left of Augsburg, and you,

1The italics are ours. For this senseless order Berthier was well reprimanded. *Infra*, p. 172.

2Pelet, tome 2, p. 389.

3*Ibid.*, p. 391. Napoleon had, it is true, said on March 30th that his object was to carry his headquarters to Ratisbon and there to centralize his entire army (*vide supra*, p. 154), but in the next sentence he qualified his purpose by other instructions in case the enemy anticipated him. This proviso evidently had escaped Berthier completely. Compare Jomini, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. III., p. 31.

4*Vide supra*, pp. 160-161.

5A statement totally unfounded; it was Berthier who changed.

Duke, the right. I count on proceeding to Augsburg to-morrow or day after to-morrow."[1]

At midnight he wrote to Marshal Lefébvre:

"I have just made a change, Duke, in the two *duplicata* of the orders which I sent you this evening. Carry one of your divisions back to Landshut if the enemy is not there; if he is, place your division one march in the rear on the side of the Lech. Have the enemy well observed, so as to give me news, and upon the slightest movement which he shall make, fall back on the Lech without compromising yourself. The division which is at Munich will do the same thing—*i. e.*, it will fall back from Munich on Augsburg. I carry my headquarters to this city, where with your three divisions I shall have more than 100,000 men. I have had the 13,000 Würtembergers advance on the Lech at Rain, intermediate position between Donauwörth and Augsburg. I have ordered the Duke of Auerstädt to carry his headquarters to Ratisbon, and to place his 120,000 men around him. In this position we can quietly await the Emperor, and if the Austrians want to sound it, they will be free (to do so)."[2]

At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 14th he wrote to Marshal Masséna:

"I have received your letter of the 13th, Duke of Rivoli, by my aide-de-camp, M. de Saint-Agnan. I informed you yesterday that Oudinot's division should remain at Augsburg. There is no doubt that he must continue to work on the bridge-head of Landsberg; there is not an instant to lose. One can have cannon come from Munich, because the enemy will soon be there. The corps of the Duke of Danzig will fall back on Augsburg. I have just ordered the Duke of Auerstädt to carry Saint-Hilaire's division and the reserve cavalry on Landshut and Freising, whence, if the enemy marches, they will gain Augsburg to put themselves in line of battle with us. The Würtemberg division has arrived with General Vandamme. I am charging it to occupy the bridge-head of Rain and to connect its posts with those of General Oudinot. I have just given

1 Pelet, tome 2, pp. 389-390.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 388-389. Compare Jomini, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. III., pp. 31-32. These movements prescribed to Davout and Lefébvre were equivalent to "exposing both to destruction, by an eccentric movement which nothing could justify."

the order to the Bavarian division of General Wrede, who is at Biburg,[1] to leave there to proceed directly to Augsburg. Send spies and try to know what is passing on the side of Füssen and Schöngau. In general, you must try to be enlightened to a distance of what is occurring, for the Austrians, as is their wont, are making great movements. I imagine that you have busied yourself to have the positions on your right reconnoitred, for if the enemy cannot force the Lech in front of us, he will come by the upper Lech. I shall reach Augsburg during the night. Transmit the appended letter to Munich."[2]

The Prince of Neuchâtel spent the day and that night at Donauwörth and did not go to Augsburg, because, as he wrote to Masséna at 9 a. m. on the 15th:

"At the instant when I was going to leave for Augsburg, Duke, I learned that the town of Ratisbon was attacked.[3] The Duke of Auerstädt, who was somewhat distant from it, marches to support General Saint-Hilaire by the right bank and by the left bank. I am having Cöhorn's brigade[4] placed at Ingolstadt. *I am ordering General Oudinot to move to Aichach*,[5] because in case of emergency we shall fall back on Ingolstadt. You, Marshal, will look out for what is passing before you; with the two divisions of the Duke of Danzig you will have 70,000 men[6] without counting General Vandamme and his 13,000 Würtembergers, who occupy Rain and the line of the Lech. Send officers to learn what is passing on our side. Open the letters which arrive at Augsburg for me, even those which the Emperor may address."[7]

Later in the day, in view of the general chaos and uncertainty, he again wrote Masséna from Ingolstadt, where he had peremptorily ordered Davout back to Ratisbon:

1On the Abens.

2Pelet, tome 2, p. 392.

3By Klenau.

4Of Claparède's division of Oudinot's corps.

5The italics are ours.

6The original reads "70,000 thousand"

7Pelet, tome 2, pp. 395-396.

"You see, Duke, that I have judged it indispensable to go to see the condition of things and to chat with the Marshal Duke of Auerstädt, to whom I have given a *rendezvous* at Neustadt. I have put General Oudinot in advance in such a way that from there [*i. e.*, Aichach] he can be useful to you and to me. I shall need twenty-four hours to go and return here. I hope that the Emperor will arrive during the day.

"P. S.—There are such circumstances when you will give orders to General Oudinot."[1]

Still later again he wrote to Masséna:

"Marshal Lefébvre has wrongly understood his orders;[2] he is evacuating Munich by moving on Landshut. Send quickly to Landshut and Freising for him to fall back on Augsburg. I had ordered Oudinot's division to move on Aichach; on the contrary, you must mass yourself, since the enemy is going to move on Augsburg."[1]

Berthier reached Augsburg before dawn on the 16th, and at 5 a. m. wrote to Masséna:

"I send you, Marshal, an order for General Oudinot. Even although the enemy should march on Augsburg, he will be in position at Aichach to defend the Lech. As for you, occupy Augsburg and the line—I think that you have couriers on Dachau; I beg you to tell me."[3]

Thus ended Berthier's orders, which had accomplished little but confusion and dissemination among the French troops. He had failed totally to understand *Napoleon's explicit instructions to concentrate about Ratisbon, provided the Austrians had not anticipated them by taking the initiative, but if the Austrians had so anticipated them, then the concentration should be made on the line of the Lech.*[4] "Never did a man show himself such a stranger to large commands. Extremely disturbed over some trifling movements of the enemy on the

1Pelet, tome 2, p. 396.

2Small wonder. Lefébvre had just been ordered to fall back to Ingolstadt, and then to retake the position of Landshut.

3Pelet, tome 2, p. 399.

4*Supra*, pp. 153, 154, 160-161.


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To Moldau and Elbe
BUDWEIS
Rhine
Danube
Vilshofen
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Upper Lech toward Schöngau and Landsberg, he was much the less so over what was occurring toward Neustadt and Ratisbon, more than six marches from Augsburg," at the points where the Archduke could strike the most fatal blows, separate the French divisions, destroy one corps, and, following up his advantages, drive the French back to the Rhine.[1] Truly one is tempted to agree with Jomini that "in his whole twenty campaigns he had not been able to learn the first idea of strategy."[2]

II.

For the 16th the Archduke made the following dispositions: On the right Rosenberg was to debouch from Dingolfing and send his advanced-guard on Ergoldsbach, thus threatening Deroy's rear and cutting his communications with Ratisbon. Veczay (Klenau's division of Kollowrath's corps) was to extend by Mengkofen to the Kleine Laber and to reconnoitre the bridge at Straubing so as to communicate with Bellegarde.[3] In the centre the Archduke, with the corps of the Archduke Louis, Prince Hohenzollern, Lichtenstein and Kienmayer, should advance on Landshut, while Hiller was ordered to move on the left to Moosburg, to observe the road to Munich, and to get news of the French. The advanced-guard of the centre column reached Landshut before dawn, but it was not until 11 o'clock that it was directed to attack in order to protect the construction of a bridge. The artillery, far superior in number and calibre, soon silenced the Bavarian guns, the bridge was completed, and at 2 p. m. the advanced-guard, followed by the

1Pelet, tome 1, p. 245.

2Jomini, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. III., p. 31. Compare Lejeune, tome 1, p. 265: "I was extremely grieved to see this man, so courageous, so calm in the midst of fire, and whom no danger could intimidate, tremble and stagger under the weight of his responsibility."

3Compare Hamley, p. 147

Fifth Corps (Archduke Louis), crossed the Isar and deployed. A short cannonade ensued, which in conjunction with the movement by Rosenberg through Dingolfing and Wörth, compelled Deroy to evacuate this important point and to retire, in good order however, on Pfeffenhausen. The Austrian cavalry followed to Weihmichel, the Fifth Corps to Ergolding, the Third Corps (Hohenzollern) to Landshut, and the Reserves in the rear. Rosenberg crossed at Dingolfing to Ober- and Ergoldsbach, after driving back the Bavarian cavalry; Hiller occupied Moosburg by his cavalry only, and Jellachich entered Munich.

Meanwhile the judicious movement of Davout from Nuremberg through Hemau toward the Danube had been arrested on the 13th by Berthier and the direction changed from Ingolstadt to Ratisbon. The abominable roads, the lack of provisions, and the inevitable scattering of the divisions had so delayed this dangerous march that, on the night of the 16th, Davout had only succeeded in reaching Ratisbon with Saint-Hilaire and the heavy cavalry. He had remonstrated vigorously against this movement,[1] but

1 "Ingolstadt, April 14th, 1809, 7.15 p. m. * * * I shall leave to-night for Ratisbon; I shall do what I can to assemble my army there to-morrow. * *

"I cannot dissemble from you that I very much fear to arrive after Ratisbon will have been evacuated. * * * It seems to me that the best manœuvre to make is to debouch through Ingolstadt. * * * The Austrians would not have attacked General Friant and General Saint-Hilaire several days ago if they had not had some plan. * * *

"In this state of things I think that what would be the best thing to do would be to debouch through Ingolstadt, and it would be easy to unite the whole army promptly. * * *

"The roads to reach Ratisbon are detestable; there is only one which issues toward the city and which is not merely a defile for the two leagues preceding it. * * *

"Then if Your Highness persists in the execution of his orders, I will carry them out. * * *

"I await with impatience the reply of Your Highness.

"Finally, in the hypothesis that the enemy will debouch by several points and in great force on the Isar—as is announced to me—I beg Your Highness to have me informed what I should do.

"It is impossible for the army to be assembled at Ratisbon before forty-eight hours, and prior to this space of time it can be ready to debouch through Ingolstadt, occupying all the crossings on the Altmühl.

had been peremptorily ordered to obey by Berthier and had no other alternative.

Meanwhile Napoleon, traveling as fast as horses could draw him, had reached Stuttgart shortly after midnight on the night of the 15th-16th and turned north to Ludwigsburg, where he arrived at 3 a. m. on the 16th.

At 4 a. m. he wrote to Marshal Masséna:

"My Cousin:

"I have reached Stuttgart. I suppose that you occupy the bridge-head of Landsberg by a detachment, and that you have had patrols made on your extreme right. I have learned that General Oudinot has been sent on Ratisbon. I have ordered him to stop his movement and keep himself within reach of you in order that he can join you under Augsburg before the enemy, and that if the Austrians attempt anything, your corps, that of Oudinot, that of General Vandamme, and that of the Duke of Danzig shall be united.

"Have a position reconnoitred which is far enough in the rear of Munich—that of Dachau.

"I wait to know what the enemy shall have done on the side of Bohemia.

"It is thought that the battalions which ought to come from Italy to reinforce you will have been prevented by the insurrection of the Tyrol and will have retrograded on Trent.[1]

"Write me at Dillingen, where it is possible that I may go this evening. Napoleon."[2]

"P. S.—Put yourself in communication with General Oudinot."[3]

"Your Highness will remember that in assembling at Ingolstadt I conformed to the dispositions which had been prescribed to me.

"P. S.—In case the information about the enemy's movements should be inexact, I ask to be allowed to go to Ratisbon by the right bank."

Vide Davout, Correspondance. tome 2, pp. 464-467.

1The insurrection in the Tyrol broke out on the night of April 8th, and Bisson's division was surrounded near Innsbruck and compelled to surrender on the 12th.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,071, tome 18, p. 473.

3Pelet, tome 2, p. 398.

Later he wrote to Berthier:

"My Cousin:

"I have received your letter by which you announce to me that you have made the corps of Oudinot leave for Ratisbon. *You do not inform me what necessitates such an extraordinary measure, which enfeebles and disseminates my troops.*[1] I think that, if you had not been brought to this decision by extraordinary motives, you will order General Oudinot to stop his movement and to place himself between Ratisbon and Augsburg in order to be ready to move on this latter place if the case demands. As for the order to occupy Straubing by General Wrede, I do not understand it, because I am ignorant why he has evacuated it.[2] Marshal Lefébvre did well to concentrate his forces at Munich; two divisions are stronger than one. I do not entirely understand the spirit of your letter of the evening of the 13th, and *I should have preferred to know that my army was concentrated between Ingolstadt and Augsburg, the Bavarians in the first line*[1]—as the Duke of Danzig placed himself—until one knows what the enemy wants to do. I am awaiting news of the Duke of Auerstädt.[3] One must conform with my instruction—which is to rally my army and have it in hand. If the enemy should debouch from the Tyrol and one be compelled to give battle at Augsburg without General Oudinot's being there, it would be a great misfortune. If, on the other hand, one were obliged to abandon Augsburg, which is not yet in a condition to defend itself, and thus to deliver our magazines at Ulm, it would still be a great misfortune. *All were perfect had the Duke of Auerstädt been near Ingolstadt, the Duke of Rivoli with the Würtembergers and the corps of Oudinot near Augsburg.*[1] Since the enemy has attacked, his plan must be found out. The principle is that Oudinot should be at Augsburg before the enemy and should have his eyes wide open. *As for the Duke of Auerstädt, the divisions of Saint-Hilaire, Nansouty, and Montbrun, the instruction is for them as for everyone else—to concentrate between Ratisbon, Ingolstadt and Augsburg—so that one must do exactly the opposite of what you have done.*[1] It is possible that I shall leave here to-day

1The italics are ours.

2By order of Berthier.

3Davout's dangerous isolation had naturally made the Emperor extremely apprehensive.

so as to arrive at Dillingen this evening. Write me by this road. Napoleon."[1]

The Emperor did continue on to Dillingen, where he met the King of Bavaria—who had there taken refuge with his Court—and at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 17th he reached Donauwörth—the place where he had selected for General Headquarters.[2] Berthier had gone to Augsburg, taking General Monthion with him, and there was absolutely no one left in charge.[3] The multitude of the contradictory despatches issued since the 13th by Berthier had produced such confusion that no one knew the situations of many of the divisions nor whither they were moving. Masséna was known to be at Augsburg, Oudinot somewhere between that city and Aichach, and the Würtembergers on the Lech. The exact positions of the Bavarian divisions were uncertain, although it was later learned that Lefébvre was at Geisenfeld. Davout's isolation caused the greatest apprehension in the Emperor's mind; Vandamme assured him that he was at Ratisbon, but it was evident that no one knew with any degree of accuracy. Beyond the fact that the Austrians had debouched from Landshut the movements of the enemy's other columns were surrounded with uncertainty—one fact alone stood out with awful distinctness—viz., *that the "Grand Army" had been divided by the "Major-General" into two nearly equal parts, one of which was grouped about Augsburg and the other somewhere about the Danube near Ratisbon, separated from the other by a void of not less than 85 miles, where only 30,000 Bavarians were bravely attempting to oppose the enemy's pronounced advance, which was rapidly cutting the army in two.* It seemed as if the hero of Auerstädt, threatened on the south by the Archduke with 153,000 men and on the north

1 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,070, tome 18, pp. 472-473.

2 *Vide supra*, p. 154.

3 In the order of March 28th Napoleon had directed that "General Monthion should be at Donauwörth with the bureau of the staff." Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 14,965, tome 18, p. 397.

by Bellegarde with 54,000, were infallibly doomed to the fate of Mack. Truly the situation was appalling. In the more than usually characteristic slowness of the Austrian advance there reposed the one forlorn hope for safety—a chance so slight that it would have been regarded as despairing by any ordinary commander. But no task was too stupendous, no hope too forlorn for the great Napoleon, and he promptly bent all his marvelous energy and superhuman genius to extricating his imperiled legions from their desperate situations.[1] Unlike Alexander, he did not cut the Gordian knot, he unraveled it, until out of the chaotic snarl came order, system, and astonishing success, and it may be well worth our while in following his manœuvres to bear continually in mind the five great characteristics of his system of strategy—viz., (1) The initiative at the commencement of hostilities; (2) One line of operations; (3) The unity of forces; (4) The rapidity of movements on decisive points; and (5) The invariable concentration before every battle.[2]

Staff officers were immediately sent in every direction to obtain accurate information on the whereabouts of the French divisions as well as of the enemy, and the reports which came pouring into the headquarters helped to throw light on the intricate condition of affairs. The Emperor's first letter was sent to Berthier at Augsburg:

"My Cousin:

"I have arrived at Donauwörth. I should very much have desired to find you here, but, in the idea that I was going to Augsburg, you left for that city. I am absolutely ignorant of where the Duke of Auerstädt is, and I see that nobody knows precisely where he is. General Vandamme

1 Napoleon is said to have declared to one of his Ministers, who joined him a few days later: "You cannot picture to yourself in what a condition the army was, and to how many misfortunes we were exposed had we had an affair with an enterprising enemy. They shall not surprise me thus again."

2 *Vide* Study on "Napoleonic Strategy," *supra*, pp. 106-118. In this instance the Austrians had taken the initiative.

assures me that the enemy is at Ratisbon. That being so, it seems to me that my position is more naturally established here than at Augsburg, as Donauwörth is the headquarters and the point of assembling for two corps. I should have desired that, in going to Augsburg, you should have left Monthion here. Proceed here as quickly as possible. It appears that the Duke of Danzig has retired to Geisenfeld; it seems to me that he is falling back a great deal on his left. Napoleon."[1]

At 8 a. m. the Emperor addressed the second of his many orders to Marshal Lefébvre at Geisenfeld:

"I have arrived at Donauwörth, where I opened the letter which you wrote on the 16th at 9 a. m. to the Prince of Neuchâtel. I remain here.

"Send me an officer who knows perfectly the situation of your troops and what has happened, so that I may be perfectly acquainted with everything. Inform me yourself where you believe are the principal forces of the enemy."[2]

The third order was sent at 10 a. m. to Davout at Ratisbon:

"My Cousin:

"I have arrived at Donauwörth. I learn that you occupy Ratisbon. *My intention has always been to concentrate my troops behind the Lech. Fall back with all your troops on Ingolstadt.*[3] I am ordering the Duke of Danzig to keep the corps at Landshut at a distance and to protect your movement. Friant's division should also fall back on Ingolstadt; he can, however, guard the posts of observation on the Altmühl, considering the Altmühl as a great bridgehead six leagues from Ingolstadt. *Keep your troops massed and in order;*[3] and if, in this abrupt movement which the enemy does not expect, you find the means to fall upon the column at Landshut,[4] if it has advanced, it will be a superb occasion; but do not go out of your way more than half a march to bring it about.

1Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,073, tome 18, p. 474.

2*Ibid.*, No. 15,074, p. 474

3The italics are ours.

4The Archduke Charles with the Austrian centre.

"To proceed to Ingolstadt, you ought to pass through Neustadt. From Neustadt, where you cannot be before to-morrow evening, the 18th, I shall be ready to give you orders. However, if you do not receive any, you should continue your movement on Geisenfeld, thus being three leagues [*i. e.*, 7.2 miles] from Ingolstadt, without ever crossing onto the left bank.

"I await with impatience news about the enemy. Which Austrian *corps d'armée* is it that has debouched at Landshut? Where is it moving? What is the march of the enemy's other columns, of which you or General Wrede have knowledge?"[1]

The fourth order, issued at the same time, was to the trusted Chief of Engineers at Augsburg:

"General Bertrand:

"I have arrived at Donauwörth; proceed here without delay. I have written, by an aide-de-camp of the Duke of Rivoli, to the Prince of Neuchâtel to proceed to Donauwörth. As soon as you receive this, proceed to him and assure yourself that he has received my letter, without which yours will serve him.

"Inform the commandant of the place and General Oudinot that I am here. Also see the former Elector of Treves; tell him the same thing, and add that I shall not delay in coming to see him."[2]

At 11 o'clock a second order was sent to Marshal Lefébvre at Geisenfeld:

"My Cousin:

"I am ordering the Duke of Auerstädt to move first through Neustadt to lean on Ingolstadt. *My intention is for you to proceed to the advanced-guard at Neustadt,* where General Wrede is, *and to unite your troops so as to keep the corps at Landshut at a distance or to move to the aid of the Duke of Auerstädt, if necessary, while he will make his movement, and to co-operate in defeating the corps of Landshut,*[3] if the unexpected return of the Duke of Auerstädt surprises it and gives him the chance to do it harm. I await with impatience news about the enemy. Which Austrian *corps*

1Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,075, tome 18, p. 475.

2*Ibid.*, No. 15,076, p. 475.

3The italics are ours.

d'armée is that which has debouched at Landshut? Where is it moving? What is the march of the other columns of which you or General Wrede have knowledge?

"P. S.—I have this instant received the subjoined letter from General Wrede. *You know how important it is to keep your corps united so as to support the Duke of Auerstädt and to give him time to fall back upon Neustadt and Geisenfeld.*[1] There is no inconvenience in your informing him of the positions you take to protect his movement and in your notifying him that I sent him, at 10 a. m., the order to move on Ingoldstadt by the right bank of the Danube."[2]

At midday the Emperor dictated to General Wrede at Biburg the following order:

"His Majesty, having himself arrived on the line of his army, has ordered the Duke of Auerstädt to unite all his corps on your advanced-guard and to manœuvre between the Isar and Neustadt so as to contain the enemy's column and to favorise the movement of the Duke of Auerstädt, *in order that the army will be united between Ingolstadt and Augsburg.*[1]

"Write to the Duke of Auerstädt that he has received the order directly from the Emperor, by one of his orderly officers leaving a 11 a. m., to proceed to Neustadt with his whole corps; that if he has not received this order, you are authorized to write him about it, because the order might have been intercepted; and that the order to leave Ratisbon and to proceed to Neustadt should be considered as an order from the Emperor signed by him, of which you are charged to transmit the duplicate to him.[3] That holds to the Emperor's intentions, which desire to have all his men in hand.

"It is possible that the sudden return of the Duke of Auerstädt, who has with him more than 60,000 men joined to the Bavarian corps, puts you in position to crush the enemy who has debouched by Landshut. You will receive orders from the Duke of Auerstädt, but I am writing you

1The italics are ours.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,077, tome 18, p. 476.

3Observe the precautions taken to insure the execution of the desired retrograde movement by Davout and the manner in which each general was apprised of the Emperor's plan and the part which each one was to take.

directly so that you may manœuvre in consequence, independently of the other Bavarian corps."[1]

During the morning Napoleon had written to Masséna at Augsburg:

"I have received your letters of the 15th and 16th of April. I have done nothing but arrive at Donauwörth. It is possible that before going to Augsburg I shall go to the corps of the Duke of Auerstädt. Always keep yourself ready with the means of four days' bread, so as to be able to march the moment the enemy shall approach somewhat and one can thoroughly know his dispositions."[2]

At 1 p. m. he again wrote Masséna:

"During the night you will receive the order to leave to-morrow, at 2 a. m., with your *corps d'armée* and that of General Oudinot. The Major-General is drawing up your instructions at this moment, but you should make your dispositions upon receipt of this letter. Prepare four days' biscuit, four days' bread, and organize Augsburg as if this place were to be besieged. * * * * Have all the gates of Augsburg closed; let no one enter or leave there, so that they will be ignorant of your movement. Let the cavalry corps which you have prevent their going along the road to Munich. * * *

"*The object of your march is to combine with that of the army so as to take the enemy in the very act and to destroy his columns.*[3] It is therefore necessary for you to be light, not to have any tail (to your column), for the artillery park to be with the *corps d'armée*, for nothing to be left on the road two hours after it shall have debouched. Answer me during the night and inform me whether there are sufficient ammunition, supplies and provisions at Augsburg; you know that I speak in case of a siege. If there are enough ammunition and supplies to hold out twelve or fifteen days, that is all that is necessary. In leaving, you will put the place in a state of siege, and from this moment everyone ought to obey the commandant. * * *

"Spread the rumor that you are marching partly into the Tyrol and partly on Munich. * * *

1Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,078, tome 18, pp. 476-477.

2*Ibid.*, No. 15,079, p. 477.

3The italics are ours.

"Make your dispositions all ready so that at 4 a. m. the tail of your columns shall have got beyond Friedberg. Push strong reconnaissances on Dachau, in order to be assured when you leave that the enemy's infantry has not reached this position.

"See to it that I shall receive during this night the report of the condition of your corps in men, horses and infantry and gun cartridges. Napoleon.

"P. S.—Prepare everything; do not make a single premature exposure, and do not let these dispositions be known to the public until you shall have left."[1]

At 6 p. m. he wrote to Davout at Ratisbon:

"My Cousin:

"Since this morning when I arrived, I have sent you General Savary, my orderly officer Vence, an artillery officer, a Bavarian major, and I have charged General Wrede and the Duke of Danzig, to whom I have written on several occasions, to inform you of my intentions. It is 6 p. m.; I am sending you your aide-de-camp, who carries to you the duplicate of my orders and who promises me to arrive before 6 a. m. Cannon have been heard between Pfaffenhofen and Freising.

"The Duke of Rivoli and General Oudinot leave Augsburg before dawn to direct themselves through Aichach on Pfaffenhofen. Nansouty's division, General Demont[2] and General Vandamme will be at Ingolstadt, where I believe I shall be to-morrow; the Bavarians between Neustadt and Ingolstadt. Thus I hope to have news from you twice to morrow, since *we are marching to meet each other.*[3] I do not know whether the enemy occupies Straubing in force or whether he debouches from this side. I am ignorant of what is on the Altmühl. *To-morrow will be a preparatory day to draw nearer,*[3] and I suppose that, Wednesday,[4] we can, according to circumstances, manœuvre on the columns which have debouched by Landshut and elsewhere and put to rout what may be between the Danube, the Isar, and

1Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,080, tome 18, pp. 477-479.

2Demont's division was composed of the 4th battalions of 14 different regiments and was destined for Davout's corps. *Vide* order of March 21st to Berthier. Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 14,934, tome 18, pp. 376-377.

3The italics are ours.

4April 19th.

perhaps even the Inn. Mask your movement from Bellegarde as much as you can, save, having obtained advantages on the Isar, to return on Ratisbon if General Bellegarde engages himself there. * * *

"*If the cannon continue to fire against the Bavarians to-morrow, accelerate your march to go to their aid.*[1] It may be that after to-morrow you can do a great deal of harm to the enemy's column of Landshut. *Everything leads one to believe that the road has not been intercepted on the right bank;*[1] however, you may correspond by both roads. The essential is to give a great deal of news of yourself and to inform us what you may have learned at Ratisbon.

"*Your five divisions, including that of General Demont, the six divisions which the Duke of Rivoli brings, the three divisions of cuirassiers are able to defeat all the forces of the Austrian Monarchy united; but above all things our communications must be assured and we must march with system.*[1] If you arrive to-morrow at Neustadt, you will be eight leagues[2] from my headquarters, just as I shall be eight leagues from the Duke of Rivoli. The Duke of Danzig will be still nearer. I can thus give orders to-morrow afternoon for the completion of the meditated operation. General Rouyer will be at Nördlingen to-day, and to-morrow at Donauwörth. * * * Do not leave more than just the necessary cavalry in observation and take with you all you can. Napoleon."[3]

Conformably to orders, Berthier had returned to Donauwörth.[4] and at 7 p. m. the Emperor dictated the last order addressed to Masséna:

"The Emperor has notified you, Duke, that you will make a movement to-morrow. *The intention of His Majesty is for you to leave to-morrow before daybreak, directing yourself on Aichach and Pfaffenhofen.*[1] Some cavalry, some infantry nearest in reach, some pieces of artillery will form the

1The italics are ours.

219.2 miles.

3Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,081, tome 18, pp. 479-480.

4Savary tells us ("Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo," Vol. II., Part 2, p. 49) that Napoleon said to Berthier: "What you have done appears to me so extraordinary that, if you were not my friend, I should suspect you of betraying me, for Davout is really at present much more at the disposition of the Archduke Charles than at mine."

advanced-guard and reach Pfaffenhofen in the evening. All the troops which you have farthest away will get beyond Aichach during the day, and your six infantry divisions will thus be in echelons between Aichach and Pfaffenhofen. Order strong cavalry patrols to move on Dachau to get news of the enemy. which will be transmitted you at Aichach. The Emperor will probably be at Ingolstadt. It will, however, be necessary for you to send him news of the enemy by the road from Aichach to Rain. The Bavarians will be between Pfeffenhausen and Biburg. * * * *Thus our army will be united to manoeuvre in concert against the enemy's corps which have debouched by Freising and Landshut.*[1] You will march, Duke, immediately after your advanced-guard, so as to be able to manœuvre according to circumstances. * * * The Emperor does not need to observe to you that in this march you should reconnoitre far on your right, so as to be forewarned in time of all that is occurring. * * * Take with you all the bread and biscuit you possibly can. Inform me the hour when you think you will arrive in person at Aichach and the place where your headquarters will be. * * *"[2]

We have quoted *in extenso* these important orders for the reason that they afford an insight into Napoleon's method of grappling with such intricate problems as nothing else possibly can. Just as the stability and permanency of every construction, architectural or otherwise, depends principally upon the foundation, so upon these preliminary orders was based the wonderful plan of extricating the French divisions and diverting the disaster onto the Austrians—a plan which for soundness and brilliancy must forever excite the admiration and astonishment of military men. These orders show that Napoleon understood that the Austrian movement had been pronounced between the Isar and the south bank of the Danube; that unless remedied the French centre, filled only by Bavarians, would surely be broken; and that the wings at Ratisbon and Augsburg were useless in those positions—the former

1The italics are ours.

2Pelet, tome 2, pp. 403-405.

being especially isolated and in danger of being crushed between Bellegarde—whose corps, concentrated at Schwandorf, was showing considerable aggressiveness—and the Archduke on the Kleine Laber. Should the opposition be first directed against Bellegarde, who was threatening the communications of the "Grand Army," or should the concentration be made by the right bank? The French had occupied and partly fortified Landsberg, Augsburg, Rain, Ingolstadt and Ratisbon, and he therefore decided to mass his troops within this right triangle, concentrating on the line of the Abens at the centre because the Austrian movement through Landshut was evidently directed against the left.[1] He hoped that on the 18th Davout could retrograde to Neustadt (19.2 miles) while Masséna and Oudinot advanced to Pfaffenhofen (31.2 miles). It is true that while the Archduke's army was massed and advancing with solid fronts well in hand, the French army was widely scattered and dangerous flank marches would be necessary for the wings to concentrate on the centre, but Napoleon knew wonderfully well how to compute the chances *pro* and *con.* the situation of both armies and their composition; he, who understood so well how to utilize the "personal equation," knew that he could count on the activity and zeal of the French, the characteristic slowness of the Austrians, and the tremendous moral effect of his own presence. By his able measures he rendered these dangerous flank marches perfectly assured. If the enemy should advance against the centre, he would gain time in this difficult country to await part of his army and would fight one of those masterful battles in which he was almost sure of victory. If the Archduke should turn toward Augsburg, he would find that city so fortified as to check all further advance in that direction, and Ratisbon was also presumed to be in a similar state of defense. In both of

1 "It is a fundamental rule in war to know how to sacrifice secondary to primary points." A. G., "Maximes de Guerre de Napoléon I., p. 98.

these suppositions Napoleon would fall upon his rear and drive him either into the Danube or on the Tyrol. Thus in the manœuvre against an Austrian movement on Ratisbon, the French assembled between the Danube and the Isar would drive the Archduke into the *cul-de-sac* formed by the confluence of these rivers and, provided possession were gained of the bridges at Ratisbon and Landshut, annihilate his entire army. Thenceforth it was only a question of drawing in the wings of the French army by long and audacious flank marches protected by the Bavarians whom chance had placed in the centre. From that hour there was no hesitation in Napoleon's course; "*L'audace, toujours l'audace*" was his motto,[1] and one may search in vain for a finer example of boldness, coupled with soundness of resolution, in a life filled with remarkable decisions.

On the 17th the Archduke realized the imperative necessity of hastening his march, but even so, his advance was limited to 5 miles by the lethargy of his cumbersome army, accustomed to move so extremely slowly. That night the Archduke occupied Weihmichel with the Fifth Corps (Archduke Louis), whose advanced-guard attacked the Bavarians (Wrede) near Hornbach and drove them back beyond Siegenburg; Hohenzollern and Rosenberg followed the Rottenburg road to Hohenthann and Essenbach; the Reserve Corps (Lichtenstein and Kienmayer) to Altdorf and Ergolding, their light troops on the Laber. Rosenberg's detachments pushed on Ratisbon reported the important information that there were French troops at Köfering and that Davout's corps was still at Ratisbon. Hiller reached Moosburg and extended to Mainburg (on the Abens) and Nandelstadt, while a strong detachment was sent to Pfaffenhofen.[2] The general direction of the

1 "*True wisdom for a general is in an energetic determination.*" Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II., 16th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 209.

2 Compare Hamley, p. 147.

Sixth Corps was through Au to contain and observe all movements from Augsburg, joined by Jellachich from Salzburg. These movements of the 16th and 17th initiated the direction of the Austrian forces to the Danube at Kelheim and Neustadt; they had for their purpose "the dispersion of the enemy's corps and for an object to pierce to the midst of these corps in order to cross the Danube between Ingolstadt and Ratisbon, and to take the direction of Eichstätt, where the Second Corps should move by Beilngries and the First by Neumarkt."[1]

Meanwhile Davout's divisions were concentrated about Ratisbon with the exception of Friant posted at Hemau to assure the communication with the Imperial Headquarters.[2] Lefébvre's divisions were assembled at Vohburg, whither Deroy had retreated covered by Wrede, but fortunately *the Archduke did not follow up his advantage in full by occupying Siegenburg in force, which would have cut the French army in two and probably have forced Napoleon to renounce all attempt to concentrate south of the Danube.* Oudinot remained at Aichach and Masséna was busy drawing in his divisions scattered at Landsberg, Zusmarshausen, Ursberg,[3] and Schwabmünchen,[4] an operation which required nearly 36 hours.

During the night of the 17th-18th additional reports received at Donauwörth brought accurate information about the enemy's columns, their positions and the direction of their march. In spite of appearances, Napoleon judged the movement on Neustadt and Kelheim too bold and too much extended to account for its slowness; he studied with great care the manœuvres of Bellegarde, and

1Letter of the Archduke Charles to Count Bellegarde. Pelet, tome 1, pp. 239-240

2Davout (Ratisbon, April 17th) to Berthier. *Vide* Davout, Correspondance, tome 2, p. 475.

3On the Mindel and about 12 miles south of Burgau.

4Midway from Augsburg to Mindelheim, between the Wertach and the Lech.

knowing that they must be subordinated to those of the Archduke, became convinced that the latter was moving on Ratisbon. The development of the Austrian movement showed plainly what could be done and what attempted; Napoleon therefore enlarged his own movements, and, no longer confining his efforts to reuniting the French army, he took steps to gain the enemy's left, his rear, and even his communications.[1] Accordingly at 4 a. m. on Tuesday, the 18th, he wrote to Lefébvre:

"General Savary has arrived; he has remitted to me your two letters, which inform me that you have received my orders. I trust that at 3 a. m. you will have had the division of the Prince Royal put on the march to move forward *in order to unite your three divisions.*† It appears that the Archduke Charles with three *corps d'armée* is directing himself between Landshut and Ratisbon; *you must therefore manoeuvre on his left flank to retard his march on Ratisbon*, now your communication with the Duke of Auerstädt, *and to make a diversion which occupies a number of men equal to your own.*[2] I hope that before 9 a. m. you will be in person with the divisions of Wrede and Deroy, and you will make the Bavarians understand what I expect from them in these days. I hope that before 11 o'clock the division of the Prince Royal will have joined and *that you will fight with more or less activity*,[2] according to whether you will learn that the Duke of Auerstädt is more or less engaged.

"The Duke of Rivoli and General Oudinot are on the march for Pfaffenhofen, where they will be this evening. I go myself to Ingolstadt. Send me news of yourself often during the day, if that be necessary. *You know the urgency of the situation; I do not need to recommend to you to act seriously.*[2] Communicate with the Duke of Auerstädt and make him understand what you will learn through deserters, in order that he may act according to circumstances."[3]

1 "*The greatest secret in war consists in becoming master of the communications of the enemy.*" Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II., p. 59.

2 The italics are ours.

3 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,086, tome 18, p. 483.

To the commander of the right wing, Marshal Masséna, he sent the following long order to Aichach:

"My Cousin:

"I have received your letter. The division which you have at Landsberg[1] and the four regiments of light cavalry should try to reach Aichach, or at least to make what (distance) they can on the road from Augsburg to Aichach, *but it is indispensable for General Oudinot, with his corps and three other divisions, for your cuirassiers and whatever other cavalry you have, to spend the night at Pfaffenhofen.*[2]

"In a word, you are going to understand what the question is. Prince Charles, with all his army, debouched yesterday from Landshut on Ratisbon; he had three *corps d'armée* valued at 80,000 men. The Bavarians fought all day with his advanced-guard, between Siegenburg and the Danube. However, to-day, the 18th, the Duke of Auerstädt, who had 60,000 Frenchmen, leaves Ratisbon and moves on Neustadt. Thus he and the Bavarians will act in concert against Prince Charles. During the course of to-morrow, the 19th, all of your corps which will have reached Pfaffenhofen, to which will be joined the Würtembergers, a division of cuirassiers and all that can, will operate either to fall on Prince Charles' rear or on the column from Freising and Moosburg, and finally enter into line. *Everything leads one to think that between the 18th, the 19th, and the 20th all the affairs of Germany will be decided.*[2] To-day, the 18th, the Bavarians can still continue to fight without great result, since they are always giving ground, but they are harassing and delaying just so much the march of the enemy's army. The Duke of Auerstädt is notified of everything, and General Wrede sends him all the prisoners. To-day it is possible that only a few shots will be fired. Between Ratisbon and the place where Prince Charles was, there were only nine leagues. It is therefore not until the 19th that something may happen, and *you will actually see at a glance that never did circumstance want a movement to be as active and as rapid as this one.*[2] Doubtless the Duke of Auerstädt, who has about 60,000 men, can with rigor get himself honorably out of this affair, but *I regard the enemy as lost if Oudinot and your three divisions*

1The first division under General Legrand.

2The italics are ours.

have debouched before dawn, and if, in this important situation, you make my troops feel what they must do.[1] Send cavalry posts to a distance. It appears that the Austrians have a corps of 12,000 men only at Munich and in that direction. *The importance of your movement is such that I will come myself to join your corps.*[1] Your cavalry which was at Dachau can leave there to direct itself and come to join you at Pfaffenhofen. As for the General who is at Landsberg, he forms with his body your rear guard, which will be six or seven hours distant. That may be useful and has no inconvenience. If necessary, he will always rejoin on the second or third day. Finally, the four regiments of light cavalry can, during the course of to-morrow, or day after to-morrow at the latest, have rejoined your head. Napoleon.

"*Activity, activity, rapidity; I commend myself to you!*"[2]

Nansouty, with his cuirassier division, and Vandamme, with the Würtemburgers, were ordered to Ingolstadt, whither the Emperor, accompanied by Marshal Lannes, who had just arrived,[3] proceeded during the afternoon and established the Imperial Headquarters. He at once sent an officer through Vohburg and Neustadt to carry news of Lefébvre to Davout and the information that the Emperor would probably go to Neustadt, and on his return to give information of Davout to Lefébvre and Wrede.[4]

During the day neither Davout nor Masséna, in spite of Napoleon's insistance and their own realization of the gravity of the situation, had been able to execute the orders sent them. The former, thanks to Berthier, was truly in a critical position; part of Bellegarde's forces had drawn down from the north, had attacked him[5] and threatened

1The italics are ours.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,087, tome 18, pp. 483-484. Compare Pelet, tome 2, pp. 405-407.

3Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 278.

4"Order to Captain Galbois," 5 p. m., Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,091, p. 486.

5Klenau (advanced-guard of Kollowrath's corps) reached Rheinhausen on the 16th and had shelled Stadt-am-Hof on the 17th.

to cut all communications north of the Danube,[1] while on the south Montbrun had encountered some of Rosenberg's detachments on the Grosse Laber. His orders were to retreat by the right bank, and yet he had learned that the bridge of Abensberg, *the most important strategic point in the entire theatre of operations*, had been burned. He had been compelled so to scatter his divisions in order to be prepared for every emergency that they could not be assembled south of the Danube until 8 p. m. He had written to Lefébvre and to the engineer officer at Ingolstadt to reestablish this important bridge at Abensberg and did not doubt his ability to rejoin Napoleon in spite of the Austrians.[2] Masséna too was unable to concentrate his divisions until the night of the 18th, and accordingly did not arrive at Pfaffenhofen until the night of the 19th. Fortunately, Oudinot at Aichach had been able to reach Pfaffenhofen during the day, thus forming the head of the Fourth Corps, and Vandamme and Nansouty bivouacked that night about Ingolstadt. The Bavarians played their all-important rôle with vigor and success in the centre, where it was so imperative to prevent the enemy from breaking through. Wrede attacked the Austrian (Archduke Louis) advanced-guard on the heights of Mühlhausen, drove

1 Davout (Ratisbon, April 18th) to Berthier:

"Monseigneur,

"It is probable that to-morrow one can no longer communicate with me by the left bank beyond the confluence of the Altmühl. I shall do all I can to send news of myself through Kelheim. Attempts must also be made to have orders reach me by that road."

Vide Davout, Correspondance, tome 2, p. 480.

2 Davout (Ratisbon, April 18th) to Berthier:

"General Friant is still eight leagues from here [*i. e.*, 19.2 miles away at Hemau], the heavy cavalry five leagues. It will be 8 p. m. before I can have all of them on the right bank.

"It is possible that you will blame me for this disposition of my troops; but when you will know that on my left flank I had Generals Bellegarde and Kollowrath you will explain easily to yourself the measures which I had been obliged to take to maintain the communication by the left bank of the Danube.

"However, to-morrow I shall be united, and I answer you that the column from Landshut will not prevent us from passing."

Vide Davout, Correspondance, tome 3, pp. 478-479.

it back across the Abens, recaptured the bridge of Siegenburg and established his troops at Biburg, supported by Marshal Lefébvre with Deroy and the Prince Royal near Neustadt. This important operation cleared the territory where it was expected that Davout would form his junction that night with Lefébvre, but the former, as we have seen, was unable to begin his retreat until late that night.

The 18th was the third day since the passage of the Isar, and yet the Austrian army had got only 22 miles from that river. The advance toward the Abens and the Danube was resumed; Rosenberg and Hohenzollern moving on Rottenburg on the right of the Archduke Louis, followed by the Reserve Corps in the centre on Pfeffenhausen, while on the left Hiller—who had been ordered to support Louis—advanced to Mainburg. During the march, news was received that Davout's entire corps had reached Ratisbon; this caused a change in the former dispositions and resulted in Hohenzollern and Rosenberg—followed by the Reserves—being pushed across the Grosse Laber to Rohr. The Fifth Corps alone remained on the road to Neustadt and that night occupied Siegenburg, in touch with Hiller's advanced-guard under General Mesko at Mainburg. The corps of the right posted at Bachl and Langquaid[1] detachments which captured near Abbach an ambulance belonging to the French Third Corps, and at Peising a despatch from Lefébvre to Davout.[2] These two captures caused a revocation of the Archduke's orders for the 19th to continue the movement in three columns toward Kelheim "between the Abens and the Danube to prevent the junction of the French and the Bavarians," and the generals assem-

1The positions given by Hamley (p. 148) are not all accurate.

2"You know, my dear Marshal, that I am here [Neustadt] to support you and to draw to myself a part of the enemy's forces if you were attacked. For this purpose I have sent a division to Siegenburg and to Biburg; two others are all ready to follow and to march against the enemy's left flank if you were attacked. Give me news of yourself, and believe that, as a good neighbor, I shall do all that I can to renew to you the assurance," etc.

bled in the headquarters were instructed to change direction and to advance in three columns through Teugen, Dinzling and Egglofsheim on Ratisbon, while Kollowrath at Schwandorf was ordered to attack Ratisbon from the north bank. All the advantages so overwhelmingly on the Austrian side—which gave promise of every success—were thus renounced by the ordinarily masterful Archduke just at the moment when he had reached the goal of Abensberg. On the 18th he was opposed only by the Bavarians, supported that night by the Würtembergers and Nansouty at Ingolstadt; *the superiority of numbers, concentration and interior lines were all in his favor, and a vigorous offensive on that day would have pierced the French centre and left him free to operate against Masséna or to crush Davout in conjunction with Bellegarde.* The Austrian troops seemed to realize that the *sine qua non*[1] lay within their grasp by the desperate manner in which they endeavored to drive back Wrede from Siegenburg, but the change of direction necessitated a suspension of these attacks, and Wrede was therefore able to hold the important line of the Abens. The reason for renouncing these immensurable advantages is still inexplicable. Perhaps the Archduke feared "being attacked on all points by Davout" if he continued on to Kelheim and Neustadt, but we are more inclined to believe the true reason lay in the news of the arrival of Napoleon on the scene, which invariably had a strangely paralytic effect upon nearly all his adversaries.

The night of the 18th-19th the Imperial Headquarters at Ingolstadt got but little sleep. At 3 a. m. Berthier, at Napoleon's dictation, instructed Lefébvre "to take a good position to fight the enemy with equal numbers and to have his seventy-two guns play if need be." He was informed that the Emperor would come to him, upon the first sound

[1] *"It is not sufficient to bring about a good operation in war by bringing our masses skillfully to bear upon the most important point. It is necessary to know how to engage them there."* Jomini, Vol. II., p. 453.

of the guns, with the Würtembergers, the cuirassiers and Demont's division, and he was recommended "to make bridges on the Abens below Abensberg; and *at all price to hold on to the bridge of this town*, on which Marshal Davout's junction would operate; *to fight in mass and united* * * *; *to attack strongly when they saw the head of the Third Corps*,[1] which will rejoin early." These orders were sent in *duplicata* and *triplicata*, and as the day wore on the Emperor became extremely impatient at receiving no further news or hearing the sound of any engagement, and fearful lest his plans had miscarried. At noon he wrote to Masséna at Freising:

"I have received your letter of 6 o'clock this morning. I suppose that you will have had the 4,000 men whom you have in front of you pushed in such a way that they will not escape, and that it will not limit itself to the 400 prisoners which you announce to me.

"At Au and Freising there is nothing much; perhaps the rest of the corps that you defeated and which, in its entirety, was five regiments.

"Our operations assume a shape. This is the true state of affairs: Prince Charles, with his whole army, was this morning a day's march from Ratisbon and had his line of operation on Landshut. The Duke of Auerstädt has this night and this morning evacuated Ratisbon to move on Neustadt and to join with the Bavarians. *I therefore expect an engagement to-day*;[1] however, it is midday and the cannon have not yet made themselves heard. *You see that, by this manoeuvre, I am refusing my left, wishing to advance my right which you form and which, from to-day, commences to enter into the game.*[1] This evening or to-morrow there will perhaps be fighting on the left.

"*Push Oudinot's corps on Au and on Freising.*[1] Push posts on Munich to learn what is there. Since the inhabitants of the country are with us, you can send estafettes everywhere.

"According to the information which I shall receive to-day, *I shall direct you from Freising and Au on Landshut; and then Prince Charles will find that he has lost his line of*

[1] The italics are ours.

operations, his protection—which is the Isar—*and will be attacked by his left.*[1]

"I tell you to carry a division to Au, and not all on Freising, because if the left were engaged more than I desire, the division which will be at Au will have made a march to succor the left.

"All this should be elucidated to-day and *the movements are precious.*[1] Keep Oudinot's corps disposable and place your four divisions around Pfaffenhofen, on the three directions of Neustadt, Freising and Au, so that, according to circumstances, one of them marches first and directs the columns on the point where they must march. *Here all is a calculation of hours.*[1] However, the 12,000 or 15,000 of this rabble which you have beaten this morning ought to be attacked, head down, by 6,000 of our people."[2]

At 1 p. m. to the *duplicata* of this order was added this postscript:

"P. S.—Instead of placing one of Oudinot's divisions at Au, as was said in the *primata* which has just been sent you by an orderly officer, you will place this division on Neustadt, in order that it may gain a march to support the left, and the other division, you will place it, as is said before, on Freising."[3]

The Emperor then mounted and hurried forward to Abensberg.

The principal interest of the day is concentrated in the narrow territory enclosed in the quadrilateral Landshut-Ratisbon-Neustadt-Au. Davout had, as we have seen, massed his divisions south of Ratisbon at 8 o'clock p. m. on the 18th preparatory to retreating to Neustadt, and "all dispositions were made to assure this flank march, which the presence of the enemy's whole army rendered extremely delicate."[4] The road along the Danube was kept free for the baggage, and the 65th regiment (3 battalions,

1 The italics are ours.

2 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,092, tome 18, p. 487.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 487-488. Compare Pelet, tome 2, pp. 407-409.

4 Davout's report.

1,800 men) left under Colonel Coutard to guard the bridge at Ratisbon until the retreat had been accomplished. The advanced-guard under Montbrun—composed of the light cavalry of Pajol and Jacquinot with 2 battalions of the 17th Light Infantry—was directed south through Eckmühl to Dinzling to cover the movement and then to regain Abensberg by the cross-roads. The infantry moved in two columns—the first (the divisions of Gudin and Friant) on the left through Weillohe, Saalhaupt and Ober-Feking, and the second (Morand and Saint-Hilaire) on the right through Gebraching, Peising, Teugen and Affeking—preceded by the rest of the light cavalry and Saint-Sulpice's cuirassier division. The retreat began about midnight and at 6 a. m. Saint-Sulpice, Gudin and Morand had reached the plateau before Ober-Saal without opposition, but at 9 o'clock the Austrians were encountered between Teugen and Hausen. Gudin, Morand, Saint-Sulpice and the baggage train were ordered to continue on without stopping to fight and to effect their junction with the Bavarians, while Saint-Hilaire, Friant and Montbrun remained behind to oppose the Austrian advance and insure the union.

On the morning of the 19th the Austrian army began its inexplicable and fatal march on Ratisbon, thus renouncing the advantages which had laid within its very grasp, and inviting Napoleon to break its own centre and defeat the corps in detail—an invitation which he accepted with greatest alacrity, to the subsequent utter discomfiture of the Archduke.[1]

At 6 o'clock—when Davout had half completed his retreat to the Abens—the 92,000 Austrians, who could so easily have overwhelmed the Bavarians on the previous day (Tuesday), commenced their movement northward on Ratisbon. The army was divided as usual into 3 columns;

1 "*To change strategical plans when not forced to by circumstances leads to disaster.*" Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, "Letters on Strategy," 5th axiom, p. 101.

on the left the Third Corps (25,000 men) advanced from Rohr and Bachl through Thann, Hausen and Teugen, where it separated to attack Abbach by Deutschhof and Peising, a detachment of 6,000 under Thierry being sent to the heights before Abensberg to observe this debouche and assure touch with the Fifth Corps. In the centre the Fourth Corps (Rosenberg) and the 12 grenadier battalions of the First Reserve Corps (28,300) moved from Rohr through Langquaid on Dinzling and Weillohe; while on the right Lindenau's division (Fifth Corps) and the cuirassiers of the First Reserve Corps (20,000) under Lichtenstein were directed through Langquaid, Schierling, Eckmühl and Egglofsheim. The troops comprised in this movement amounted to 73,000 as compared with Davout's 46,000, but it was, of course, absolutely necessary to leave a body to observe and contain the Bavarians during this flank march to the north. The Fifth Corps (Archduke Louis) was accordingly left with 14,000 men opposite Siegenburg, supported by the Second Reserve Corps (Kienmayer) at Pfeffenhausen. Mesko's brigade had been sent on the 18th to Mainburg[1] and these forces were further augmented by the Sixth Corps coming up from Au and Luzmannsdorf (south of Pfeffenhausen), of all of which Hiller was to assume supreme command, and his instructions were to retreat, if necessary, through Landshut.[2] On the left bank of the Danube, Kollowrath at Stadt-am-Hof was about to attack Ratisbon, while Bellegarde was moving from Amberg on Neumarkt *en route* to Ratisbon. It will therefore be observed that *the Archduke, whose forces had been so admirably concentrated on the 18th, threw his inestimable advantages to the wind by making this foolish movement of division while Napoleon was*

1The Austrian front from Eckmühl to Mainburg and the French front from Ratisbon to Neustadt occupied very nearly the same extent. *Vide* Hamley, p. 151.

2Notice how the Austrian left would thereby be refused during the forward movement of the right and centre.

making every effort to concentrate. The retreat of Davout parallel to the Danube and the advance of the Archduke were such that, while the heads of their columns continued on, the rear divisions on the inner flanks necessarily encountered. The skirmishers of the Austrian column of the centre met the French patrols near Schneidhardt and attacked, but the Archduke halted Rosenberg's troops on the heights of Grub to await the arrival of Hohenzollern's column of the left, which, after a long delay, debouched through Thann, moving on Hausen. About 9 a. m. Davout near Saalhaupt was informed of the Austrian approach, and promptly posted Saint-Hilaire on the heights of Teugen and at Hausen, and as Friant's regiments came up they were placed on the left. Morand, Gudin and Saint-Sulpice had at that hour got past Ober-Feking and the Saalbach, and near Arnhofen had united with the Bavarian divisions established at Mühlbach, Biburg and Neustadt, thus forming part of the French line extending from Teugen to Siegenburg. The advantage of position was all on the side of the French, who occupied a gentle height covered with woods and susceptible of easy intercommunication between the various parts. At 11 o'clock the action became general and the equality of numbers engaged led to a desperate fight, in which Hohenzollern and Davout lost heavily. For some entirely unexplained reason, the Archduke failed to bring into action all the troops at his immediate disposal[1] and again lost the opportunity to crush Davout's slender forces, which held their ground with remarkable firmness until a terrific thunder-storm put an end to this battle of Thann at 6 p. m.

On the extreme Austrian right Lichtenstein, after a

[1] *"The first principle of war is that one ought not to deliver battle except with all the troops which one can unite on the field of operations."* Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 26th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 227

slight skirmish with Montbrun[1], had pursued his march through Eckmühl to Egglofsheim and Luckenpoint in total ignorance of the course of the battle to the west. In the centre Thierry (Hohenzollern's corps) had left Rohr at 6 a. m. and moved with his 6,000 troops through Kirchdorf on Arnhofen, where he endeavored to prevent the union of the divisions from Ratisbon with Lefébvre, but at 4 p. m., after having been charged by the Bavarian cavalry, attacked in front by Morand and threatened on his right by Wrede, was forced to retrograde beyond Offenstetten, which the Bavarians, supported by Morand and Gudin, promptly occupied, and *this advance served as the entering wedge which subsequently separated the Austrian left from its centre.* The Archduke Louis, left to contain the Bavarians, had become so anxious over the heavy firing heard in the direction of Abensberg that he sent General Bianchy with a brigade to support Thierry, and upon reaching Biburg the former learned of Thierry's defeat and was himself opposed by Wrede, but a vigorous artillery duel lasting until darkness found each one stubbornly holding his ground.

On the Austrian left the scales of Fortune had likewise changed. At 6 a. m. Masséna, who had spent the night at Schrobenhausen, reached Pfaffenhofen at the head of Oudinot's divisions, attacked and routed Scheiber's corps and drove it back vigorously on Au, thereby overawing Hiller, who did not dare until evening to continue his movement from Au on Mainburg to support the Archduke Louis, lest he should be attacked in the rear while on the march. Oudinot was pushed forward along the road to Freising, but Masséna was himself compelled to await his rearmost divisions, which rejoined him that night at Pfaffenhofen. Although Masséna did not actually "get into the game"

1 "The advanced-guard had encountered the enemy at Luckenpoint and had driven it as far as Dinzling. It maintained itself in this position until evening, but, destitute of artillery and the enemy having at the end of the day established eighteen pieces in battery against it, it retired to Peising without being attacked." Davout's report.

that day, he formed the marching wing which threatened and ultimately cut the Austrian line of communications through Landshut.

After the battle of Thann, in which the Austrians lost 2,994 killed and wounded[1] and 700 prisoners,[2] and the general officers greatly distinguished themselves,[3] the Archduke's corps occupied the following positions: Lichtenstein near Egglofsheim, Rosenberg before Dinzling, Hohenzollern behind Hausen, with Pfanzetter's detachment at Bachl. The grenadiers of the First Reserve Corps (Lichtenstein) on the heights of Grub, Thierry behind Offenstetten, Bianchi near Biburg, the Fifth Corps (Archduke Louis) facing Siegenburg, the Sixth (Hiller) at Mainburg, and Kienmayer at Luzmannsdorf. Louis, upon hearing of Thierry's defeat, had sent Schustek with 4 squadrons of Kienmayer's corps to Rohr to cover this important point and preserve the touch with the centre, but the Archduke found himself totally unable to obey the order which he received that evening.[4] Lichtenstein was ordered to retire across the Grosse Laber through Leierndorf, which he did that night, instead of approaching Kollowrath at Stadt-am-Hof and Bellegarde advancing from Amberg.

That night Marshal Davout with the divisions of Friant and Saint-Hilaire bivouacked on the heights of Teugen and Peising in possession of the battle-field, where they were joined by Montbrun;[5] Morand, Gudin and Saint-Sulpice were

1"Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 106.

2Davout (Teugen, April 20th, 5 p. m.) to Napoleon. Davout, Correspondance, tome 2, p. 482.

3The Princes Lusignan, Louis and Moritz von Lichtenstein were wounded.

4At 3 p. m. the Archduke Charles, on the heights of Grub, had written his brother that "having encountered the enemy, he is strongly engaged, and that it is announced that Marshal Devout wants to atttack on all points, that the Fifth Corps should march during the night by Rohr and Langquaid to support him, if, however, he did not fear for himself in front of Siegenburg, where General Hiller should replace him as early as possible." Pelet, tome 1, p. 303.

5*Vide* Davout, Correspondance, tome 2, pp. 481-482.

posted on the hills of Arnhofen. Marshal Lefébvre occupied Offenstetten and Biburg supported by Vandamme and Nansouty at Neustadt. On the right Masséna occupied Pfaffenhofen—preceded by Oudinot on the road to Freising and his cavalry on all the roads to Munich—and effectually cut Jellachich off from the Archduke. The French army thus occupied a line about 21 miles in extent, but entirely unbroken, and so placed that in a few hours it could be concentrated on any given point. The two principal masses were assembled opposite the Austrian centre and left, and already threatened to separate and interpose between them.

That night the Austrian line from Amberg to Mainburg was triple the extent of the French line. Davout had completely blocked and now threatened the advance on Ratisbon, and *between the Archduke's centre and right existed a dangerous opening of nearly 13 miles*,[1] just at the place where the French columns from Ratisbon and Ingolstadt would necessarily meet, *and the line of operations from Landshut on Kelheim*, for which he had sacrificed so many days, *was therefore quite uncovered.*[2] This line from Landshut—where he had just established his new base—through Braunau and Linz meets the true line of operations from southern Germany through Augsburg and was already menaced by Masséna's advance. The fatal result of the change of direction from Neustadt to Ratisbon and Napoleon's remarkable strategic foresight now become apparent.[3] "When the Archduke on the 19th advanced on Ratisbon to attack Davout, he was obliged to leave a strong force on the Abens, for he knew

1 "*Never separate the wings of your army, one from the other, in such a way that your enemy can place himself in the intervals.*" Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 11th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 196.

2 "*Preserve with care and never abandon with a light heart your line of operations.*" *Ibid.*, "Quelques Considérations sur la Guerre de Sept Ans," tome 32, p. 240.

3 "*If there was one distinguishing feature of Napoleon's system of war, it was that of so manœuvring as to divide the forces of the enemy and then to defeat them in detail.*" Sargent, "Campaign of Marengo," p. 131.

that a great part of Napoleon's army was collected on the other bank; and had he withdrawn his *whole* force toward Ratisbon, the enemy from Abensberg would have cut him from the line Landshut-Braunau by the single march on Rottenburg. Hence he could only perform the movement by dividing his army. But while he was making a movement of separation, Napoleon was making one of concentration;"[1] Davout had effected his junction with the centre and thenceforth the continuity of the French line remained intact. The Archduke's golden opportunity vanished with the sun of the 19th and on the following day the Austrians found themselves disunited, separated, and beaten in detail.[2]

Late in the afternoon Napoleon had arrived on the line of the Abens, where he thoroughly examined the position, paying especial attention to the debouches onto the plateau Rohr, and determined to make his decisive movement next day on this point;[3] he then returned to Vohburg, where his headquarters had been established. The exact *status quo* of the Austrian army became manifest as the reports poured in to the Imperial Headquarters during the night, and he resolved to complete the separation of the left from the centre, to destroy Hiller, to occupy Landshut with its immense dépôts, and by seizing the Archduke's line of communications, to open the road to Vienna. While Davout contained the Austrian right and centre, he purposed to draw in reinforcements, to pierce by Kelheim-Landshut —instead of augmenting the movement of Masséna against the extreme right, which would necessarily throw Hiller onto the Archduke—and, uniting his forces at Landshut, to

1 Hamley, p. 151.

2 *"One must keep the army united, concentrate the greatest forces possible on the field of battle, profit by every occasion, for Fortune is a woman; if you miss her to-day, do not expect to find her again to-morrow."* Napoleon, "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," 40th conclusion, Correspondance, tome 31, p. 418.

3 *"The fundamental principle upon which every military combination rests is to operate with the greatest mass of our forces, a combined effort, upon a decisive point."* Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. II, p. 448.

crush the main army in the *cul-de-sac* formed by the Inn and the Danube. Orders were accordingly issued to Davout at Teugen to manœuvre against the Archduke "in such a way as to make him uneasy and contain him in his positions on both banks of the Laber, leaving Saint-Sulpice's division in front of the defiles of Post-Saal to guard them and to connect Davout's troops with those which he would himself conduct." Lefébvre was directed "to debouch and to second the dispositions of the Third Corps," and at midnight Masséna was informed that "A general engagement has taken place between Prince Charles and the Bavarians. The Austrians have suffered considerably. *The Emperor desires in this position for you to manoeuvre to a double end by sending reinforcements on Abensberg by one or the other of the roads and by marching on Landshut.* The Emperor is at Vohburg."[1]

At 3 a. m. a second order was despatched by Berthier to Masséna:

"*The Emperor*, Duke of Rivoli, *orders you to have the corps of General Oudinot ascend either by Au or by Geisenfeld, to concert in his operations with the left of the army and to aid it.* Consequently he should hasten his march if he hears the cannonade. With your corps and Espagne's division, Duke, the intention of the Emperor is that *you will direct yourself on Freising and even on Moosburg;* therefore you should pass through Au, after having assured yourself that nothing can bother you from Freising. *From Freising you will try to get possession of Moosburg or of the bridge on the Isar,* for if the enemy succeeds in gaining Landshut, he will want to defend the passage of the Isar. *It will therefore be good,* Duke, *that you should unite with the army which will attack Landshut, to offer it a bridge over the Isar.* However, we shall see during the day what the enemy will do and the course that will be taken by the bulk of the enemy. Have the march which General Oudinot will follow well understood. It is probable that this movement will force the enemy to evacuate Munich, to retreat; and according to the information which you will receive about the enemy, you will at-

[1] Pelet, tome 2, p. 410. The italics are ours.

tack him. His Majesty, however, relies on you for what cannot be forseen in an expedition of this nature.

(Signed) Alexander."[1]

At 6.30 a. m. he wrote to Vandamme:

"You are at Neustadt. You have troops at Mühlhausen and near Siegenburg. *Carry yourself to Siegenburg with all your forces; take under your orders all the Würtembergers.* The officer carrying this letter will in passing give the order to the Würtemberg brigadier-general, who is in reserve, to move to Siegenburg. I am mounting my horse to proceed to the outposts, where I shall direct the movements myself. You will debouch through Siegenburg with all the Würtembergers."[2]

At the same time another despatch was sent to Masséna at Freising:

"All this morning's reports are that the enemy is retreating as fast as he can. The battle-field is covered with his dead. The divisions of Friant and Saint-Hilaire and a Bavarian division alone were engaged.

"I am mounting my horse so as to go to reconnoitre myself the condition of things at the outposts, to attack the enemy, if he still occupies some positions, and to pursue him closely if he retreats. *I beg you on your side not to lose a moment and to surprise him at the crossing of the Isar.*

"P. S.—*The more you will approach Landshut the better that will be.* No doubt that, if you can go to Landshut, that would be preferable; but try to go to Moosburg."[3]

Napoleon then rode forward to the Abens to complete his examination of the terrain and to direct the concentration of his forces for the battle destined to cut the Austrian army in two. Since the war had been brought about largely on account of the imperilled interests of the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon had resolved to give the allied

1 Pelet, tome 2, pp. 410-411. The italics are ours.

2 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,097, tome 18, p. 490. The italics are ours.

3 *Ibid.*, No. 15,098, p. 490. The italics are ours. Also Pelet, tome 2, p. 410.

troops the greatest proof of his confidence by placing them in the centre under his immediate command, and as the Bavarians, followed by the Würtembergers, moved into position on the Abens, Napoleon halted and addressed to them one of those marvelous allocutions with which he knew so well how to arouse enthusiasm to its utmost pitch.[1] The French line when formed extended thus: Davout with the divisions of Montbrun, Friant and Saint-Hilaire from Peising to Teugen, Saint-Sulpice at the defiles of Post-Saal to preserve connection with the remainder of his corps (Gudin and Morand), under the command of Marshal Lannes, who had just arrived, *à cheval* on the road from Kelheim to Landshut, Vandamm with the Würtembergers in the centre, and Lefébvre with the Bavarians prolonging the line beyond to Siegenburg. At 9 o'clock the general advance on Rottenburg was begun, with the exception of Wrede on the extreme right reëstablishing the bridge at Siegenburg under fire from the Archduke Louis' batteries. Lannes on the left penetrated through Rohr toward the Kleine Laber, driving Thierry from Bachl onto Schusteck at Rohr, and, throwing both into confusion, rolled them back early in the day on Rottenburg, thereby severing communication with the bulk of the Archduke's forces, cutting off all support from that direction and thus forming the most advanced echelon of the attack. In the centre Napoleon himself directed the Würtembergers through Offenstetten on Rohr and the Bavarians through Pruck on Kirchdorf, but their advance was opposed with great vigor by Bianchi opposite Biburg, supported by the Prince Reuss' division (Fifth Corps). Both sides fought with utmost desperation, and the Emperor was careful to keep up the action until some time after Lannes had occupied Rohr and reached the Grosse Laber, thus occupying the road to Rottenburg and barring the retreat of the Fifth Corps toward the Archduke Charles. On the ex-

1 *Vide* his Correspondance, No. 15,099, tome 18, p. 491.

treme right Wrede was kept refused, and the completion of the bridge at Siegenburg under fire was not accomplished until 2 p. m., when Wrede crossed and advanced toward Pfeffenhausen, thereby threatening the Archduke Louis' line of retreat and compelling him to retire his whole corps through the defile leading to that point by the only road then open to him.[1]

Meanwhile at 8 a. m. Hiller at the head of his column received at Nieder-Hornbach news of the fighting of the previous day on the Austrian right, and, halting his corps, proceeded in person toward Siegenburg, where he observed the French preparations for attack on the side of Abensberg and learned that the road to Rohr was thereby threatened. He accordingly sent Vincent (3rd division) to Rohr and resumed his own advance on Rottenburg, where he met the débris of Thierry and Schusteck flying before the Bavarians; but, in spite of the stubborn defense of Weissenvolf's brigade, he arrived too late to occupy the bridge and marshes of the Grosse Laber, where he might possibly have checked any further advance. He therefore masked his movement with great skill and retreated with Kienmayer to Türkenfeld, where he spent part of the night, and later continued on to Landshut.[2]

At Rottenburg, despite the approaching darkness, another desperate fight took place, and Napoleon, to prevent the union of the Austrian corps, ordered Wrede to drive the Archduke Louis' rear-guard (Radetzki) through the defile of Pfeffenhausen and attack it during the passage of the Grosse Laber. The Bavarians executed this order with re-

1*Note the manner in which the French columns were kept in touch with each other and the careful observance of the rule that "a wing must be turned or outflanked, without separating the army."* Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 23rd observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 221.

2Although both banks of the Laber were unoccupied by the French until nearly nightfall, it appears that neither Hiller nor the Archduke Louis knew that the headquarters were at Egglofsheim. *Vide* Pelet, tome 2, p. 24.

markable vigor, and succeeded in throwing Radetzki into such confusion that he was unable to burn the bridge to cover Louis' retreat on Landshut. On the left Lannes' flankers had attacked near Langquaid the posts of the Third Austrian Corps and forced Hohenzollern to send them aid by posting Pfanzetter to occupy Langquaid; but the French crossed the Grosse Laber and, spreading out, compelled Hohenzollern to hurry his park and baggage through Eckmühl on Ratisbon. This movement also connected Davout's outposts with the centre, obliged the Archduke Charles to deploy his extreme left, and severed his communication with his left wing.

On the extreme right of the "Grand Army" Masséna, in obedience to orders, sent Oudinot with Boudet's division, which formed the tail of his column, on Abensberg,[1] and himself made a forced march to Freising, where he arrived early in the day with his light cavalry, Legrand and Claparède. He at once repaired the bridge destroyed previously by Lefébvre and sent the Baden dragoons toward Moosburg. On the extreme left Davout played the rôle of containing force, which contributed much to the success of the day. The check which the Austrian advance had encountered on the previous day made it doubly imperative for the Archduke to get possession of Ratisbon in order to effect a junction with Kollowrath at Stadt-am-Hof and with Bellegarde approaching from Neumarkt. Lichtenstein was accordingly pushed forward on Ratisbon, *where the 65th regiment*—there left on the 18th by Davout —*kept the entire army at bay until 6 o'clock, when it capitulated.* Davout's 3 divisions on the heights from Peising to Teugen necessarily came into contact with Hohenzollern's column, which formed the left of the Austrian advance, and, after fighting all day, had driven Vukassovich's division—which had replaced the grenadier reserves withdrawn at

[1] Tharreau's division had already been directed on Neustadt, where it arrived that night.

dawn by the Archduke—supported by troops posted at Dinzling, from Hausen back on Leierndorf. Davout was supported by Saint-Sulpice in reserve near Ober-Saal and by Demont's division at Vohburg, and, with his communication with the centre assured by Lannes' flanking detachments, he was therefore enabled to hold his positions all day.

Such was the battle of Abensberg, in which Napoleon, profiting at once by the void left in the centre of the Austrian front by the march of the 19th, had concentrated his forces, driven back Hiller, Louis and Kienmayer, and completed the separation of the Austrian left wing[1] from the centre, while Davout by containing the Archduke prevented the union of the enemy's parts. "While Napoleon was defeating the left wing, Davout was left in front of a very superior enemy;[2] and it would seem at first as if an attack upon him would have balanced the fortunes of the day. But Davout, if compelled to retreat, would have approached Napoleon, whereas the Austrian left wing, when defeated, was receding from the Archduke Charles. The result of the Archduke pressing back the force in front of him would have been that the main French army, supporting Davout, would have fought on the 20th or 21st the battle of the 22nd without the trouble of going to seek the enemy."[3] Moreover, since Masséna was beyond the sphere of action on that day, the sum total of the armies actually in the presence of each other was greatly in favor of the Archduke by about 134,000[4] to 104,000; *but Napoleon's remarkable skill in determining the most decisive point and in concentrating for the battle had made him superior to*

1The Austrian left wing lost 25 officers and 467 men killed; 63 officers and 2,156 men wounded; and 4,000 prisoners. "Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 106.

2Davout had only 24,000 men as opposed to the Archduke's 91,000.

3Hamley, p. 151.

4Not including Bellegarde (27,800) or Jellachich (10,971).

the forces actually opposed to him that day by 80,000 to 70,000. The immensurable advantage of interior lines had shifted in two days from the Austrians to the French, and Napoleon's use of them[1] *contrasts strongly with the Archduke's failure to employ them at the very moment when success lay within his grasp,* and in the subsequent operations we shall "get something like an approximate idea of the actual equivalent in force of the advantage possessed by the army whose action is concentric over that which is divided."[2]

The French army that night occupied the following positions: Davout from Peising to Teugen, Saint-Sulpice and Demont before Vohburg; Lannes between Rottenburg and Ascholtshausen, Vandamme between Rohr and Pfeffenhausen; Lefébvre along the Grosse Laber to Pfeffenhausen, Masséna at Freising, Oudinot near Abensberg, and the Imperial Headquarters at Rohr—the three principal masses (Davout, the Emperor and Masséna) in perfect intercommunication; while of the Austrian army, Bellegarde had reached Neumarkt and Beilngries, and Kollowrath, disengaged at 6 p. m. by the surrender of Davout's regiment, had been ordered and had begun his movement from Stadt-am-Hof to Beilngries. On the left bank Lichtenstein retrograded from Ratisbon toward Wolkering, Rosenberg camped at Dinzling, Hohenzollern occupied Leierndorf and the grenadiers of the First Reserve Corps between Hoheberg and Egglofsheim, where the Archduke's headquarters were, while the entire left wing (Archduke Louis, Hiller and Kiermayer) was in full retreat from Rottenburg and Pfeffenhausen on Landshut.

1Observe how Napoleon realized their full value (1) by acting constantly on the offensive and in force; and (2) by taking the offensive upon only one point at a time. Compare Derrécagaix, "Modern War" ("Strategy"), p. 270. *Vide* also *supra*, p. 109, footnote.

2Hamley, p. 152.

III.

The night of Thursday, April 20th, was a busy one in the Imperial Headquarters, for the indefatigable Napoleon was resolved to follow up the advantage gained in order to put the Austrian left wing decisively *hors de combat*, seize the Austrian communications, and then to roll the Archduke up in the *cul-de-sac* between the Isar and the Danube and annihilate him.[1] He accordingly ordered Berthier to write to Masséna:

"We have beaten the enemy for two days and made lots of prisoners, taken guns and flags. His Majesty supposes that you are at Landshut. *It is very important to have a bridge over the Isar; that will be of great use in gaining on the enemy and reaching his line of operations.* The Emperor thinks that there is nothing which will be able to resist your army; you can therefore go head down.

Alexander."[2]

Wrede was ordered to move early on Landshut "and upon reaching Schmatzhausen to assure himself whether the enemy still holds before Rottenburg; in this case to fall upon his rear." Vandamme was directed to follow Wrede and Nansouty to move through Rohr. At 5 a. m. Napoleon wrote to Davout at Teugen:

"Day before yesterday and yesterday are another Jena. The Duke of Rivoli ought to have arrived yesterday at Landshut, after 3 p. m. yesterday. You have before you only a curtain of three infantry regiments.[3] I have had the villages of Thann occupied; a lot of wounded were found there.

1Compare Hamley, p. 144: *"It is not enough to pierce and divide the enemy's army: the advantage thus gained must be promptly followed up, or a subsequent reunion of the parts may nullify all the previous operations. * * * That is to say, the first stroke must be followed up by successive blows on one or both sides, which shall, at once, keep the enemy asunder, and destroy his force."*

2Pelet, tome 2, p. 411. The italics are ours.

3Napoleon had evidently forgotten the immense force behind this curtain.

"This morning I am ordering the Duke of Danzig, with Demont's French division and Deroy's Bavarian and the Saint-Germain's cuirassiers, to move on Langquaid, to put to rout this rear-guard which covers their parks and their wounded, and to pick up everything during the day. If you hear the guns, it will be that; in case of need you ought to support him.

"Boudet's division spent the night at Neustadt.[1] I am ordering it to proceed to Abensberg. This fine division is under your command.

"Here is what you have to do: The Duke of Danzig is going to pursue the parks, the equipages and even Prince Charles, if he takes the direction of the Isar and if he should go to Landshut by Eckmühl, or should go to Straubing; support him if he needs it.

"Whenever your rear is cleared, when you will have gathered up lost men (and) baggage, you will move on Ratisbon; you will attack Bellegarde and Klenau; you will act in such a way that the left bank of the Danube will be cleared and that only the wrecks will rejoin.

"I am proceeding to Landshut, and, as soon as I shall have done all the harm possible to the enemy, I shall anticipate him on the Inn. I expect frequent news from you during the day. I shall be on the road from Rohr to Landshut."[2]

At the same hour Berthier wrote to Lefébvre of the movement of Napoleon on Landshut and directed him that: "He ought to leave at Rottenburg the Prince Royal's division, which there forms a sort of reserve,[3] and to march in the direction of Langquaid with the divisions of Demont, Deroy, Saint-Germain's brigade and the Bavarian cavalry. He will march at the head of Demont's division, will push the enemy with all the impetuosity of the French, will seize the parks, the baggage, will have the Bavarian cavalry attack, supported by the cuirassiers of Saint-Germain. He will send news about the positions and the movements of Prince Charles toward Ratisbon, Straubing and Lands-

1Of Masséna's corps, directed from Pfaffenhofen under Oudinot.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,100, tome 18, pp. 491-492.

3To cover the line of operations, preserve the communication with Davout, and to observe and contain the left of the Archduke.

hut. If this one is already engaged on the road to Landshut and anticipated this side of Eckmühl, he is going to be cut off on the Isar," and Lefébvre was ordered to concert with Davout."[1]

The reserve was formed by Oudinot's two divisions (Tharreau and Boudet), which had moved on the 20th from Pfaffenhofen to Neustadt and were ordered "to march on Abensberg and on the road to Ratisbon, to take orders from Marshal Davout in case he has need to be supported, and to hasten their steps if they hear the guns."

Napoleon's masterful dispositions were thus manifested. The line of operations through Neustadt and Vohburg to Donauwörth could scarcely be compromised until the advance on Landshut had been ended, because Davout would be additionally supported by the veteran French divisions, reinforcements had been directed on all the essential points, and the intercommunications had been perfectly assured. Even if Davout were repulsed beyond the Grosse Laber, the French would have to traverse a shorter distance than the Archduke, who would thereby be deprived of Kollowrath's aid and additionally be assailed by Masséna. If Davout *in extremis* were driven across the Danube or the Lech on Ingolstadt or Donauwörth, Napoleon could easily change his own line of operations and take that of Masséna from Landshut through Freising on Augsburg and Ulm. Indeed, the more one studies the dispositions for these five days the more one becomes astonished at the marvelous foresight and profound care with which Napoleon had prepared for every emergency.[2]

During the night the Archduke Louis, Hiller and Kienmayer continued to fall back on Landshut by the roads

1 Pelet, tome 2, pp. 37-38.

2 *"A great captain ought to say to himself several times a day, 'If the enemy's army should appear on my front, on my right, on my left, what shall I do?' If he finds himself embarrassed, then he is badly posted, he is not correct. He ought to remedy it."* Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, pp. 338-339.

from Rottenburg and Pfeffenhausen in great demoralization, their retreat hampered by the artillery parks and baggage trains choking both roads. As the Isar was approached the disorder increased, since the plain on the left bank was full of canals and marshes and the two roads leading to Landshut, there forming long narrow causeways like dykes, were literally blocked by artillery, baggage and pontoon wagons, and conveyances of every conceivable sort. The three Austrian corps experienced the utmost difficulty to penetrate into this inextricable jungle of wagons, and their hardships were increased when the French appeared on the heights advancing with the precision of parade. Hiller ordered Vincent (3rd division) to form up his cavalry to resist the French onslaught, and supported him by 4 battalions of Kienmayer's Reserves. Napoleon brought up all his artillery to play upon the disorganized troops struggling along the dykes, and under cover of this overwhelming fire launched the cuirassiers (Nansouty), all the Allied cavalry (now under the command of Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria), and Lannes' grenadiers (Morand's division) against Vincent, who was thrown back upon the disordered rabble on the *chaussées*.[1] Guns, wagons and pontoons were abandoned, and the disheartened Austrians fled in hopeless confusion into Landshut, where they attempted to burn the bridge across the river, but General Mouton, one of Napoleon's aides-de-camp, with the grenadiers of the 17th, followed close on their heels and prevented its destruction. Behind Mouton came Wrede and Morand, and another desperate fight ensued in the suburbs, where the Archduke Louis and Hiller fearlessly exposed themselves in order to make a stand to reform their troops and save part of their artillery.

[1] At 7.30 a. m. Saint-Sulpice was sent with a Bavarian brigade and cavalry to drive the enemy out of Essenbach and to send patrols to Ergoldsbach for news. Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,103, tome 18, p. 493.

Meanwhile, on the south, Masséna had sent his light cavalry from Freising to Moosburg, where it surprised the Austrian detachment and occupied the triple bridge. Marulaz' cavalry, supported by Claparède's division, was pushed by the eastern bank to Landshut, driving Nordmann, whom Hiller had sent on Moosburg (with 4 squadrons and 1 battalion), on Landshut, but Claparède, declining to act without orders from Masséna, did not support Marulaz, and a capital chance of cutting off the Austrian retreat was lost. Masséna, informed of this action, hastened up by the right bank, and, reaching Landshut before noon, joined in the general attack,[1] and the Austrians, thus menaced, at once abandoned Landshut and, pursued by Bessières' cavalry to Geisenhausen, retreated through Neumarkt across the Inn to Neu-Oetting, completely isolated from their centre and right.

The battle of Landshut completed the dispersion and demoralization of the Austrian left wing, which had lost heavily[2] and was definitely put *hors de combat* during the rest of the Campaign of Eckmühl. The arrival of Masséna's corps swelled the total of the troops at Napoleon's disposition to 105,000 and left him free to concentrate, this time on his left, in order to crush the Archduke Charles, who had that day lost his part of his park, baggage, pontoons, dépôts, hospitals, and *his real base.*

In contrast with the precise, rapid and decisive movements of Napoleon those of the Archduke were timid, slow and unproductive of results. Lichtenstein was ordered to send Veczay on Abbach, supported Lindenau between Wolkering and Hinkofen, and by the grenadiers at Egglofsheim; Rosenberg was to move behind Dinzling to cover the road to Eckmühl and communicate with Veczay.

1Masséna's report.

2Eleven officers and 639 men were killed; 29 officers and 2,119 men wounded; 21 officers, 2,313 men, 38 guns, 500 wagons and 1 pontoon train were captured by the French. "Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 106.

Hohenzollern was to halt behind Unter-Laichling, with his advanced-guard between Leierndorf and Paring and a detachment across the Laber awaiting Hiller; Kollowrath, on the march to Hemau, was ordered back to Ratisbon,[1] while Bellegarde turned to Hemau to observe the road to Kelheim, and the Archduke, thinking that Napoleon was before him, awaited developments. In this erroneous supposition he was shortly confirmed, for just before 8 a. m., Davout advanced from Hausen and Teugen and, vigorously attacking Hohenzollern's posts, drove them in and forced that general, who had as then received no orders from the Archduke, to retreat across the Grosse Laber to Schierling. Rosenberg—who had likewise received no order—hastened to evacuate Dinzling and move to Unter-Laichling, between which and Schierling he took position after considerable fighting. About 8 o'clock Davout learned that Lefébvre, with Deroy, the Prince Royal and Demont, was moving on Langquaid to support him, had driven Rosenberg's rear-guard across the marshes and, in spite of being taken in the flank by an Austrian battery, had attacked and captured Schierling. The Archduke, more apprehensive than ever, ordered Hohenzollern to hasten to Rosenberg's support by crossing the Laber at Eckmühl, breaking the bridges, and taking position between the road and Laichling, and Lichtenstein to leave his advanced-guard on Abach and to threaten the French left through Wolkering and Weillohe or Luckenpoint. The grenadiers were posted between Hoheberg and Gailsbach, facing Luckenpoint, where the Archduke feared to be turned.

Opposite these troops and separated by the deep valley of Laichling, Montbrun was posted on the extreme left toward Dinzling; on his right Saint-Hilaire, Friant, and Demont, the cavalry and the Bavarians took position at 11 a. m. and at 11:30 the guns came into action. Davout advanced Friant in *echelons* to outflank the Austrian left

[1] This order was not received until 6 p. m.

and about noon carried Santing. The Archduke hastened thither to prevent the breaking of his line between Rosenberg and the Reserve, and sent urgent orders to hurry Lichtenstein's regiments to that point; he also directed one of Hohenzollern's brigades on Egglofsheim and posted another behind Rosenberg. The Austrians then took the offensive and stormed the heights, but Davout drove them back into the valley with great loss and retaliated by attacking their centre and left near Unter-Laichling in spite of the constant fire of an overwhelming mass of Austrian artillery. At 6 p. m. the Archduke relinquished his attacks, after having lost in killed and wounded 67 officers and 2,872 men,[1] and occupied the plateau east of Schierling and Eckmühl (Rosenberg and Lichtenstein), Egglofsheim (Headquarters and Hohenzollern), Gebelkofen (Lindenau), Traubling, Köfering and Abbach (Veczay), thus forming a semi-circle from the Danube to the Laber,[2] in the middle of which the French occupied the position Santing-Schierling, with the Prince Royal in reserve at Rottenburg.

It may be true that the broken ground covered with woods prevented the Archduke from ascertaining the force in his front, but no praise is too high for the skill and prudence with which Davout made the best of his greatly inferior force[3] and by the vigor of his attacks caused the Archduke to fear lest the Austrians should be cut off from the Danube. Although Davout lost as heavily as the Archduke,[4] his audacity was such that early in the day he caused his bivouac fires to be lighted to show the enemy that he did not intend to give way one foot of the ground already gained.

One of the most important and skillful achievements that

1"Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 106.

2For a brief but thorough description of the distances, *vide ibid.*

3Davout had barely 30,000 men, to whom Lefébvre added 24,000, opposed to 91,500 Austrians.

4The Austrian losses were 11 officers and 415 men killed, 56 officers and 2,457 men wounded. "Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 106.

day was the change in the French line of operations. The concentric movement from Rohr on Landshut had, to be sure, made Napoleon master of the Archduke's lines,[1] yet his own were not as thoroughly assured as he desired, because the advance of Bellegarde across the Danube threatened them between Neustadt and Donauwörth. *One of the characteristics of his strategy was the singleness of the line of operations,*[2] *and he did not abandon his former line, but changed it, which is the ablest manoeuvre in war.*[3] At 3 a. m. he had caused Berthier to write from Rohr to General Moulin, the Governor of Augsburg, "to assure the army's route through Augsburg and Landshut by sending to Dachau a good corps and a good general, either the battalions of General Marion or the regiments of the Confederation. These troops will proceed to Munich when Jellachich evacuates it, and will guard the Isar as far as Freising. The Emperor is striking the last blow and everything takes the enemy away from Augsburg. * * *" Indeed, the last despatch sent off from Landshut next day, when the Emperor was leaving for Eckmühl, bore upon this important line, and was addressed to General Rouyer, commanding the Confederated troops at Ingolstadt:

"I inform you, General, that everything which is between Donauwörth and Vohburg is under your command. If there are unusual events, it is for you to arrange everything without awaiting orders. If the enemy breaks out in the direction of Donauwörth, all who are on the Danube will regain Ingolstadt—or Augsburg, if they have not time to reach Ingolstadt. You must not forget the troops which are at Neuburg; they will fall back on Ingolstadt first—or

1 "*The most advantageous direction of the lines of operations is that which permits an army to threaten the communications of the enemy without compromising its own.*" Derrécagaix, "Strategy," pp. 230-231.

2 Napoleon never operated except by a single line. Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. 2, p. 11.

3 "*He does not violate a second principle not less sacred, that of not abandoning his line of operations, but he changes it, which is considered as the ablest manœuvre taught by the art of war.*" Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 10th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 184.

finally on Augsburg, if they have not time to regain Ingolstadt." * * *[1]

Napoleon waited as usual until after midnight, when all the reports had been received, and at 2.30 a. m. wrote to Davout on the heights of Eckmühl:

"My Cousin:

"General Piré arrives.[2] *I have sent you General Oudinot with Tharreau's division and Boudet's division.* My movement on Landshut and the advanced-guard, which is already half way to the Inn, ought to decide the retreat of the enemy, who will probably hold to clear away his artillery. If it were otherwise and the enemy holds all day, and you should judge yourself able to hold your position or every other analogous position, and that a diversion of 25,000 men at Eckmühl would furnish favorable positions in order to get possession of that position which is in the rear of the enemy, you can so inform me. I can have your reply before 1 p. m., and I have already ordered General Vandamme, the divisions of Gudin and Friant, and the cuirassiers to be at Ergoldsbach before noon, with their advanced-guard at Neufahrn and on the little river of the Laber. Try to put yourself in communication with these troops by the peasants and by the cross-road.

"Finally, if you think your position untenable, you are free to take that which will suit you, *taking care merely to protect the communication which passes through Rohr, Rottenburg and Landshut, so that we can unite ourselves promptly.*[3] I wanted to give this letter to Piré, who has already gone. If you hear a cannonade on the side of Eckmühl, because it might be possible that the enemy had moved forward and

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1 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,109, tome 18, p. 497.

2 Piré brought Marshal Davout's report:

"To the Emperor and King:

"Heights of Eckmühl, April 21st, 1809, 7 p. m.

"Sire,—I am sending to Your Majesty General Piré, who, having seen everything, will have the honor to report to you on my position.

"My ammunition is all used up, and, whatever diligence may be exercised, I shall not have my park ready before to-morrow evening."

Vide Davout, Correspondance, tome 2, p. 487.

3 "*In order for an army to be ready to fight, it must be united.*" Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 5th observation, Correspondance, tome 29, p. 337.

Compare Hamley, p. 152. The italics are ours.

that there were an engagement, sustain it in whatever position you may be. As soon as the enemy will evacuate and make his retreat to return home, push him by putting Oudinot in the first line and your tired divisions in the second line. Napoleon."

An hour and a half later the following was added:

"P. S.—It is four o'clock. I have resolved to put myself on the march and shall be at Eckmühl at noon and ready to attack the enemy vigorously at three o'clock. I shall have with me 40,000 men. Send me *aides-de-camp* with Bavarian escorts to acquaint me with what you have done this morning. It seems to me that by taking (the road) either through Rohr or Rottenburg or Langquaid, they will not fear falling into the enemy's hands, because, as the inhabitants are on our side, they can conceal them.

"I shall be in person at Ergoldsbach before noon. If we hear the cannonade, that will tell me sufficiently that I must attack. If I do not hear it and you are in position to attack, have a salvo of ten guns fired at once at noon, an equal number at one o'clock and an equal number at two o'clock. My *aide-de-camp* Lebrun will leave at 4.15. I have decided to exterminate the army of Prince Charles to-day or at the latest to-morrow.

"This letter is for the Duke of Danzig; communicate it to him."[1]

In the interim Napoleon had the following "Orders dictated to the Major-General":

"Landshut, April 22nd, 1805. 3 a. m.

"Give the order to General Wrede to leave with his division and to support the movement of Marshal Bessières, who spent the night at Geisenhausen, so as to throw the enemy as far as one can onto the Inn. The Bavarian division will leave its present position at 4 a. m.

"Order the Duke of Rivoli to assemble between Landshut and Ergolding, in the plain, three of his divisions, their artillery, (and) Espagne's division. He will there assemble his divisions nearest here; it will be necessary that the first division can be assembled on the left bank at 6 a. m., so as to be able to leave at once. The Duke of Rivoli will put himself on the march with his three di-

[1] Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,104, tome 18, pp. 493-494.

visions to direct himself on Eckmühl and to surround the enemy; the Emperor will march with him. The Fourth Division will assemble at Landshut to guard the position and support, if need be, Marshal Bessières, who is between the Inn and the Isar with the Bavarian division and the light cavalry.

"Gudin's division will leave at 4 a. m. to reach Ergoldsbach at 9 o'clock.

"General Morand will leave at 5 a. m. to reach Martinshaun at 9 o'clock. Saint-Sulpice's cuirassiers will mount at 6 o'clock and follow the movement of Gudin's division. They will be under the orders of the Duke of Montebello.

"To General Rouyer: The Duke of Auerstädt having sent Boudet's division to Ingolstadt, it is sufficient to defend the Altmühl; however, His Majesty does not bother further about the Danube. If there are extraordinary circumstances, he must cut all the bridges and confine himself to guarding Ingolstadt."[1]

Marshal Lannes was informed that

"The Duke of Auerstädt is always fighting. General Vandamme has departed with the Würtemberg infantry and three regiments of light cavalry to march on Eckmühl. I desire you to leave so as to arrive at Ergoldsbach at 7 o'clock; you will take Saint-Sulpice's division in passing Essenbach. You will push the Würtembergers before you as far as Neufahrn, and even to the little river of Laber. Independently of the Würtembergers, and Saint-Sulpice's cuirassiers, you will have under your orders the divisions of Gudin and Morand.

"I shall move there myself as soon as possible. You will acquaint me with the news you will get from this side. You will choose a good position on the little river of the Laber. My intention is that, as soon as you have received news from Marshal Davout, you will march on Eckmühl and attack the enemy on all sides. I am having your movement supported by the Duke of Rivoli and his three divisions which have just arrived. Since the enemy is obstinate, he must be exterminated. *Have Gudin's di-*

[1] Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,105, tome 18, p. 495.

vision leave without losing a moment; these troops cannot start too quickly."[1]

The Emperor then turned his attention to the pursuit of the Austrian left wing, and at 3.30 a. m. wrote to Marshal Bessières:

"My Cousin:

"I know that you have arrived at Geisenhausen. I should desire to have reports on the enemy's force. The Bavarian division of General Wrede is going to join you. I shall leave to-day to surround the corps of the Austrian Army of Bohemia, which have come to Eckmühl. I shall have with me the Duke of Rivoli and three of his divisions, so that there remain to you General Wrede and the 4th division, in reserve before Landshut.

"P. S.—Evince a great deal of confidence in General Wrede."[2]

Later the final letter was sent to Davout:

"My Cousin:

"I have talked with General Piré and a quarter of an hour later I sent you one of my orderly officers. I am sending you my *aide-de-camp* Lebrun to inform you that I am directing on Eckmühl the divisions of Gudin and Morand, Saint-Sulpice's cuirassiers and a brigade of the Würtembergers. The Duke of Rivoli will follow with three divisions and Espagne's cuirassiers. *Concert with the Duke of Danzig upon what you ought to do in case of attack, in whatever position you may be, and arrange so that the divisions of Oudinot and Boudet may participate in the battle as well as the divisions of the Duke of Danzig*[3]—viz., two divisions of Bavarians and Demont's division. If Prince Charles remains to-day, and the position is attackable, I hope to attack him at 4 o'clock, above all if I hear you engaged. Send me by the cross-road some Bavarians who will come to join me and give me news of you. If there is a possibility of joining me, the Duke of Danzig may send a strong detachment to connect himself with me. The

1 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,106, pp. 495-496. The italics are ours.

2 *Ibid.*, No. 15,107, tome 18, p. 496.

3 The italics are ours. Note the observance of the "*General rule: When you wish to fight a battle, assemble all your forces. Do not neglect a single one; a battalion sometimes decides the day.*" *Supra*, p. 116.

Austrian army must be exterminated and the regiment which was captured avenged.[1] Napoleon."[2]

Meanwhile the Archduke, baffled for two entire days by Davout, had determined to take the offensive during Napoleon's absence on the Isar and, by throwing his right, strongly reinforced, on Abbach, to issue onto the French communications which he naturally presumed still remained along the southern bank of the Danube through Neustadt to Donauwörth.[3] He therefore ordered Kollowrath to cross the Danube and march to Abbach, preceded by Veczay (26,600);[4] the 2nd column under Lichtenstein to move at 1 p. m. through Weillohe on Peising (12,600); the 3rd column under Hohenzollern (8,000) at noon through Luckenpoint and Dinzling toward Peising; Rosenberg (12,400) was ordered to defend the position of Laichling during the attack by these columns, and if pressed to retire on Hausen to cover the left. The grenadiers (900) were formed up in columns in reserve, the cuirassiers (300) were placed at Thalmassing and Köfering, and Vukassovich with 5,800 (Hohenzollern's corps) remained to guard the defile of Eckmühl, under Rosenberg's orders. The army thus backed to Ratisbon faced west. The Archduke with 77,400 at his immediate disposition—while Bellegarde with 27,000 was on the opposite bank at Hemau—accordingly fully expected to be able to drive Davout back on Abensberg, but this determination—which would have been of

1The 65th, under Colonel Coutard, which had surrendered at Ratisbon.

2Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,108, tome 18, pp. 496-497.

3The wisdom of Napoleon's changing his line of operations was then manifest and the advantages of this able manœuvre fully reaped, since "*an army which changes its line of operations deceives the enemy, who no longer knows where are its rears and the delicate points by which he can threaten it.*" Napoleon, "Précis des Guerres de Frédéric II.," 10th observation, Correspondance, tome 32, p. 184.

4Kollowrath moved only 8 miles in the time in which Napoleon marched 22 that day.

inestimable advantage had it been carried out on the 19th[1] —was destined to produce only disaster.

A thick fog obscured the entire country until 8 a. m., and when it lifted, the opposing forces were discovered in very nearly the positions of the previous sunset. The enemy's advance toward Abbach raised the greatest apprehensions in the mind of Davout, who anxiously awaited the arrival of reinforcements, but the French line extending from near Abbach to the Laber (Lefébvre and Nansouty) spent the morning watching the slow movements of the Austrian columns made with the precision of parade. About noon Davout's heart was gladdened by the distant roar of guns in the direction of Landshut, which brought the welcome tidings of the arrival of Napoleon with the bulk of the army[2] on the enemy's extreme left, and he promptly ordered a general attack against the plateau.

The guns which Davout had heard were those of Vandamme's Würtembergers (12,000) preceding Lannes (19,000), Masséna (24,000) and Espagne's cuirassiers (1,600), a force of 56,600 men, which, added to those already in position, gave Napoleon a total of 105,000 as against 77,400 under the Archduke.

Vandamme promptly attacked Vukassovich and drove him from the villages of Buchhausen and Lintach on Rosenberg, who immediately sent to the Archduke for reinforcements and, retiring behind Laichling, posted troops on the heights of Eckmühl to cover the road to Ratisbon. After a short conference with his Marshals, Napoleon fixed upon the village of Eckmühl as the key which would unlock the road to Ratisbon, turn the Austrian left and cut it off

1Compare Jomini, "Grand Military Operations," Vol. 2, p. 453: *"It is not sufficient to bring about a good operation in war by bringing our masses skillfully to bear upon the most important point. It is necessary to know how to engage them there."*

2*"The force of an army, like the amount of movement in mechanics, is estimated as the mass multiplied by the rapidity."* Napoleon, "Observations sur les Campagnes de 1796 et 1797," 2nd observation, Correspondance, tome 29, pp. 327-328.



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from the lower Isar and the Danube, and under his own supervision made the Würtembergers storm the bridge and village. The Austrians fought with the utmost fury and several times repulsed the Würtembergers, during which Rosenberg moved his left to the wooded heights bordering the marshes of the Laber. If sufficient time could be gained to get up artillery and to occupy the woods and hills of Roking in the rear, the position could be made impregnable, and to prevent this Lannes sent forward his voltigeurs. They had halted at the edge of the stream to await Gudin when one of Masséna's *aides-de-camp*, Captain Pelet, put himself at their head and led them across the stream and up the heights, where they drove off the enemy and, seconded by Gudin, repulsed all attempts to retake this dominating position, and assisted the Würtembergers to carry Eckmühl.

On Gudin's left, Lannes decided to cross the Laber and to support the former's attacks against Vukassovich and Biber (St. Julien's division of Hohenzollern's corps) in the Roking wood, while the cavalry formed line between Schierling and Eckmühl—the Bavarians on the left, the Würtembergers in the centre, and the French on the right—and charged up the slopes. On the extreme left Davout had carried the strongly fortified village of the Unter-Laichling and the wood in the rear, protected by *abatis*, with Saint-Hilaire's division, and on his left Friant had driven the enemy back to Ober-Santing. Rosenberg had been forced to throw his left back at an angle in order to face toward Eckmühl as well as toward Laichling; his troops fought with splendid stubbornness, compelling Saint-Hilaire to his utmost efforts to obtain possession of the road of Laichling, while the cavalry by desperate charges succeeded in saving most of the guns. These accidents of the ground were such that the French and Bavarian attacks achieved no great result until the French cuirassiers, who had been directed to complete the discomfiture of the regiment of Stip-

sicz—in disorder behind Unter-Laichling—charged home so brilliantly that Lannes' troops on the heights stopped to applaud and cheer them.

Meanwhile the Archduke had ordered Kollowrath to retrograde from Abbach and take position between Isling and the Galgenberg under Ratisbon; Lichtenstein to move between Gebelkofen and Thalmassing, and Hohenzollern between the latter village and Santing, but this last corps was so deeply engaged with Friant that it could not be withdrawn until a gallant attack by the Ferdinand hussars had checked the French advance. The grenadiers were retired through Egglofsheim and Köfering, and a brigade of cuirassiers (Lichtenstein) posted before the Headquarters. The result of these dispositions was to place the army in echelons from Santing to Thalmassing and from Gebelkofen to Isling, in a column parallel to the high road, with the grenadiers far in the rear and the cuirassiers on the road. The battle had commenced by a series of isolated attacks on the part of the French, due entirely to the broken terrain; but when Napoleon observed this concentration about Ratisbon, he ordered Lannes, who had been placed at the decisive point, to push forward and to turn their left, and by his own presence animated this attack. This would in itself have been sufficient to overturn the Austrian line, but Davout had already contributed most puissantly and the Austrian infantry and cavalry had begun to retreat, abandoning there many of their pieces, which the heroic gunners defended until overpowered. Napoleon then ordered forward all his cavalry along the road to Ratisbon and directed a general advance of his entire line—Davout on the left through Santing, Lefébvre with the Bavarians and Demont on his right, the cavalry in the centre, and Lannes on the right through Pfakofen and Gailsbach, followed by Oudinot and Masséna, forming a powerful reserve, to the Laber.

In vain did the Austrians endeavor to stem their irresistible advance. Prince Rosenberg and his officers exposed themselves with the utmost fearlessness, and the splendid manner in which their men sustained the attacks of the entire French army for three hours when pressed in front and on both flanks, with but few reinforcements, must excite the greatest admiration. They were ultimately compelled to retire from Santing on Egglofsheim, covered by cavalry and artillery on the heights behind the defile of Höheberg. Instead of throwing a corps against Davout to check his advance and making a change of front on the centre, the Archduke, with his right toward Abbach and his left near Köfering, seems to have been much more concerned to save his troops than to gain the battle, and since many of his divisions were not put into action at all, there was a decided scarcity of reinforcements sent to those already engaged, in which respect no one was more neglected than the gallant Rosenberg. He held for some time the position of Höheberg, but the sloping ground to the west uncovered his left, and when the French line advanced, Rosenberg, despite his persistent attacks, turned on both flanks and overthrown in front, was forced to retreat through Hagelstadt beyond Egglofsheim, where another desperate stand was made.

As the French debouched from the various woods and copses, Napoleon re-formed his line at the edge of the vast plain which extends to the Danube, while the Archduke, to re-establish order among his confused infantry, echeloned it on the cross-roads under the protection of a last reserve of cuirassiers and hussars, formed up before Egglofsheim and supported by several infantry and some grenadier battalions. About 7 o'clock Napoleon directed his light cavalry forward and to the right, and supported it by the cuirassiers of Nansouty and Saint-Sulpice. A few charges were exchanged and the Austrians, who should have confined themselves to gaining time in order to cover the

retreat of the infantry and artillery, then attacked with the utmost fury. The French moved forward to meet them and a terrific fight ensued, lighted by the rising moon, until the exhausted Austrians broke and fled in greatest confusion, vigorously pursued by the cuirassiers, who rode through and over everything as far as Egglofsheim.[1] Close behind them was Napoleon with his Marshals, of whom Lannes proposed to follow the enemy to the Danube,[2] but the others objected because of the excessive fatigue of the troops—most of which had marched that morning from Landshut—the dangers of an engagement at night, the resoluteness which the enemy had begun to show and the resources of Ratisbon for an obstinate defense. Napoleon therefore decided to suspend all further advance, and ordered his hungry and weary troops to bivouac in a broad bow from Santing to the Danube, while he occupied himself the Archduke's Headquarters of Egglofsheim.

Thus ended the battle of Eckmühl, in which the Austrians lost 6,000 men, 5,000 prisoners and 12 guns, and the French about half that number.[3] So faulty were the Archduke's dispositions that he did not have more than 47,000 men engaged until the close of the battle, whereas Napoleon concentrated against him 105,000 men, of whom he employed 80,000 to defeat Charles, but did not find it necessary to bring into action at all the reserve, consisting of the corps of Masséna and Oudinot. This battle, while by no means of the first magnitude, is a masterpiece of resolution and manœuvres.

The situation of the Archduke was indeed critical; his

1The battle of Eckmühl definitely decided the long-debated question of the superiority of the double over the single cuirass. The Austrians wore the single breast-plate only, and when forced to retreat exposed their backs, whereas the French were completely protected by the double cuirass. The reports show that for every French trooper found dead on the battle-field there were 13 dead and 8 wounded among the Austrians—a veritable butchery.

2Compare Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 287.

3Compare "Oesterreichs Kriege seit 1495," p. 106.

troops were so fatigued, utterly discouraged, demoralized and weakened by the loss of the reserve parks and ammunition train at Landshut that in spite of the 80,000 men at his disposition he did not dare hazard a battle cooped up in the *cul-de-sac* formed by the Danube, with the chances of his being driven into the river by the irresistible and ubiquitous Napoleon. A second bridge was therefore thrown across just below the confluence of the Regen, and during the entire night his forces defiled with such expedition that at noon next day everything—troops, artillery, ammunition wagons—was safely on the left bank, with the exception of the cavalry left to cover the movement and General Floshei with 6 battalions to occupy Ratisbon. The French were amazed that morning to find the plain deserted except for the cavalry rear-guard which Napoleon ordered to be attacked at 9 a. m., while Masséna was directed on Straubing to seize the bridge and bar all retreat in that direction by both banks of the Danube.[1] The Austrian cavalry was soon routed and retreated toward the Abbach gate to draw off Lannes, but that Marshal reached the lower bridge in time to bring up his guns and to throw Lichtenstein's corps also into disorder as it crossed under the protection of artillery fire from the left bank and destroyed the bridges.

The Austrian rear-guard had got into Ratisbon and closed the gates, but when Napoleon arrived with Masséna and Davout he massed his artillery, formed a breach and ordered an assault, but, while consulting with Lannes in a very exposed position, he was slightly wounded in one heel and was obliged to remount to calm his anxious soldiers. Lannes directed his guns against one house at the edge of the *fosse*, and over the débris thus filling the ditch his *aides*, Marbot and Labedoyère, led one of the most brilliant assaults and escalades in history;[2] Ratisbon fell, and on the

1 Napoleon, Correspondance, No. 15,110, tome 18, pp. 497-498.

2 *Vide* Marbot, Mémoires, tome 2, pp. 128-138

morning of the 24th not one Austrian regiment remained south of the Danube and west of the Inn.

It is not our purpose here to follow the future operations in detail. The Archduke retreated precipitately into Bohemia, followed by Davout, while Napoleon sent Lefébvre to occupy Munich and himself pushed on through Landshut after Bessières, driving Hiller, Louis and Kienmayer before him. Davout was then withdrawn to follow the French army, which continued down the right bank through Braunau, Ebelsberg—where the Austrians endeavored in vain to check its advance (May 3rd)—to St. Poelten. Part of the Austrian left wing crossed to the right bank through Krems, whither the Archduke had advanced from Budweis on Linz, but, anticipated there and at Krems and finding both bridges destroyed, continued down the left bank. On May 13th Napoleon entered Vienna, and on the 19th attempted to cross through the island of Lobau in the face of the concentrated Austrian forces. The bloody battles of Aspern and Essling (May 21st and 22nd)—in which the intrepid Lannes was mortally wounded, to die a week later in awful agony—forced him to retreat into Lobau, which was converted into an entrenched camp on a scale of unprecedented magnitude, there to await the arrival of Prince Eugene from Italy. The Archduke John had signally defeated Eugene at Sacile on April 16th, but the French successes in Bavaria and consequent rapid advance down the Danube had forced him to retire into Hungary, followed by the Viceroy, who was thus enabled to join Napoleon on May 26th. On July 2nd the invariable concentration for battle was begun, "and never in modern times, probably never in the history of the world, was such precision witnessed in the movements of corps converging together from such distant quarters."[1] On the night of the 4th the French began to issue from Lobau, and on the 6th Napoleon, at the head of 180,000 men, fought the bloody battle of Wagram, which was followed

[1] Alison, Vol. III, pp. 244-245.

by the retreat of the Archduke Charles into Bohemia. The armistice of Znaim (July 12th) terminated hostilities, and the definitive Treaty of Vienna (October 14th) wrested from the Austrian Empire 50,000 square miles and more than 4,000,000 inhabitants.[1]

These successes were rendered possible only by the marvelous manœuvres terminating at Eckmühl and Ratisbon. In six days after arriving at Donauwörth, Napoleon had extricated his troops threatened with disaster, brought order out of chaos, withdrawn Davout from his dangerous isolation, concentrated on his own centre, separated and driven the Austrian left back to the Inn, gained possession of the enemy's communications, and had defeated the Archduke and forced him across the Danube.[2] In three days he had fought three successful pitched battles[3] and had killed, wounded or captured more than 24,000 men. This "Five Days' Campaign" is unique in history[4]—alone it would have sufficed to immortalize such consummate genius, for never was success more brilliant or decisive and never was it better deserved.[5] In his dying days at St. Helena the Emperor recurred with constant pride to the strategy of Eckmühl,[6] and in his own Commentaries declared that "The battle of Abensberg, the manœuvres of Landshut, and the battle of Eckmühl were the most brilliant and the ablest manœuvres of Napoleon."[7]

1Fyffe, Vol. 1, p. 430.

2"So rapid had been the movements that Napoleon's household had not been able to follow him, and that he had to live like a soldier, riding only borrowed horses." Ménéval, Vol. II., p. 210.

3In reward for his remarkable skill and gallant conduct, on November 28th, 1809, the Emperor bestowed upon Marshal Davout the title of "Prince of Eckmühl."

4"The most successful manœuvres that I ever executed, and upon which I congratulate myself the most, took place at Eckmühl, and were infinitely superior to those of Marengo and other campaigns before or since." O'Meara, "Napoléon en Exil," tome 2, p. 226.

5Jomini, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. III., p. 42.

6Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: The Last Phase," p. 212.

7Napoleon, "Notes sur le manuscrit venu de Sainte-Hélène," Correspondance, tome 31, p. 235. Also "Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre," *ibid.* p. 359: "His manœuvres of Eckmühl and of Landshut are his finest."


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
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